Is now a good time to invest?

I've just been asked by a client whether he should switch from cash to equities. Here's my view, and it may explain why I haven't earned much from investments over the last few years:

It is not possible to predict the market with any accuracy, but I think I have done well in foretelling the current state of affairs as early as the late 1990s. The market has dropped to half its 1999 peak (again, as it did in 2003), but that is not to say we are now at the bottom. Some (and I am moderately persuaded to this view) think that there may be a "bear market rally" soon-ish - maybe a rise that recovers perhaps 50% of the losses so far - but it is perfectly possible that the underlying trend is still downwards, so there may then be a horrid lurch towards - what? Maybe, ultimately, 4,000 on the Dow and 2,000 on the FTSE.

We are in the middle of an exciting ride and I fear that entering the market at this stage may still be for the adventurous and nimble. Yes, had one invested in mid-2003 and got out, say, late 2007, it would have turned a nice profit; but much depends on the entry and exit points. So as ever, attitude to risk and corresponding watchfulness are key factors.

There is also the question of what asset class to choose. I think domestic and commercial property are still overvalued, relative to income; because of fears regarding other assets, and also because of central bank investment ("quantitative easing" etc) government bonds are very highly priced, which is why the yields are so low (and if interest rates rise, bond values could then drop sharply); equities are depressed, but as dividends decline in very testing economic conditions, they may ultimately be depressed still further. Commodities (e.g. gold, silver, oil) are the subject of some speculation, but owing to shortage of borrowed money to invest with, not quite so much institutional speculation as formerly; even so, gold (for instance) is a bit above its long-term inflation-adjusted average, as far as I can tell - though if inflation takes off, the price could indeed escalate.

And then there is the question of currencies. The pound has lost heavily against the dollar; but some say the dollar may catch us up again. The Euro may also not stay as strong as it is now - several countries within the Eurozone are suffering economic problems and are hampered by the common currency; I have even read speculation that the Euro system may fall apart within a decade, or some states may secede from it.

In short, I still urge caution, and if you do decide to get in, be prepared to move quickly if the market should turn. Meantime, there are relatively safe options such as National Savings Certificates, including the index-linked ones that will at least keep the value of your savings roughly in line with RPI...

Murphy: raise interest rates!

A striking article by Robert Murphy on Mises today, about the earlier Depression of 1920-21, and how raising interest rates was the painful, but quick way out.

"... the high rates of the 1920–1921 depression had certainly been painful, but they had cleaned the rot out of the structure of production very thoroughly....Going into 1923, the capital structure in the United States was a lean, mean, producing machine."

Time for another Jubilee

Karl Denninger elegantly demonstrates that compound interest on debt will always tend to blow up the economy, if the interest rate x is more than y (the average rate of economic growth) + z (the average rate of default).

Lenders will try to achieve this blessed state of affairs, but if they succeed, they will eventually end up owning everything, and the system will go "pop" long before that point. Which is why the Bible talks about a Jubilee year of total debt forgiveness, occurring every half-century.

Getting governments to take over all bad debts interferes with that reset, and so the "pop" must be louder when it finally, inevitably happens.

What will happen to interest rates?

Jim in San Marcos envisages eventual interest rate rises worldwide, to 10-15%. Commenting on the preceding post, Nikolay disagrees and James asks the question. I'm trying to understand the situation, like everyone else, so I'll have a go at thinking aloud:

Nikolay makes the point that people are becoming more concerned about the return OF their money, than the interest ON their money. So money-holders will limit demand for their cash by being picky about who they'll lend it to; control by quality screening, not by price.

Also, if people who habitually live on credit become frightened - and I think they are - then they will start trying to live within their means.

And discretionary expenditure could be reduced and/or redirected, not necessarily towards the cheapest end. I was listening to someone in the UK fashion industry on R4 yesterday, and they said far from everyone turning to Primark, the trend was to buy better quality, less of it, and make it last longer. Note that it's budget airlines like XL (competing on price) that are in danger of going down - they don't have much "fat to survive the winter".

From another angle, as the supply of cash and credit is dwindling, so are prices of houses and many other big-ticket items - look at the deals on cars and computers.

So it's possible to imagine that the contraction in credit may be approximately matched by a contraction in demand for credit, at least for a time. Bankruptcies and house repossessions will burn off a lot of debt, so we'll see a lot of ordinary people cleaned out and possibly more bank failures, especially as (in response to reduced expenditure) unemployment grows.

Thus we could see a recession in which the government tries to stimulate consumer demand by cutting interest rates - and this may not work, because many won't want (or be able to afford) to take on debt at any price; and those who do have cash and are watching prices fall, will hang off, waiting for further falls - as happened in Japan.

But Jim himself has acknowledged that rates may be cut in the short term. What about the longer term?

More unemployment, lower profits etc will shrink the tax base and increase the benefit burden. The budget won't balance without cuts in the public pay sector (= even less tax, even more benefits) or more government borrowing - I don't see how we in the UK could be taxed much more. So there's a danger that while consumer debt leads the way into recession, increased government demand for debt (and increased concern about government creditworthiness) may then lead the way to higher interest rates on State bonds.

When the State has more dependents, it will also find that not everything is going down in price. Food and fuel are must-haves, so benefits will have to be increased to cover the cost of such items. There will be more poor, and they will each need more. And the government will have to borrow more.

Or start devaluing the currency. Then all bets are off.

So here's a scenario: interest rates kept low, or cut; then government borrowing rises, while the economy burrows into a slump; then the real "credit crunch": the moment when the government, like an ad-man under pressure, needs a feelgood episode and, despite having sworn off it for life, reaches for the booze or the white powder, in this case inflation.

More and more, Michael Panzer's dire financial drama seems plausible.

Forgive us our debts, Part 2

A very stimulating response from "Caronte" to the earlier post on debt reduction, so I've taken the liberty to bring the argument out front here.

Caronte, you say:

Suppose it is believed with absolute certainty that every 50 years, say every year divisible by 50, all debts are forgiven. There would follow a bunching of loan demand as the forgiveness date nears, while willing lenders would simultaneously vanish. The market would no longer match credit demand and supply, total welfare would suffer. Debt forgiveness would only avoid this problem if it was done by stealth, unpredictably, once and for all and never again. Like forgiveness of tax evasion or illegal buildings. Difficult to persuade debtors, (or builders, or taxpayers), that forgiveness would not occur again. Lots of people would be encouraged to borrow beyond what they can afford (or evade tax) – the moral hazard implication. Unsustainable indebtedness would multiply rather than disappear. Moreover, a defaulting borrower does not need forgiveness if she genuinely cannot pay: can’t pay, won’t pay, period. If the defaulting borrower has some residual wealth, though less than the outstanding loan, who is to deprive the creditor of that? What legal or moral right would support state action without creditor compensation?

Would “debt cancellation (or rather, reduction) … be a suitable punishment for the principal offender”? True: “the relationship between mortgage lender and borrower is unequal. You have to live somewhere, and if you don't buy, you have to rent - and rents will tend to reflect the purchase price of houses.” No more than the relationship between employer and worker. There are various way to reduce this inequality, workers can form Trades Unions and cooperatives, and borrowers can found building societies – until New Labour wickedly de-mutualised i.e. privatised this form of social property which was not theirs to privatise. But the main reduction of the inequality comes from competition among lenders (and among employers).

“By adjusting the ratio of deposits to loans as it suits them, lenders can multiply the money supply”. True, there is a credit multiplier at work when banks re-lend their deposits and get some new deposits as a result. If they were prevented from re-lending – by law or by contract – they would act solely as custodians (as in the early days of gold-money) and would charge depositors for the service instead of paying interest. And any act of individual saving would instantly reduce total demand by the same amount and cause unemployment. Besides, the ratio of deposits to loans is regulated by law and is variable at will only when it is higher than a prudential limit. And banks face the consequences of their bad loans, they can go bankrupt and their shareholders can lose all their capital. That’s punishment enough. As long as they are competitive, there is not much of a reason to “punish” them by forcing them to remit those bad loans that still have a residual market value.

“Rather than prop up the worst of the lenders, let them go down. Why should the taxpayer assume the burden?” Absolutely right. “Pay off the depositors” – if the bank can, or if there is a state guarantee. But why “shrink the lending book” by debt remission? If mistakes are always to be automatically corrected ex-post when they are revealed as such, the market disappears and with it all the conceivable advantages that it brings.

An Australian economist whose name now escapes me once wrote an article mocking the theory of general economic equilibrium – with its complete system of futures markets – by imagining a system of “past” markets in which economic agents could undo their past transactions that with the benefit of hindsight turned out to be a mistake. Just imagine. Debt remission would have some of the same effects.

I say:

Caronte, welcome, and many thanks for the length and thoughtfulness of your response. I don't pretend to have your economic expertise, but I still think there's a debate to be had. I'll try to tackle some of your points, not necessarily in strict order.

I suppose that in ancient Israel, the economy was not so monetised as today, so the advent of the year of Jubilee may not have been so disruptive as it would today. I don't really advocate a periodic debt cancellation - though I'm beginning to wonder about the necessity of charging interest. (Isn't it the case that some Swiss banks do in fact charge you for looking after your money securely, instead of making investments with it or lending it out to others?)

Competition between lenders may help keep down interest rates, but it's the ballooning of asset prices - and the consequent increase in the size of mortgage required - that causes the damage. So many are now locked into monster mortgages that a significant rise in interest rates - which otherwise might be appropriate for tackling inflation - is politically very unfeasible.

I argue that the price of houses is pretty much beyond the buyer's control, except that there's a point where a purchase is either not affordable (we seem to have reached that stage) or, as with subprime, fudged at the outset with disastrous consequences later. So I suggest the expansion of credit (for which, as you say, regulators also share responsibility), and the terms set by fee-hungry lenders and intermediaries, are more to blame than the family that wants a roof over its head it can call its own. Finance for cars and consumer goods is something else; a house is a necessity, and surely, owning one is not an unreasonable aspiration.

Banks should be, but are not being made to face the consequences - look how governments are propping-up Northern Rock and Bear Stearns.

Debt reduction does not seem unreasonable to me. If a life insurance company fails, the book of life business can be passed on to another provider, who is only required to underwrite 90% of the outstanding life cover. So why not for lenders who (through greed and stupidity) have gotten their sums wrong? A 10% reduction in the capital only represents a couple of years' interest. Better a borrower who repays a reasonable proportion of the loan, plus interest, than simply mail back the keys and leave the bank with illiquid stock it doesn't know how to manage.

This is not a problem limited to a single bank -and anyway, there are far fewer these days, and they are much larger, so one failure could really rock the boat. At worst, we could now be facing the prospect of mass bankruptcy, the crash of the credit system and general economic carnage. It's worth coming up with some fudge to keep borrowers and lenders going.

Here in the UK, you can enter an agreement with creditors and as long as you keep up the scheduled payments, interest charging stops altogether. Maybe that would be another way forward - the monthly repayment would be lower and the borrower would see his equity in the house increase over time.

We've been watching enslavement by money-owners who have been licensed to print almost unlimited amounts of their own money, but the poor man only feels it going past and can save none, so remains in debt-bondage. Better any reasonable rearrangement, than "I owe my soul to the company store".

Some interesting correlations

Greg Silberman reveals the results of some interesting research:

1. Since 2003, if the dollar falls, all other asset classes rise; and conversely, if the dollar rises, the rest drops.

2. The "real" (adjusted for the price of gold) interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills predicts movements in the exchange rate of the dollar a year later.

Since the "real" interest rate has fallen sharply, he therefore expects a strengthening in other assets next year.

Modestly, Silberman adds, "Correlations are never perfect and tend to fail just when you need them most."

I think he's right there. To me, there seems to be a lot of jiggery-pokery in the gold market (speculators vs. central banks), and the predominance of "fiduciary money" (credit) in the economy means that we're measuring sizes with elastic bands.

In times of stress, the normal predictors don't hold, so currently I view all investments as speculative. My first priority is to reduce my vulnerability with respect to creditors, and my second is building cash to take advantage of emerging opportunities.

Stockmarket crash on the way?

Clearly, The Contrarian Investor (2 Dec) thinks it's a possibility. So does Frank Barbera, who looks at the jaded market response to interest rate cuts and says:

All investors take heed, you are staring at a market that is NOT responding well to “Good News.” Markets that cannot rally on Good News tend to accelerate downward on any type of bad news, and that is the kind of market which appears to be taking shape.

The Fed may trigger off a run on Treasury bonds, says Wallenwein

Alex Wallenwein thinks the Fed will curb its impulse to drop interest rates as much as people want, because of its fear of inflation. He expects it will backfire when people figure this out.

Wallenwein suspects that the Fed has been buying longer-term US Treasury bonds to sustain demand and so keep interest rates low, but he thinks that once others scent the Fed's fear, there will be a massive dump that will throw more on the market than the Fed can mop up. This, he thinks, will send longer-term interest rates soaring.

His conclusion is that gold will perform its usual function of a safe haven in times of uncertainty.

As I pointed out this summer, the UK has (fairly recently) become the third-largest holder of US Treasury bonds.

Why the sea is salt, and why we are drowning in cash

We are said to be heading for a recession, so I had another look at Bank of England statistics for M4 - money supply as measured by private lending by financial institutions.

Since June 1963, there has NEVER been a quarterly period when M4 contracted. In fact, here are the only times in the last 44 years when UK quarterly monetary inflation ran at less than 5% p.a. equivalent:

As you see, mostly it was the nineties, with one instance in 1975 and three times in the sixties. The average rate for the whole series up to December 2006 is 13.47%. So the hand-mill never stops grinding.

But should it? Wikipedia gives an account of recession and the Great American Depression, and notes that during the latter period the money supply contracted by a third. Great for money-holders, bad for the economy and jobs.

This page points out that we tend (wrongly) to think of a period of economic slowdown as a recession, and says that technically, recession is defined as two successive quarters of negative economic growth. By that measure, we haven't had a recession in the UK (unlike Germany) for about 15 years - here's a graph of the last few years (source):

And then there's the stockmarket. It doesn't seem to reflect the real state of the economy - until you shift the lines, when for example the S&P 500 turns out to be a fair predictor of changes in GDP, as shown in a graph in a 2005 entry from this blog ("Capital Chronicle", by RJH Adams):

The same post also provides a brilliant graph of a measure of fair value for investors, known as Tobin's Q. Look at the wonderful opportunities presented by two world wars and the economic shock (blamed on oil prices, but maybe the causality is the wrong way round) of the 70s:

Mind you, looking at Wikipedia's Tobin's Q graph, the median market valuation since 1900 seems to be something like only 70% of the worth of a company's assets. Can that be right? Or should we take the short-sighted view of some accountants and sell off everything that might show a quick profit?

Nevertheless, it still feels to me (yes, "finance with feeling", I'm afraid) as though the markets are over-high, even after taking account of the effects of monetary inflation on the price of shares. And debt has mounted up so far that a cutback by consumers could be what finally makes the economy turn down. Not just American consumers: here is a Daily Telegraph article from August 24th, stating that for the first time, personal borrowing in the UK has exceeded GDP.

The big question, asked so often now, is whether determined grinding-out of money and credit can stave off a vicious contraction like that of the Great Depression. Many commentators point out that although interest rates are declining again, the actual interest charged to the public is not falling - lenders are using the difference to cover what they perceive as increased risk. Maybe further interest rate cuts will be used in the same way and keep the lenders willing to finance the status quo.

Some might say that this perpetuates the financial irresponsibility of governments and consumers, but sometimes it's better to defer the "proper sorting-out" demanded by economic purists and zealots. History suggests it: in the 16th century, if Elizabeth I had listened to one party or another in Parliament, we'd have thrown in our lot with either France or Spain - and been drawn into a major war with the other. We sidestepped the worst effects of the Thirty Years' War, and even benefited from an influx of skilled workers fleeing the chaos on the Continent. If only we could have prevented the clash of authoritarians and rebellious Puritans for long enough, maybe we'd have avoided the Civil War, too.

So perhaps we shouldn't be quite so unyielding in our criticisms of central bankers who try to fudge their - and our - way out of total disaster.

Pioneer work ahead

Nigel Maund (November 5, republished in SafeHaven Nov. 12), after a florid beginning, concludes that gold must rise and the dollar must be defended with heavy interest rate rises:

...gold's great bull market will be the harbinger of a major global recession or, more probably, a depression brought on by a sequence of massive defensive interest rate rises required to support the dollar in its pre-eminent position as a global currency, with all the benefits, political and economic, that this brings to the USA.

That's the way to do it (not)

Punch and Judy Bank

An interesting article by Tim Wood in SafeHaven yesterday, in which he argues that the market is too big to manipulate. According to him, interest rates and market movements are largely unrelated and operate on separate cycles.

The Clashing Rocks

Martin Hutchinson (Money Morning, today) sees the Fed caught between a rock and a hard place: as the dollar drops, oil and commodity prices go up and so American inflation worsens; if the dollar is supported by higher interest rates, the already-frail housing market stalls and maybe dives.

It's said that the Chinese pictogram for "crisis" combines the ideas of "threat" and "opportunity". Hutchinson offers ideas for those who want to take advantage: invest in...

• Japan
• gold
• natural resources
• Canadian oil
• - and a Korean bank.

Another snort to keep going

Chris Ciovacco in SafeHaven today reads the historical charts and concludes that recent multiple Federal Reserve rate cuts are slightly bullish indicators:

... From my perspective, almost all the items above slightly favor the reflation trade over gloom-and-doom. However, the edge is small enough to remain diversified while keeping a close eye on the stock market's 50 and 200-day moving averages.

This would chime with Jim Puplava's assessment that "more of the same" will buy us a little more time until the system is exhausted, which he expects to happen around 2009 onwards.

Dollars, gold and words

A couple of useful items from Financial Sense:

Gary Dorsch (October 18) explains that a falling dollar helps the S&P 500, "which earn roughly 44% of their revenue from overseas, mostly in Euros", and supports house prices in the US; but it also raises the price of oil, gold and agricultural commodities. While the US seems set to cut rates further, the Eurozone may raise theirs to control inflation. In five years, the Brazilian real has doubled against the dollar! Oh, to have been a currency trader.

Meanwhile, Doug Galland at Casey Research explains that gold was dipping together with shares, because institutional investors were scrambling for cash in the unfolding credit crisis. His view is that in the longer term, these sectors will diverge and gold will soar. He supplies an eloquently simple graph:

Speaking of eloquence, financial writers know their business but many need to hone their writing, so I propose a new prize: Sackerson's Prose Trophy. The first winner is Doug Galland, with the following simile:

Though admittedly impatient to see the gold show get on the road, we were largely unconcerned by gold’s behavior. That’s because our eyes remained firmly fixed on the perfect trap set over the years for Bernanke’s Fed.

Like hunters of antiquity watching large prey grazing toward a large covered pit, the bottom of which is decorated with sharpened sticks, we watched the handsomely attired and well-groomed Bernanke and friends shuffle ever closer to the edge, their attention no doubt occupied by pondering the flavor of champagne to be served with the evening’s second course.

One minute pondering bubbly, the very next standing, wide-eyed and hyperventilating, on thin cover with decades of fiscal abuse cracking precariously under their collective Italian leather loafers. We can’t entirely blame Bernanke for the dilemma he now finds himself in; it was more about showing up to work at the wrong place at the wrong time.

The second paragraph is splendid in its anticipation, and the phrasing conveys both the anguished expectation of the hunters and the relaxed, expansive mood of the prey. The denouement is a little disappointing: "pondering" is a repetition and the syntax is too florid; a short sentence would be better, contrasting the suddenness of the fall with the slowness of the approach.

Further nominations for Sackerson's Prose Trophy are welcomed.

Round and round

"from the Chrysopoeia ('Gold Making') of Cleopatra during the Alexandrian Period in Egypt. The enclosed words mean 'The All is One.'"

Here's a piece by Brian Pretti yesterday, on the Federal Reserve and its attempts to shore up the system with interest rate cuts.

His prose is a little sparky and luxuriant, but his point is that even though the official interest rate may drop, the lending market has become more bearish and there may be higher rates (or more stringent terms) for riskier loans. He feels that lending has not previously enjoyed the discipline of a proper open market, which is why pension funds ended up buying pigs in pokes (subprime packages dressed up as a form of reasonably secure bond).

But why is so much wealth tied up in housing, anyway? I've previously suggested that lenders like to put money into houses because they rise in value, yet that rise is mainly the result of increased lending. It's what looks like an infinite loop, but there are other factors involved, that will lead to braking and possible breakdown.

Over a long period, house prices have increased:

a) because wages tend to increase faster than RPI; but in a global economy, Western wages are stalling; and in an ageing population, social costs (and therefore taxes) are rising.

b) because, sometime after WWII, we moved from a pattern of one significant income earner per couple, to two, who could bid more as DINKYs (dual income, no kids yet); but unless we learn to live as threesomes (TRINKYs) or in larger communes (FAMILIES), this driver has gone as far as it can.

c) because interest rates fell a long way, so people could service much larger mortgages; but now interest rates can't go up much, without widespread repossessions and bankruptcies - of registered voters. And whenever things get difficult, the temptation will be to drop rates further, which expands the lending and ultimately tightens the noose.

d) because lenders got rich and reckless in the boom; they might have offloaded the loans, but they may still have to pay a price for their deceits.

Meanwhile, we have diverted money into real estate that should have been powering business: R&D, startups, expanding small firms. Instead, large concerns are wiping out their potential successors: shopkeepers' children are stacking shelves for hypermarkets.

Democracy is rooted in a degree of economic independence and social equality. In effect, by permitting excessive concentration of capital, we are in danger of enslaving the next generation: the first of the "mind-forged manacles" is the limiting of their aspirations.

Money supply, shares and property

Here's a 22 May article by Cliff d'Arcy in The Motley Fool, comparing house prices and the FTSE 100. From mid-1984 to December last year, the FTSE has outperformed by 7.4% compound per year versus 7.2% for houses. But as he points out, houses are "geared" by mortgages, whereas most of us don't borrow to buy shares.

From September 1984 to the end of 2006, the money supply as measured by M4 showed an annualised average increase of 11.64%. Looking at the growth of M4 as against that of two classes of asset, I wonder where the difference went? Do interest charges roughly account for this?

More on Brad Setser

Further to the last, it's worth struggling through Brad Setser's presentation to the Congressional committee even if (like me) you're not an economics buff.

In essence, he says that America has gotten away with its continuing trade deficit over the last few years, for several reasons:

• the effective interest rate on foreign debt held by the US, is higher than on loans made by foreigners to America


• foreign equities have had higher yields and better capital appreciation, so US overseas investment has done better than foreigners' share holdings in America


• the weakening dollar has amplified the effects in both points above


• foreign central banks' willingness to buy US debt has kept US interest rates low, making Americans' debts easy to service and fuelling share and property booms

But it can't go on for ever. Either America's debts will continue to increase, or foreign sovereign wealth funds will buy more and more equities, or both. If foreigners slacken in their support for US debt, interest rates will rise; and losing equities to foreign owners takes away from America's future wealth and income.

Setser concludes:

The US will likely both have to sell more equity to the rest of the world and pay a somewhat higher interest rate on its external debt than it has recently...

While rapid central bank reserve growth and large official financing of the US deficit can help the US postpone the necessary adjustment, the longer the adjustment is deferred, the greater the long-term risks...

Bringing the US deficit and emerging economy surpluses down without tremendous costs will also take time. If the US and the world are to adjust gradually, they need to get started.

Yet again, I wonder whether the UK's enormous purchases of US dollar-denominated securities since June 2006 make sense for Britain.

Another thought: seeing two late market interventions last week, Dan Denning in The Daily Reckoning Australia (3 August) speculated that there may be "...in the financial market a buyer of last resort who comes in to goose the indexes at critical times, when investor confidence is especially fragile."

Rather than the Plunge Protection Team, could it be foreign sovereign wealth funds buying-in on the dips? Maybe that's why the Dow has bounced back 286 points today, as I write.

The rewards of "honest money" and interest-free lending

Some things are so simple that it takes a while to understand them. For me until now, one was the question of how anybody could lend money and not expect interest - for centuries, usury was forbidden under both Christian religious and civil law. In France, interest was illegal until after the Revolution in 1789 - see here.

And then the penny dropped, so to speak. If the supply of money is fixed, and the economy gradually becomes more larger and more efficient, then money gradually becomes more valuable, as The Mogambo Guru explains here. So if real GDP grows at the rate we seem to expect (on average, about 2% per year), then with a fixed money supply, a depositor would earn 2% in real terms, as would a lender. All you would need is adequate security for the return of capital.

Banks would have to cover their running expenses (I believe Swiss banks already do charge depositors for holding their cash really safely), but this would be need to be in the form of explicit costs, which might therefore be better restrained. Borrowers would have no reason to keep switching loans; in fact, the need to charge arrangement fees would act as an incentive to remain loyal to the existing creditor.

But it looks to me like it would mean the end of fractional reserve banking, inflation and periodic banking crises, not to mention the permanent and pervasive importance of money lenders.

Would that really be so bad? If so, then "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em" - would you and other like-minded readers care to join forces with me and start another bank? It seems to be the only game in town.

Peter Schiff on US monetary policy

Peter Schiff's latest commentary (today in Forex Street) pours scorn on the Treasury Secretary's professed commitment to a strong dollar, and points out that Ben Bernanke's reasons for a stronger Chinese yuan (renminbi) also imply higher interest rates AND higher consumer prices in the US.

Schiff concludes with the same recommendations as in his book, Crash Proof (my review here): buy gold (he's selling Australian Perth Mint Certificates through a dedicated website) and selected foreign (i.e. non-US) equities.

Puplava on debt and credit

Financial Sense, 14 July: Jim Puplava notes that there is a US credit contraction underway. Real incomes are falling by 6% per year; bank credit is going down; the quality of loans is worsening.

Consumers appear to loading up their credit cards to maintain living standards, but this is more expensive than mortgages; the Federal Reserve is buying Treasury bonds to keep the interest rates down, hoping to prevent a real estate recession from becoming a depression.

Consequently, Puplava anticipates lower discretionary spending and a cut in interest rates by the end of the year.