And so say all of us...

Investment experts Jim Rogers and Marc Faber agree with Jim Puplava that (a) the US will try to reflate out of its troubles, and (b) cutting interest rates to achieve this, will lead to worse trouble.

According to Bloomberg today, "Rogers said he is buying agricultural commodities and recommended investors purchase Asian currencies including the Chinese renminbi and the Japanese yen.

Faber, publisher of the Gloom, Boom & Doom Report, said he is buying gold."

DOW 9,000 update

At the time of writing, the Dow stands at 13,493 and gold at $713.70/oz. Adjusted for the change in the price of gold, the Dow has fallen by just over 10% since July 6.

Puplava: this isn't the big one

I'm a bit behind on my listening to Financial Sense Newshour, but as ever, the issues we're talking about aren't momentary. Jim Puplava's view (8 September) is that this crisis isn't the big one: the US will reflate its way out. It can't do that on its own without sacrificing the dollar, so (as has been happening for a long time) there will be cooperation with other nations' central banks. In effect, we are in an international currency inflation cartel, since no trading nation wants a hard currency that leaves its industries high and dry.

But, says Jim, the next recovery will be shorter, and the next fall back much worse. He sees this as happening around 2009/2010, which coincides with the time of Peak Oil, in which he is a big believer. That's when he feels the energy and credit crunches may come together. He sees gold and silver soaring to levels that currently seem fantastic.

For us ordinary people, that may be less interesting than the effects of energy shortage on our daily transportation and domestic heating.

The outlook from Financial Sense

Some voices and topics from Financial Sense, 25 August:

inflation, deflation, gold, cash...

Jim Puplava: ...I've had Bob Prechter on this program and Bob is a deflationist and Bob believes that we get deflation first and then hyperinflation where I guess my views are we get hyperinflation and then what follows will be deflation. And that's the way it has unfolded with great debtor nations. And I think history will repeat itself here with the US. There is too much debt here and it has to be inflated away...

...I really believe that the full force of these storms aren't going to hit until somewhere between 2009 and 2010 when this really comes home to roost. And all of these debt problems, the problems that we have with energy today, availability, peak oil, the geopolitical problems in the Middle East – I do not expect the next decade to be a pleasant one, John. I wish I could say otherwise because as a father with three children, one to get married shortly and looking forward to grandchildren, you know, this is something that you don't like to think about...

credit bubble, credit crunch, commodities, East delinking from West...

Doug Noland: ...the economy is much more vulnerable than many believe because of the credit that was going to the upper end; and I think the upper end mortgage area is where we had the greatest excesses.

So I think when all is said and done, subprime losses are going to be small compared to the losses we see in jumbo and Alt-A, and especially, unfortunately out in California...

...there’s desperation out there to find buyers for mortgages... Washington generally doesn’t understand the risk of Fannie and Freddie [US government-sponsored entities - "GSEs" - that offer mortgages], so of course they would think it’s their role to step in and provide the liquidity.

But... their total exposure is over 4 trillion dollars now. And this is a huge problem, and I fully expect down the road these institutions to be nationalized. And I think the US taxpayer is going to pay a huge bill for this... To be honest, I don’t mind the GSEs if they want to play a role in affordable housing; if they wanted to try to rectify some of the problems at the lower end because of the lack of the availability of credit in subprime. But to think that the GSEs should start doing jumbo mortgages, to try to be the buyer of last resort for California mortgages, my God, it’s hard to believe that makes sense to anyone because that’s just a potential disaster. It’s also reminiscent of the S&L – the Savings and Loan problem that, you know, was a several billion dollar problem during the 80s that they allowed to grow to several hundred billion by the early 90s. And definitely, the tab of the GSEs is growing rapidly right now...

...even if the central banks add a trillion dollars of liquidity to help out this deleveraging we still have this issue of how are we going to generate the trillions of additional credit going forward to keep incomes levitated, to keep corporation earnings levitated, to keep asset prices levitated, to keep the global economy chugging along...

...The global economy may be something of a different story because we have credit bubbles all over the world. Like the Chinese bubble right now is pretty much oblivious to what’s going on in the US and in Europe. You can see a scenario where, you know, you have serious credit breakdown but let’s say Chinese demand keeps energy and resource prices higher than one would expect. So I’m going to be watching this very carefully because we’re going to see some very unusual dynamics as far as liquidity and inflation effects between different asset classes and different types of price levels throughout the economy.

Jim Puplava's interview with Richard Bookstaber

Richard Bookstaber's interview on Financial Sense (21 July - audio file) was interesting. He discussed the derivatives market (which is the subject of his book, "A demon of our own design"), in which he has been intimately involved. It's a long interview and I'll just pick out one or two points.

Derivatives are financial bets. Portfolio managers use them as a kind of insurance, which then means that they can safely (they think!) increase their exposure to equities.

But derivatives are complex, and can have unexpected effects. For example, in October 1987 there was a sizeable drop in the stockmarket, and as the prices went down, automated trading programs noted the crossing of pre-set thresholds and this triggered more selling, which took the market below other programmed thresholds, and so on.

Also, to work properly, the derivatives market needs to be "liquid and efficient". Well, when the major turmoil was happening as just described, people held off buying back in - the scale had scared them. So they weren't doing what the system expected them to do, and this change in behaviour meant that there was less support at certain price levels than the system assumed.

Another way in which the system became inefficient at greatest need, was that certain classes of asset behaved in an untypical fashion. For example, normally bonds move together, and in the opposite direction to equities; but in 1987, when it looked like major disaster, poorer-quality bonds fell as though they were equities (because of fear of their defaulting), whereas Treasury bonds (backed by the government) rose.

I have heard that in times of stress, people make unusual mistakes, such as confusing left and right, and it seems that the derivatives market has similar potential in extreme situations. You can't tell how people will react under great pressure.

Then there's "black swan" events that haven't been factored-in, but can still happen, such as Russia's decision to default on its loans, which very nearly did for Long Term Credit Management and much more besides.

On top of that, there's the question of leverage, i.e. borrowing that greatly increases the risk and returns of an investment. The current debacle re mortgages packaged as interest-yielding investments stems from the fact that not only are the packages leveraged by a factor of 10 or 20 to 1, but the hedge funds that bought them might themselves be leveraged by a factor of 5, so magnifying the basic risk of sub-prime lending by a multiple of 50 or 100. So when things go wrong, they really go wrong. As we now see.

There is also the question of inadequate information about derivatives. The method of accounting was originally developed to track rolling stock for railways, not for super-fast, computer-based trading. The data available may not be what you need to assess the situation properly, and will almost certainly be out of date in the moment-to-moment market changes. Bookstaber thinks we need to use modern technologies to get the right data out of the system fast enough to make sensible decisions.

And in assessing risk, people's memories are too short. Fund managers may be too young to remember really bad times like 1989-91, so run the risk of complacency.

Speaking of age, there's a demographic risk, too: the baby-boomers are coming to the point where they'll want money out for retirement, and maybe the market hasn't fully realised this change in the financial climate. It could be a "slow burn" crisis like the one that hit Japan, lasting maybe 15 or 20 years.

Now, many of these periods of turbulence probably don't impact on the individual investor, says Bookstaber; the private investor should buy and hold, not panic.

However, a systemic risk that could have really serious consequences is the possibility of a major failure in the mortgage and credit markets, which could then roll on to the banking sector.
Yet again, we're back to the banks, credit and the money supply. How ever did we come to think of bankers as responsible people!

Anyhow, listen to the audio file and see if I've represented it fairly. And buy the book if you think it's relevant to your line of work or investment.

Puplava on inflation, commodities

Financial Sense, July 14: Jim Puplava discusses inflation figures and the management of our perceptions of inflation.

The effects of expanding the money supply must, he feels, eventually spill over from assets to consumer prices. He sees three scenarios:

1. A credit contraction, leading to recession.
2. An inadequate credit expansion, resulting in consumer price inflation.
3. A change in public perception of inflation. If people expect their money to become progressively worthless, they will eventually try to get rid of it as fast as possible, in exchange for tangible things.

Conclusions:

• Cut unnecessary living expenses, shop smarter.
• Avoid bonds.
• Because there is no sign of (1) or (2) above happening, we are heading for a US hyperinflationary depression, perhaps starting around the same time as the oil crisis, i.e. 2009. So invest in tangibles: gold, silver, oil.

By the way - some thought-provoking replies to listeners:

• Puplava agrees that Israel may be sitting on a valuable oil field!
• He says creditor nations in Asia may have a deflationary depression, while ours will be inflationary.
• He notes that Iran now demands payment from Japan in yen, not US dollars.

Puplava on debt and credit

Financial Sense, 14 July: Jim Puplava notes that there is a US credit contraction underway. Real incomes are falling by 6% per year; bank credit is going down; the quality of loans is worsening.

Consumers appear to loading up their credit cards to maintain living standards, but this is more expensive than mortgages; the Federal Reserve is buying Treasury bonds to keep the interest rates down, hoping to prevent a real estate recession from becoming a depression.

Consequently, Puplava anticipates lower discretionary spending and a cut in interest rates by the end of the year.

Puplava on the coming oil crisis

Jim Puplava's Financial Sense, 14 July (3rd hour transcript): this leads with the coming energy crisis, especially in oil. Puplava's programme features an interview with Basil Gelpke, who has made a documentary on oil called "A Crude Awakening".

Demand is rising, and will continue to do so even if there is a world economic slowdown, because the developing world aspires to Western standards of living; supply is not keeping pace, as exploration and extraction become more difficult and expensive. R&D in alternatives has been inadequate. The crunch could start as early as 2009.

Jim draws two broad conclusions:

1. Prepare to live in a world where energy is much more expensive. There are obvious implications for your transportation and housing.
2. Invest in energy stocks.

How long can Japan power world stockmarkets?

An interesting audio file of Gary Dorsch (Global Money Trends, Sir Chartsalot) being interviewed by Jim Puplava (Financial Sense) on 16 June.

He notes UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (i.e. finance minister) Gordon Brown's denial that increases in the money supply are closely correlated with inflation, and says that this is why governments around the world don't raise interest rates fast enough and high enough. (Now that Gordon Brown is Prime Minister, I don't expect a sudden change of heart.)

Dorsch also notes that foreigners are becoming reluctant to keep pumping cash into US Treasury bonds, and bond yields are rising. He regards the yield on the 10-year bond as critical for housing and stockmarket valuations.

He also notes that Japan is resisting rises on its own 10-year bond yield, for fear of a strengthening yen and weakening trade balance; but the rate (c. 2%) is still so incredibly low that traders are borrowing vast sums (the Japanese have $7.5 trillion in bonds, I think Dorsch stated) to invest in global equities. So until there is a significant hike, the "carry trade" will continue to help inflate stocks. He wonders whether at some point, "bond vigilantes" will have enough strength to force an interest rate rise.

Meanwhile, Dorsch notes growing interest in commodities. He likes producing countries such as Canada, Australia and Brazil, and thinks that the ever-growing demand for base metals and energy (especially oil) from China and India will bear them up on the tide.

Puplava on the commodities bull market

Jim Puplava's Financial Sense Newshour, July 7: having discussed what he sees as a long bull market in energy, Puplava turns to other commodities such as gold and silver: "the best protection in inflation has always been gold and silver, which represents real money". He sees a new "leg up" in the market within 3 to 6 months, because of the continuing inflationary expansion of money and credit. Another factor will be A&M - "junior producers" being acquired or merged to achieve economies of scale.

So as a hedge against inflation for the small investor, he recommends regular savings into a mutual fund in energy and precious metals, or even commodity ETFs (exchange traded funds) in energy and food.

Puplava on value investing

Jim Puplava's Financial Sense Newshour, July 7: to get rich slowly but surely, invest in companies that pay high dividends.

Puplava quotes research showing that over 100 years, the stockmarket has grown by 5.4% per annum, but reinvesting the dividends raises the return to 10.1% p.a. Over a long period, this margin compounds up impressively.

Features he suggests you look for:

• a low P/E ratio (i.e. a high dividend proportionate to share price)
• essential industries - companies that make things people need constantly or frequently (e.g. energy, consumer staples)
• companies that have a record of increasing dividends over the years
• larger, more mature companies - ones that have gotten past the stage of having to plough back most of their profits into R&D
• strong cash flow and earnings growth
• good management and solid corporate governance

In response to a listener's question, Puplava opines that the utility sector is currently "grossly overvalued", but says there may be reasonably-priced shares available in oil and consumer product companies.

Puplava on the energy market

Financial Sense Newshour, July 7: Jim Puplava sees a long bull market in energy.

This is because there is a long-term upward trend in demand. In the West, we use more devices in the home - and in the US, new homes are actually getting bigger, requiring more energy for space heating; and in the developing world, people are keen to join the consumer lifestyle - "Next year, emerging market energy demand will surpass industrialized countries' energy demand for the first time in history". Meanwhile, extraction costs are rising.

Puplava sees 3 themes in relation to the energy market:

• efficiency
• new types of transportation (e.g. hybrids), or more use of old types (e.g. railways, barges)
• substitute fuels (e.g. ethanol) / alternative energy resources (especially nuclear, solar and wind)

Puplava on subprime lending

For the time-challenged, I propose to highlight sections of Jim Puplava's Newshour. "Financial Sense" is what it says on the tin and I plan to make this a regular read/listen. Working off the transcript for July 7 (and that's another very laudable feature of his service), here is my interpretation of some points he makes about the subprime crisis:

The real sting of subprime defaults is in how they may affect the credit ratings of CDOs (Collateralised Debt Obligations, i.e. mortgages grouped together and sold on as interest-yielding investments). Some major institutional investors, including pension funds, have bought CDOs, but are required NOT to hold any bonds below "investment grade". So if these CDOs drop below a "BBB" rating, the fund managers will be forced to sell, and if there is a wholesale selloff there will be a sharp drop in the price.

Also, the hedge funds that invest in CDOs may have borrowed 10-20 times the value of their capital, to multiply their investments. The margin of safety is thin and a relatively small loss could trigger a cash call. So although Federal Reserve officials are correct in saying that subprime debt is only a small proportion of the lending market, this borrowing-to-invest vastly magnifies the problems.

Another complication is that credit ratings don't mean the same thing for all types of bond. Over the last decade or two, "BBB" rated corporate bonds have had a default rate of 2.2%, but BBB-rated CDOs have a 24% default rate. Do all investment managers fully realise this?

There is over $200 billion in subprime bonds that need to be re-rated, but rating firms are putting off the evil day. One reason for the delay is that the ratings people have a conflict of interest. It seems that many were involved in designing the CDOs in the first place, so if a re-rating happens soon, awkward questions will be asked and reputations shredded. There might even be litigation for damages. Meanwhile, Puplava speculates, the government itself might wish to encourage a more gradual unfolding of the bad news, to prevent the avalanche.

Listen to Financial Sense!

Click here for the transcript of July 7's edition of Jim Puplava's Financial Sense Newshour. This is a wide-ranging overview, from subprime loans to commodity investing and listeners' queries.