Smugness, alla Italia

Jonathan Russell writes in the Telegraph:

Spain's finances are in the dock thanks to Standard & Poor's, the spreads on Greek bonds have soared and Germany's economy is set to deteriorate faster than ours, according to the OECD. Suddenly the euro doesn't seem like such a one-way bet.

But where is the usual suspect, Italy, in all this euro-doom? Sitting pretty according to its finance minister Giulio Tremonti. The country didn't get involved in the sub-prime crisis and GDP figures could be significantly better than reported.

How do you work this out? "Our banks suffered little from the sub-prime crisis. There are few of them where English is spoken," he told Les Echos newspaper, no doubt not in English.
And GDP? "One should be suspicious of GDP figures …they do not include the informal economy."

The Italian "informal economy"? I'm sure there is another word for that.

And as one of my earlier posts shows, they've also invested less than 1% of their officially-declared GDP in US Treasuries.

Snap! And crackle...

On Thursday, I noted that, in the last 12 months, America has paid over $400 billion in interest payments on "the debt", AND increased the debt outstanding by around $1 trillion, making a total of $1.45 trillion. (I know I'm adding apples and oranges, but both elements are burdensome obligations.)

Now, noting the drop on the Dow and the cost of rider-bribes to the bailout bill, Karl Denninger is at the fruit-summing game:

Bailout Bill $700 billion
Additional Pork $150 billion
Dow (-484) in 3 hours $600 billion
Total carnage to you, The Taxpayer $1.45 trillion

The government is feeding the woodworms. Mish is convinced that deflation is inevitable ("There has never been hyperinflation in history with falling home prices.")

So you'd be forgiven for thinking, "What's the point in destroying even more money on this bonfire? Cut out and burn the rotten wood first, then rebuild the house."

Not so easy. The situation is especially bad because it's spilling over into international relations. Some American official (I forget who) flew over to China last year to get the Chinese to buy into mortgage-backed securities. Did the US really think a powerful partner would allow itself to be cheated when the package turned out to be rotten? (And didn't the Chinese know that, anyway? Isn't it possible they bought the rubbish because they were confident they could force the US Government to make good on it?)

I would almost say, buy into the packages the Chinese bought; but I expect there are ways to make the Chinese the preferred creditors and stiff everybody else.

Remember that Denninger has been saying recently, buy a good home safe and get your cash out of the bank? Let's see how unreasonable his doomster position turns out to be.

Credit default insurance and murky dealings

You have to have car insurance, it's a legal requirement. So it occurred to me a long time ago that you could make some money selling very low-cost car insurance that (when you looked at the fine print) promised nothing, thus making a safe profit for the company, fooling the regulators and satisfying the cheapskate customer, all at the same time. Fine, till the regulators find out.

According to Karl Denninger today, this is exactly what's happened in the case of UBS insuring one of its mortgage debt packages against default losses. The insurer, it's alleged, has totally inadequate capital for the insurance it's undertaken, but the insurance suited UBS because it permitted the stinking package to be left off the balance sheet.

Oh, to be a lawyer now.

Mortgage bond re-rating: reversing the rescue?

Karl Denninger notes that Moody's have re-rated previously "AAA" packaged mortgage products, and points out that since the Federal Reserve only accepts AAA, it may be forced to send much of this stuff back and demand better collateral. The banks' headache returns.

Housing stall, after all?

Looking at the economy now, we have to go well beyond subprime, and consider the general value of housing. Karl Denninger repeats that, in the long term, average house prices are three times income, but at the same time observes that they are "sticky". No-one wants to crystallise a loss, and you have to live somewhere, so why sell now?

If the financial victim next door has to sell his house at a 50% discount, that's all the more reason for you not to sell yours. If no-one sells voluntarily, how do you determine a real, as opposed to forced-sale value? So one effect of the housing drop could be a general slump in sales - with maybe a rise in home swaps for those who need to go to a different geographical area, perhaps for job reasons.

But what about people caught in negative equity? Here in the UK, ditching the house for less than the outstanding loan could leave you being chased for the balance, for years, unless you opt for bankruptcy. However, in the USA, many mortgages are on the roof but not on the borrower, leaving the lender short if the homeowner mails the keys back. Denninger has said more than once that borrowers need to consider this option solely on its financial/legal merits, as he thinks many lenders lost the moral argument when they knowingly advanced far too much to people who they knew couldn't maintain the loans. Now this could really upset the applecart.

Michael Panzner features a piece by FT columnist Martin Wolf. Wolf wonders what may happen if a high proportion of negative-equity homeowners default. The economic impact may be closer to Nouriel Roubini's $3 trillion, than to Goldman Sachs' more sanguine $1 trillion (the latter itself is a massive increase on the sort of figures bandied about before Christmas). Wolf sees two options:

There are two ways of adjusting the prices of housing to incomes: allow nominal prices to fall or raise nominal incomes. The former means mass bankruptcy and a huge fiscal bail out; the latter imposes the inflation tax.

But either option is so unattractive that (despite Denninger's image of paddling furiously as we head for the waterfall) there is a very strong incentive for fudge and delay. We've seen central banks pump many billions into the system in the last few days; and the ratings agencies seem to be trying their best to help maintain the status quo by not downgrading lenders as quickly and severely as some think they deserve. But again, housing is intrinsically illiquid, and houses aren't turned over rapidly like shares, which is why we have "mark to model" instead of "mark to market". What's the rush to crystallise a terrible loss now? Better a Micawberish hope that "something will turn up" than a grim Protestant insistence on an immediate collapse which would benefit very few people.

Assuming wages continue to rise over time, the gap between prices and incomes will lessen. If the homeowners can somehow be reassured that the government is determined to support house prices, then the sell-to-rent speculators could be caught out in their attempt to "short" the housing market. Can they be sure that, having sold their nice house, they can buy another such in the right area for much less, later? What will they do meanwhile?

The real threat is this "jingle mail", and the potential consequences seem so dire that something creative may be done. Bankruptcy rules might be modified to protect lenders; maybe portions of recent loans may be written-off. How about part-ownership, part-rent, as with UK housing associations - having escaped the trailer park, many first-time homeowners may want to keep their foot on that first rung of the ladder. Not everyone will want to pour engine oil into the carpet and trash the light fittings.

So I think we will have fudge, delay and attempts at more creative solutions, and a long stall in the housing market. Unless there's another hammer blow that the system simply can't take, such as an explosion in the financial derivatives market, as arch-doomster Marc Faber expects and (in his inherited Swiss Protestant way) hopes. In that case, every sign we've seen so far is that our governments will run the money-presses white-hot rather than face major deflation. We all have an incentive to paddle away from the brink.

Deus ex machina

You know you're in trouble when you have to appeal to the Great Leader to do something. Karl Denninger publishes an open letter to the President, the Presidential candidates and others.

1. He complains that 23A exemption letters and the recent TAF facility are being used to hide the scale of banking problems from the public.
2. He points out that over the last 100 years, local house prices trend to 3 times median local income (work that out for your own house).
3. He lists action points to make the system transparent and honest - even though some lenders will be immediately destroyed, like the little slips of flash-burn paper used by spies in Sixties movies.

Being right is not nearly enough - work it out for yourself:

1. Imagine the conversation between interns on receipt of Denninger's fax;
2. List the not-to-be-published reasons why nobody who could solve the problem, will;
3. Compose the official reply.

Now, head for the tree line.

The bigger they are, the harder they fall

Michael Panzner refers us to a Financial Times article on the (overdue) dwindling confidence among our youngster trading community. The piece includes this paragraph:

Unlike past housing crises, the banking sector is far less well equipped to cope with the fallout because of the wave of banking consolidation in the last decade. [...] This means the pain has become concentrated among a small handful of institutions, all of whom play a crucial role in keeping all markets liquid.

I recently quoted this Contrary Investor article, which includes a graph of the ballooning exposure of American banks to credit default swaps (CDS), under which arrangement everybody insures everybody else. The risk is 99%+ concentrated into only SIX banks.

Who benefits from such concentrations? I commented on Panzner's site:

Concentration of finance into an ever-smaller number of giant banks is inherently dangerous. You reduce the risks of small hazards, but you increase the potential damage from a Black Swan / fat tail event. Systemic safety is in diversity, dispersion and disconnection.

There is increasingly a conflict of interest between those who benefit from concentrations of power and wealth (think of the bonuses and cushy jobs), and the general populace. Wasn't the US Constitution itself specifically designed to prevent such concentrations?

In my view, the sub-prime contagion is not only spreading to other sectors of the economy, but beginning to call into question how big government, high finance and monstrous companies impact on the fundamental values of our (systematic and real in the USA, ramshackle and sham here in the UK) democracies.

It seems to me that small-scale democracy-cum-economy is not only an historical reaction to the centralist authoritarianism of George III (who meant well, I am sure), but a kind of imitation of Nature, which has endured the most massive disruptions (a planet encased in ice, or burning from a massive meteor strike) because of my alliterative trio of survival traits: diversity, dispersion and disconnection.

A secular bear market in housing?

It's now generally accepted that houses are overpriced. I think valuations will not only go down, but (notwithstanding bear market rallies) stay down for at least a generation.

Here's some reasons, some having a longer-term effect than others:

• house prices are now a very high multiple of earnings, choking the first-time buyer market.
• presently, there is increasing economic pessimism, which will further inhibit buyers.
• the mortgage burden now lies in the amount of capital to be repaid, rather than the interest rate; that's much harder to get out of, and will prolong the coming economic depression, either through the enduring impact on disposable income, or through the destruction of money by mortgage defaults on negative-equity property - and as valuations fall, there will be more and more of the latter.
• fairly low current interest rates allow little room to drop rates further to support affordability - and at worst, rate drops could sucker even more people into taking on monster mortgage debt. But interest rate reductions are unlikely to benefit borrowers anyway. The banks have survived for centuries on the fact that while valuations are variable, debt is fixed. They got silly with sub-prime, but by George they will remain determined to get all they can of their capital back, and preserve its value. The people who create money literally out of nothing - a mere account-ledger entry - are now tightening lending criteria and will continue to press for high interest rates; for now, they will content themselves with not fully passing on central bank rate cuts, so improving the differential for themselves, as compensation for their risk.
• food and fuel costs are rising, and given declining resources (including less quality arable land annually), a growing world population and the relative enrichment of developing countries, demand will continue to soar, cutting into what's left of disposable income.
• our economy is losing manufacturing capacity and steadily turning towards the service sector, where wages are generally lower.
• the demographics of an ageing population mean that there will be proportionately fewer in employment, and taxation in its broadest sense will increase, even if benefits are marginally reduced.
• the growing financial burden on workers will further depress the birth rate, which in turn will exacerbate the demographic problem.

In short, there will be less money available to chase house prices; and in my view, less to chase investments, too. It may be very similar in the USA - as Jim from San Marcos says now (repeating himself from last May):

A market goes up when more people want to buy, than those that want to sell. Well, all of these first time home buyers have no spare cash for the Stock Market. The Baby Boomers, sometime in the future are going to want to sell. The question arises, "Sell to Whom?"

Returning to houses, there are still those who think valuations will continue to be supported by the tacit encouragement of economic migration to the UK.

Now, although this helps keep down wage rates at the lower end (where is the Socialist compassion in that?), the government is pledging the future for a benefit which is merely temporary, if it exists at all. Once an incoming worker has a spouse and several children, how much does he/she need to earn to pay for the social benefits consumed now and to come later? State education alone runs at around £6,000 ($12,000) per annum per child.

And then there's the cost of all the benefits for the indiginous worker on low pay, or simply unemployed and becoming steadily less employable as time passes. And his/her children, learning their world-view in a family where there is no apparent connection between money and work. The government makes get-tough noises, but in a recessionary economy, I don't think victimising such people for the benefit of newspaper headlines will be any use. I seem to recall (unless it was an Alan Coren spoof) that in the 70s, Idi Amin made unemployment illegal in Uganda; not a model to follow.

So to me, allowing open-door economic migration to benefit the GDP and hold up house prices doesn't work in theory, let alone in practice.

Besides, I maintain that in the UK, we don't have a housing shortage: we have a housing misallocation. There must be very many elderly rattling around alone in houses too large and expensive for them to maintain properly. This book says that as long ago as 1981, some 600,000 single elderly in owner-occupied UK property had five or more rooms; the ONS says that in 2004, some 7 million people were living alone in Great Britain. Then there's what must be the much larger number of people who live in twos and threes in houses intended for fours and fives. Before we build another million houses on flood-plains, let's re-visit the concept of need.

Maybe we'll see the return of Roger the lodger - if he's had a CRB check, of course.

Would I buy a second home now? No. Would I sell the one I live in? I'd certainly think about it - in fact, have been considering that for some years.

Punish the perp

Karl Denninger says we should make the people who caused the subprime problems pay for the consequences. Either they should burn up with their own debt (Marc Faber has said some players should be taken out of the game) or pass on the grief to their shareholders, issuing new shares to raise capital and so diluting the existing stockholders' portion.

Unfortunately, we in the UK have chickened out - for party political reasons to do with its power base in the north of England, the Labour government is currently holding the baby in the case of insolvent lender Northern Rock, even though the tax payer is on the hook for nearly $120 billion as a result. (Hey, that's nearly as much as the proposed new tax break to reflate America - and our population is one-fifth the size of yours!)

Hope you have better luck - or better leaders - over there. Buy a Lottery ticket and hope?

Little boxes, revisited

I've previously suggested that you don't need to be too technical, as long as you focus on the reward systems (the cui bono?). Here, Michael Panzner quotes and discusses an article by Nat Worden on the failure of ratings agencies in the subprime debacle.

I think it's in "Jane Eyre": a teacher who wishes to instil piety into a little boy, asks him whether he'd rather have a biscuit or a blessing. When he answers, a blessing, he gets two biscuits.

When recession empties the the biscuit barrel, maybe we'll get authentic leadership.

UPDATE

My beloved recalled it better, and so I've found the quote on the Net:

...I have a little boy, younger than you, who knows six Psalms by heart; and when you ask him which he would rather have, a ginger-bread nut to eat, or a verse of a Psalm to learn, he says: "Oh, the verse of a Psalm! Angels sing Psalms," says he. "I wish to be an angel here below." He then gets two nuts in recompense for his infant piety.’

Anatomy of a CDO

The Wall Street Journal provides a grisly visual dissection of a subprime mortgage package - thanks to The Contrarian Investor for the lead.

If I follow correctly, the trickery seems to come in step 4, where a CDO largely composed of middling-rated mortgage risk sells bits of itself with unreasonably optimistic ratings attached. "Skimmed milk masquerades as cream".

Denninger: depression, but when?

Karl Denninger offers two options for the US financial regulators. The first is to get banks to put all their potential liabilities on their balance sheets - financial suicide for some.

The other is to keep the door closed until the smell is too bad, and then we have far worse problems - but it could take years. End result: deflationary depression.

Little boxes

In India, where many people cannot read, you sign for the State pension by thumbprint. This seemed like a secure system, until a man was caught with a tobacco-tin full of thumbs.

It would have made no difference had it been a tin of cloned credit cards. You don't need to know what's in the box, or how it works; you need to know what it does, and who it's for.

Once you start thinking along these lines, things get so much clearer. For example, you don't have to be a "quant" like Richard Bookstaber, to know that derivatives are about risk. More precisely, they're for increasing risk.

Supposedly, a derivative reduces risk; but if you look at its use, it's a box that tells lenders and gamblers how far they can go. Seeing the fortunes that can be made in high finance, there is the strongest temptation to push the boundary.

My old primary school had a lovely little garden behind it, where we played at morning break. One game was "What's the time, Mister Wolf?". You went up to the "wolf" and asked him the time; he'd say nine o' clock; to the next child he'd say ten o'clock and so on, until he'd suddenly shout "Dinner time!" and chase you. Obviously, the game was not about telling the time.

So it is with financial risk models that service the need to maximise profits: always another trembling step forward. There's only one way to find out when you've gone too far.

But what if you could ask the time, and know that someone else would end up being chased? I think that explains the subprime packages currently causing so much trouble.

The bit I don't understand is why banks started buying garbage like this from each other. Maybe it's a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing, since these organisations are so big. Or maybe it's that everyone has their own personal box.

Then there's credit default swaps, and other attempts to herd together for collective security. They don't work if the reduction in fear leads to an increase in risk-taking. United we fall: no point in tying your dinghy to the Titanic's anchor-chain.

In fact, I think this opens up a much wider field of discussion, about efficiency versus survivability. In business, economics and politics we might eventually find ourselves talking about dispersion, diversity and disconnection.

The Fed and King Canute

Michael Panzner directs us to John Hussman, who explains that the Federal Reserve's power to manage the financial system is very limited - the funds it provides are dwarfed by the amount out in the economy.

... the problem with the U.S. financial system ... is not liquidity, but the solvency of mortgage loans and securitized debt. The Fed's actions are not likely to have material impact on this.

This, plus Larry Lindsey's comments noted in my previous post, adds weight to Karl Denninger's continuing theme of inevitable deflation.

Larry Lindsey: extraordinary rendition

Ed Steer (Financial Sense) relates his October experience of an unusually frank speech, and answers to questions, by President Bush's former economic adviser. According to Steer (I paraphrase), Lindsey's views include:

- The Fed knew home loans were getting dumb, but didn't want to spoil the party
- Banks are going to have to revalue their property holdings realistically
- Hedge funds will have to take what comes, and probably will
- America has offloaded zillions in toxic-waste loan packages to other countries, and ha, ha !
- House prices will plummet
- Don't trust the government CPI figures
- Gold dumping is coming from European central banks, not the US
- America could handle a 20-30% dollar devaluation

... loads of beef in that burger, where's the fluffy bun?

The Angriest Guy In Economics

Supposedly "the angriest guy in economics" is Richard Daughty, aka The Mogambo Guru - but he gives his rants a comedy twist.

Karl Denninger, on the other hand, is very emphatic that our economic woes are no laughing matter. Here he calls for all the "off-book" items to be included in lenders' accounts, and if that bankrupts them, so be it: a cleansing of the financial system, condign punishment for the perpetrators and a warning to others. This is similar to Marc Faber's position: he says the crisis should be allowed to "burn through and take out some of the players". Gritty.

And concrete. Denninger supplies a photo of a customer-empty store at 6 p.m. on a Sunday evening, to underscore his point.

Now that's something we can put to the test - look at the shops in your area and work out how crowded you'd normally expect them to be at the beginning of December.

Drinking in Last Chance Saloon

The Orient Saloon at Bisbee, Arizona

Michael Panzner alerts us to an article by Martin Hutchinson in Prudent Bear, which explains how the rotten apples in the banking barrel can affect the others. Here's a grim tidbit or two:

... If as now appears likely the eventual losses in the home mortgage market do not total only $100 billion, but a figure much closer to $1 trillion, then the subprime debacle becomes something much more than a localized meltdown...

Hutchinson suggests that in a bear market, "Level 3" assets may actually be worth as little as 10% of the banks' own declared estimates, and:

This immediately demonstrates the problem. Goldman Sachs, generally regarded as insulated from the subprime mortgage problem, has $72 billion of Level 3 assets; its capital is only $36 billion. If anything like 90% of the Level 3 assets’ value has to be written off, Goldman Sachs is insolvent. [...] Only the bonuses will survive, paid in cash and draining liquidity from the struggling company.

I observed a couple of weeks ago that "the Dow and the FTSE rise towards the end of the year, when traders' annual bonuses are calculated" and guessed that "the Dow will rise until bonus time". Watch for a rally of sorts and a final, determined suckout of bonuses, ahead of a forced, sober reassessment.

Which banks are weakest?

Matt at Discursive Monologue compares the banks' mysterious black-box "level 3 assets" with the value of shareholder equity, to give an idea of the scale of the risk the investor in financial stocks may be taking.

Turkeys should note that Thanksgiving is on November 22 this year.

Secondary explosion

Ty Andros (Financial Sense, Friday) repeats the point made by Jim Puplava (which we reported earlier this summer), that the credit agencies' re-rating of subprime packages have ignited an explosion inside the banking system, but this may only be the detonator that sets off the main charge:

Whereas the big banks and investment houses can hide behind tier three and pray for a market recovery, the investing community cannot. Pension funds, institutions and money market funds, have fiduciary investment covenants which direct them to sell securities which are below certain ratings levels. Once an investment falls into the lower rungs on the investment scales they are bound by their own investing rules to divest the assets.

Tens of billions of dollars of securities have been downgraded since the beginning of October and this will require that they be sold in a timely manner. Once those securities hit the markets we will know their true value, and it won’t be pretty. The super SIV will quickly become an exercise in wishful thinking as their “high quality” paper becomes junk in the maelstrom of liquidation which increases every time a security is downgraded. The super SIV’s whole reason for being was to prevent fire sales and price discovery.

Trouble ahead

The money-lender's pleasant dream

Market Ticker reports that a bank has borrowed $75 million at exceptionally high interest rates, suggesting that the collateral they were offering wasn't sound enough to be acceptable. And there are futures contracts being taken out that indicate some traders expect a major financial dislocation.

In other words, this bet is one that the credit markets will go supercritical.

And it wasn't made by just one firm, one speculator, or one guy.

A few months ago I pointed out that every big equity market dump - every last one of them - has started in the credit markets. It always starts there, simply because of the volume of business transacted and the sensitivity to problems. In the equity markets one company can go "boom" and it doesn't mean much. But in the credit markets "systemic risk" - that is, a refusal to trust people as a foundational principle - once it takes hold is very, very difficult to tamp back down.

Read the whole post here. And here's the evidence (source):