Financial experts "miserably bearish"

This report by Jim McTague from Barron's, reproduced on the Cumberland Advisors site, gives an indication of how the money experts were feeling this month, on their annual fishing trip in Maine:

[David] Kotok's diagnosis of the cause of the gloom that permeated the crowd was this: Most of them see more economic downside than upside; we don't have functioning credit markets; banks and big Wall Street credit intermediaries are either dead, wounded or on life-support; housing is a wreck; and the auto industry "is done."

Once the economy stabilizes, it will take many years to fully recover, he said, because no strong growth engines are evident. "That's why people are so gloomy! They see no upside!" He personally is investing client money in agricultural plays because, he says, the long-term price of food is trending up. He likes bio-companies whose products are geared to an aging population. And he likes Asia as an investment destination...and he doesn't like much else.

I conducted in-depth interviews with a dozen of the participants. They all perceive the economy in the early stages of a multiyear recession that will be the most painful downturn since the 1970s. The housing market, which experts once predicted would recover in 2008, may not recover even in 2009. Credit woes on Wall Street will begin to inflict real pain on Main Street.

We're already seeing the impact on housing, though the worst may not have happened yet; and I think stocks and bonds are still in something of a fool's paradise. I'm sticking with my guess that in retrospect, we will see that the upturn began in the Spring of 2010.

House prices underpinned by shortages, boosted by inflation?

The Centre for Economics and Business Research reckons house prices will steady next year and shoot up for three years after that, thanks to housing shortages and building project cancellations - reports The Grumbler.

"Real estate could become a very good investment and inflation hedge once the government starts seriously printing money," commented Jim from San Marcos (who still has a realtor's licence) after his July 27th post.

US lending market: Apocalypse Now?

Some points from Denninger's latest (summary in my words):

It's getting hot. The collapse of IndyMac may take 10% - 20% of the FDIC's balance sheet, and that's assuming a savers' panic doesn't start.

If the government underwrites Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Federal public debt doubles (goes up by $5 trillion), the US' credit rating is compromised (it's starting to happen already) and all debts will cost more in interest - maybe 3% extra. KD's recommendation is that the two monster lenders be put into receivership and wound down over time; this means a steep drop in house prices so that they can be afforded on more sensible terms and conditions.

His advice to you: head for the high ground. Get out of debt, get your savings balance below the FDIC's $100k ceiling, think about buying Treasury bonds. "If the government goes down you will need steel, lead and brass, not money."

BUT...

See Jim from San Marcos on the same matter. And someone copied Denninger's piece whole into a comment at Jim's, to which the latter responded:

"There is a very peculiar situation here from a stock ownership position. These two stocks are being shorted en-mass. I kind of get the feeling that neither one is going to zero. I smell a bear trap here. You can be right but still be dead wrong."

The housing bubble: 5 - 12 years to the turn

According to iTulip, we are at Step D in a timetable (published in January 2005) that implies we have quite some years to go before a housing upturn.

Their point about real estate being an illiquid market seems valid to me, and I've suggested before now that we should expect a decline and a long stall, rather than an equity-style crash.

UK economy: between a rock and a hard place

CU has asked me to comment on his latest post on the UK's economic crisis. I'm flattered that someone thinks my opinion is worth anything, but here's my effort:

There's often a kind of self-destructive excitement as a crisis develops, as at the gathering of forces for a war. But the Rupert Brookes will be succeeded by the Wilfred Owens.

I have believed for about 9 years that we are in for an unpleasant time, and that is why I returned to the public sector pro tem at the end of 1999: I really did (and do) think that everybody should prepare for a storm. I have also been encouraging my clients to become/stay cautious, for the last 10 years. I thought we'd returned to sanity in 2003, when the FTSE had halved from its start-2000 peak, but off we went again. From my amateur perspective (and who exactly is an expert on the world economy?), the delay in facing economic reality has allowed the patient's condition to worsen.

Mark Wadsworth's opening comment here was "Sell to rent. Cash is King." Yes, I agree, at this stage. I was talking to my wife last year about selling the house (and, I think, the year before that) but personal circumstances and priorities often trump the cold financial calculations, don't they?

However, I don't think cash will be king for a long period. I can't see the government rapidly shrinking the public sector, and at the same time we shall see reduced earnings, more insolvencies and increasing unemployment in the private sector. The financial sector, which has helped our nation's books to nearly balance, is being hit in banking and investment now, and will (I think) be hit worse in future; that cow will yield far less milk to the Treasury, and so the budget will be even more unbalanced than it is today.

Europe seems keen to enforce a discipline on the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that it has been unwilling to emulate with respect to its own accounts for many years; if the EU continues to take such a rigid line, maybe there will be a tear in the EU fabric, along the line of the English Channel.

Meanwhile, I think Gordon Brown's reputation as a money manager is ruined. As has been said, he failed to fix the roof when the weather was fine. A playboy can seem a financial wizard as long as he keeps partying on his yacht, but the adoring guests will disembark when the holes below the waterline make themselves felt.

(I wonder what would have happened if the Conservatives had won again in 1997? Can we be confident that the consequences would have been better?)

To right the ship of State will take money, or (since we hardly know what faith to place in money any more) perhaps it would be apter to say, wealth. This, I think, is where the "cash is king" slogan will wear thin. At the moment, we see a devaluation/destocking in houses, cars, computers and other big-ticket items. It's a good time for Loadsamoney to go shopping, even if the price of his dried pasta is up 40%.

But when the stocks have been run down to match shrunken demand levels, and Loadsamoney's firm is on the skids, the game will probably change. RPI is on the up, but now the causes are more external than internal: we have forgotten the lessons of WWII and have become very dependent on imports of food and fuel, which are major components of those inflation indices that aim to reflect the circumstances of the ordinary person. So interest rate rises are unlikely to reduce the cost of such necessities, except indirectly insofar as they may help strengthen sterling; yet a weakening in sterling is the hope for our trade in manufactures (the pound has dropped 15% or so against the Euro, in the last year). Indeed, we seem to have a policy of shadowing the plummeting US dollar, as once we shadowed the Deutschmark; perhaps, perceiving this strategy, George Soros will stage another coup, to our country's cost, again.

If revenues are down because of recession (or the D-word), where else will the Chancellor find wealth to repair the yacht? More sale of assets to sovereign wealth funds (there goes the family silver)? More bonds sold to trade-surplus foreigners (but will they have the cash, at a time when their own economies may be slumping together with Western consumer demand)? (Perhaps they will, if the US insists on handing the Chinese mortgage bail-out money - see Mish!)

Left high and dry in public view as the tide of wealth recedes, will be the billions in cash held by the crafty, the nervous and the cautious old. And the subtlest way to steal it is by inflation.

I do not know what will be the best store of wealth when major inflation strikes. All the world's gold currently above ground could be made into a cube that would fit comfortably under the arches of the Eiffel Tower (and historically, a fair bit of it could have been found not far away from the Tour Eiffel, stashed away in French ceiling-bowl lights). The gold market is small enough to be a prey to manipulation both ways.

Perhaps a safer store of value would be NS&I index-linked savings certificates. If inflation gets too bad, the easy way out for the government will be not to launch new issues, and the old ones have a maximum term of 5 years. There could theoretically be a problem for investors, in the effect of inflation between the date of maturity and the date the money is cleared in the investor's bank account, but we must hope that the government will never permit a hyperinflation.

And I note that landowners such as the Duke of Westminster have rarely sold their land because of temporary monetary inflation. Even if house prices do decline towards 3 times earnings, they will always have a value, and if rented out, will create an income. Perhaps Mark's comment would then be reversed: buy to rent, not sell to rent. Even now, as many try to get out from under the mortgage trap, there are signs that renting out property is a promising sector, since (I understand) demand is increasing faster than supply.

I'd be interested to hear other ideas.

Why were construction companies caught in the credit crunch?

That's my question. Years ago I went to a Midlands construction company to prospect them for business, and learned that they had a long-term strategy of buying land when the market was depressed and developing it when the upturn came (well, duh, you're saying, doubtless). They'd done this for several business cycles, as (I assume) any well-established firm in their sector would have done.

It was obvious to me ages ago that house prices had gotten silly. How did major building companies get it so wrong this time, when watching the trend is so fundamental to their survival?

Government and homelessness

The "Pathfinder" project for urban renewal has come in for some criticism, because so far it's meant a net loss of 9,000 homes and many of those whose houses have been demolished have not received sufficient compensation to buy something similar elsewhere (see here and here, with an attempt at more balanced discussion in the Liverpool Daily Post).

I suspect we don't have a housing shortage, but a housing misallocation. There are lots of old people rattling around in houses too large for them, and too expensive for them to maintain properly. And how many million bedrooms have been converted into domestic gyms, games rooms etc? We simply expect far more space than we used to, and so the "shortage" is a function of our choices.

But there is a limit on land space, if we want to retain the capacity to feed ourselves in hard times. Maybe we should review policies on housing, housing benefit, local taxation etc. And the policy of using foreign labour to keep down wage rates, and so create traps for our working and under-classes. And is there a Gramscian plan to undermine the cultural cohesion of the country by means of deliberate negligence in border controls, with the side-effect of worsening the pressure on accommodation?

Governments have a talent for creating problems that will long survive them. After four centuries, Northern Ireland still has its difficulties. And look at Fiji, where a century ago British planters imported Indians for indentured service periods of ten years. By the end of their contractual decade, quite naturally the labourers had married, had children and put down roots in the island. The historical result is festering resentment between ethnic groups, leading to outbursts such as George Speight's rebellion in 2000.

Similarly, covering England's green and pleasant land with concrete, tarmac and brick will also have persistent unpleasant consequences. And is there any way to change it back? Could we put a foot depth of earth along a disused motorway to convert it to arable use? So, new building on agricultural land, flood plains etc is tricky, and now we are seeing some of the problems of brownfield development.

But there's a huge number of houses built in the Thirties that need refurbishment. There may be a boom in plumbers, plasters, electricians and bricklayers; while at the same time we may see growing white-collar unemployment, as a result of outsourced information-processing. Maybe the working class will be victorious, after all, while the chattering classes fill holes in their shoes and jumpers with old copies of the Guardian.

I know it can happen, because it did happen in the Thirties - read Helen Forrester, whose debt-burdened middle-class father made the mistake of leaving London post-Crash, to return to his Liverpool birthplace, where the parish had no statutory obligation to support him. Helen wrote that if the Depression comes again, the things to stock up will be newspapers, razor blades and soap. And in her case, a purse inside her clothes so that her own family couldn't steal her meagre savings.

Housing: have we reached the "point of maximum pessimism"?

Blanche Evans of Realty Times thinks the most of the bad news in housing has already been built into the market; she was interviewed on iTulip a couple of years ago, predicting a downturn but also saying that housing would be supported by the government, to some extent.

Benjamin Graham said we should “buy from pessimists and sell to optimists”. The smart money has done the second part, maybe it should look out for the first soon.

Making money out of distressed financials

Michael Panzner has come across a real estate blogpost that includes this idea:

Several of the deal guys said that banks they contacted three months ago about buying assets are all of a sudden calling back. Three months ago they said everything was fine. The idea du jour is to buy the bank to get the bank’s real estate. Sounds screwy to me but I’ll write some more about this one tomorrow.

This reminds me of something I read many years ago in "Adam Smith" (George Goodman) and wrote about here almost exactly a year ago - buying bankrupt (or nearly so) stock that includes the rights to tangible assets.

I don't have the cash or sophistication for this one, but maybe one of you out there knows how to work out whether a bank's shares are selling at a discount to the value of its underlying assets.

There's always an angle, isn't there?

No stagnation, but a house price crash

A carefully-reasoned post by "Alice Cook" on UK Housing Bubble concludes that house prices will drop 25% quickly (by the end of next year).

The alternative (house prices stagnate, allowing inflation to achieve the same result more slowly) has become unsustainable because of fears respecting the stability of the banks.

Please read this man

David Parsley writes in today's Sunday Express, a piece titled "Homes Panic Is A Bank Ploy" (not yet available on the Net for free, but look for it again soon). The content is self-evident, but please, read and believe him. Spread the word. Find more such pieces by optimistic counter-contrarians, and publicise them. Blow away all that negative thinking.

That way, I may have more time to sell my house at current ridiculous market prices, which for personal reasons I can't yet.

Does State expenditure inflate the market?

Charles Moore comments on Jonathan Ross' £18m 3-year deal with the BBC:

... even if it is a wonderful idea to pay Mr Ross roughly 30 times more (annualised) than the Prime Minister and 20 times more than the Governor of the Bank of England out of what is, after all, tax, it is obvious rubbish that this does not push up the market. If the BBC were not competing in this field, Mr Ross’s price to commercial channels would plummet.

Deplorably, Mr Ross is unbelievably coarse, which sends a message to his (relatively) young audience. Peter Hitchens suspects that this crassness is a cynically avaricious pretence:

Ross talks on TV in an arrogant sort of loutspeak.

I wonder if he talks like that when he’s dealing with his lawyers and his accountants.

Now that would be a fly-on-the-wall documentary to screen next to Ross' show.

So, celeb wages inflated and manners undermined by spendthrift public services.

Meanwhile, Liz Jones takes a very laudable interest in the young, especially those rotting away in the complex trap of social security benefits. And again, a market may be distorted by public money:

Her room is damp, sparsely furnished, has a stinking, threadbare carpet, and Paris mostly sits on her bed, terrified to walk to the shared bathroom in case one of the boys who slouches around outside harasses her.

Drugs are dealt openly in the corridors. Each week, ‘the council’ (I’ve never heard her use the words ‘government’, ‘Labour’ or ‘Gordon Brown’) pays the £330 rent (yes, that is £1,430 a month, more than my mortgage repayments) for her box room direct to the private landlord; on top of that, Paris is given £47 a week to live on.

That is, she was, until the council got wind she had got off her backside and found a job, just three days a week, in a clothes shop in Oxford Street (she would have loved, she told me once, to have been a fashion designer).

Although her pay is less than her rent, she has been bombarded with letters and forms, too complicated for anyone, let alone someone with dyslexia, to fill in, demanding six months’ back rent.

She is now being threatened with eviction.

The negative reinforcement is too obvious to summarise, but look at this young girl's rent as a proportion of her total "income": 87.5%!

Compare that with this, from the Guardian in December 2007:

The CML said a typical first-time buyer paid 20.6% of their income to service their mortgage in October, up from 20.4% in September, while for those moving house it rose to 17.6% from 17.5%. The figures are the highest recorded since 1991 and 1992.

There are now very many people (about 4 million) on some form of housing benefit. Is it not possible that rents, and consequently housing valuations, have been grossly distorted by such interventions? Isn't there some other way to house people without creating opportunities for modern Rachman types?

Does asset inflation help support stock prices?

An anonymous comment on the preceding post has set me speculating further. The commentator says:

You are right, but I believe that this time around it will be equities, rather than commodities or real estate that will provide the hedge against coming inflation. Tobin's Q will prevail due to the juxtaposition of equity prices vs. the other two asset classes (which already had their surges) and the market's increasing valuation sophistication compared to the last time we saw hyperinflation in developed economies (i.e. the 1970s). So I've been buying stocks as an inflation hedge, despite the statistical evidence that this is foolish...

Wikipedia offers an explanation of Tobin's Q here. Essentially, Q is a measure of the relationship between the value of all a company's shares, and the value of the company's assets. If Q is greater than 1, there is some reason (real or imaginary) why the company has extra value to offer; if less than 1, a share investor could buy a company's underlying assets at a discount.

In 2006, Michael Alexander wrote a series of articles for Safe Haven, about stock cycles. Below, from the second in the series, is his graph for Q in several bear markets, including the one which he suggests began in 2000:

According to this, Q was already below 1 in 2006, and since the market is now back to about where it was a couple of years ago, that would suggest that shares are now fairly valued in relation to company assets.

But if history repeats itself, the current bear market has a long way to go, since the other three lasted 15 - 20 years. And in each of the previous cycles, Q slumped below 0.4.

Another complicating factor, thanks to the lending boom, is the real estate bubble. Steve Moyer is firmly of the opinion that real estate is very heavily overvalued, even now. So a collapse in that market would push Tobin's Q back up for many companies, a technical indication that share prices would have to drop steeply to get back to fair value (let alone overshoot to below Q=0.5).

In this context, it's worth noting that one of Mike Alexander's books, published in 2000, is titled "Stock Cycles: Why stocks won't beat money markets over the next twenty years".

Beakernomics: house prices

Forgive us our debts, Part 2

A very stimulating response from "Caronte" to the earlier post on debt reduction, so I've taken the liberty to bring the argument out front here.

Caronte, you say:

Suppose it is believed with absolute certainty that every 50 years, say every year divisible by 50, all debts are forgiven. There would follow a bunching of loan demand as the forgiveness date nears, while willing lenders would simultaneously vanish. The market would no longer match credit demand and supply, total welfare would suffer. Debt forgiveness would only avoid this problem if it was done by stealth, unpredictably, once and for all and never again. Like forgiveness of tax evasion or illegal buildings. Difficult to persuade debtors, (or builders, or taxpayers), that forgiveness would not occur again. Lots of people would be encouraged to borrow beyond what they can afford (or evade tax) – the moral hazard implication. Unsustainable indebtedness would multiply rather than disappear. Moreover, a defaulting borrower does not need forgiveness if she genuinely cannot pay: can’t pay, won’t pay, period. If the defaulting borrower has some residual wealth, though less than the outstanding loan, who is to deprive the creditor of that? What legal or moral right would support state action without creditor compensation?

Would “debt cancellation (or rather, reduction) … be a suitable punishment for the principal offender”? True: “the relationship between mortgage lender and borrower is unequal. You have to live somewhere, and if you don't buy, you have to rent - and rents will tend to reflect the purchase price of houses.” No more than the relationship between employer and worker. There are various way to reduce this inequality, workers can form Trades Unions and cooperatives, and borrowers can found building societies – until New Labour wickedly de-mutualised i.e. privatised this form of social property which was not theirs to privatise. But the main reduction of the inequality comes from competition among lenders (and among employers).

“By adjusting the ratio of deposits to loans as it suits them, lenders can multiply the money supply”. True, there is a credit multiplier at work when banks re-lend their deposits and get some new deposits as a result. If they were prevented from re-lending – by law or by contract – they would act solely as custodians (as in the early days of gold-money) and would charge depositors for the service instead of paying interest. And any act of individual saving would instantly reduce total demand by the same amount and cause unemployment. Besides, the ratio of deposits to loans is regulated by law and is variable at will only when it is higher than a prudential limit. And banks face the consequences of their bad loans, they can go bankrupt and their shareholders can lose all their capital. That’s punishment enough. As long as they are competitive, there is not much of a reason to “punish” them by forcing them to remit those bad loans that still have a residual market value.

“Rather than prop up the worst of the lenders, let them go down. Why should the taxpayer assume the burden?” Absolutely right. “Pay off the depositors” – if the bank can, or if there is a state guarantee. But why “shrink the lending book” by debt remission? If mistakes are always to be automatically corrected ex-post when they are revealed as such, the market disappears and with it all the conceivable advantages that it brings.

An Australian economist whose name now escapes me once wrote an article mocking the theory of general economic equilibrium – with its complete system of futures markets – by imagining a system of “past” markets in which economic agents could undo their past transactions that with the benefit of hindsight turned out to be a mistake. Just imagine. Debt remission would have some of the same effects.

I say:

Caronte, welcome, and many thanks for the length and thoughtfulness of your response. I don't pretend to have your economic expertise, but I still think there's a debate to be had. I'll try to tackle some of your points, not necessarily in strict order.

I suppose that in ancient Israel, the economy was not so monetised as today, so the advent of the year of Jubilee may not have been so disruptive as it would today. I don't really advocate a periodic debt cancellation - though I'm beginning to wonder about the necessity of charging interest. (Isn't it the case that some Swiss banks do in fact charge you for looking after your money securely, instead of making investments with it or lending it out to others?)

Competition between lenders may help keep down interest rates, but it's the ballooning of asset prices - and the consequent increase in the size of mortgage required - that causes the damage. So many are now locked into monster mortgages that a significant rise in interest rates - which otherwise might be appropriate for tackling inflation - is politically very unfeasible.

I argue that the price of houses is pretty much beyond the buyer's control, except that there's a point where a purchase is either not affordable (we seem to have reached that stage) or, as with subprime, fudged at the outset with disastrous consequences later. So I suggest the expansion of credit (for which, as you say, regulators also share responsibility), and the terms set by fee-hungry lenders and intermediaries, are more to blame than the family that wants a roof over its head it can call its own. Finance for cars and consumer goods is something else; a house is a necessity, and surely, owning one is not an unreasonable aspiration.

Banks should be, but are not being made to face the consequences - look how governments are propping-up Northern Rock and Bear Stearns.

Debt reduction does not seem unreasonable to me. If a life insurance company fails, the book of life business can be passed on to another provider, who is only required to underwrite 90% of the outstanding life cover. So why not for lenders who (through greed and stupidity) have gotten their sums wrong? A 10% reduction in the capital only represents a couple of years' interest. Better a borrower who repays a reasonable proportion of the loan, plus interest, than simply mail back the keys and leave the bank with illiquid stock it doesn't know how to manage.

This is not a problem limited to a single bank -and anyway, there are far fewer these days, and they are much larger, so one failure could really rock the boat. At worst, we could now be facing the prospect of mass bankruptcy, the crash of the credit system and general economic carnage. It's worth coming up with some fudge to keep borrowers and lenders going.

Here in the UK, you can enter an agreement with creditors and as long as you keep up the scheduled payments, interest charging stops altogether. Maybe that would be another way forward - the monthly repayment would be lower and the borrower would see his equity in the house increase over time.

We've been watching enslavement by money-owners who have been licensed to print almost unlimited amounts of their own money, but the poor man only feels it going past and can save none, so remains in debt-bondage. Better any reasonable rearrangement, than "I owe my soul to the company store".

Housing stall, after all?

Looking at the economy now, we have to go well beyond subprime, and consider the general value of housing. Karl Denninger repeats that, in the long term, average house prices are three times income, but at the same time observes that they are "sticky". No-one wants to crystallise a loss, and you have to live somewhere, so why sell now?

If the financial victim next door has to sell his house at a 50% discount, that's all the more reason for you not to sell yours. If no-one sells voluntarily, how do you determine a real, as opposed to forced-sale value? So one effect of the housing drop could be a general slump in sales - with maybe a rise in home swaps for those who need to go to a different geographical area, perhaps for job reasons.

But what about people caught in negative equity? Here in the UK, ditching the house for less than the outstanding loan could leave you being chased for the balance, for years, unless you opt for bankruptcy. However, in the USA, many mortgages are on the roof but not on the borrower, leaving the lender short if the homeowner mails the keys back. Denninger has said more than once that borrowers need to consider this option solely on its financial/legal merits, as he thinks many lenders lost the moral argument when they knowingly advanced far too much to people who they knew couldn't maintain the loans. Now this could really upset the applecart.

Michael Panzner features a piece by FT columnist Martin Wolf. Wolf wonders what may happen if a high proportion of negative-equity homeowners default. The economic impact may be closer to Nouriel Roubini's $3 trillion, than to Goldman Sachs' more sanguine $1 trillion (the latter itself is a massive increase on the sort of figures bandied about before Christmas). Wolf sees two options:

There are two ways of adjusting the prices of housing to incomes: allow nominal prices to fall or raise nominal incomes. The former means mass bankruptcy and a huge fiscal bail out; the latter imposes the inflation tax.

But either option is so unattractive that (despite Denninger's image of paddling furiously as we head for the waterfall) there is a very strong incentive for fudge and delay. We've seen central banks pump many billions into the system in the last few days; and the ratings agencies seem to be trying their best to help maintain the status quo by not downgrading lenders as quickly and severely as some think they deserve. But again, housing is intrinsically illiquid, and houses aren't turned over rapidly like shares, which is why we have "mark to model" instead of "mark to market". What's the rush to crystallise a terrible loss now? Better a Micawberish hope that "something will turn up" than a grim Protestant insistence on an immediate collapse which would benefit very few people.

Assuming wages continue to rise over time, the gap between prices and incomes will lessen. If the homeowners can somehow be reassured that the government is determined to support house prices, then the sell-to-rent speculators could be caught out in their attempt to "short" the housing market. Can they be sure that, having sold their nice house, they can buy another such in the right area for much less, later? What will they do meanwhile?

The real threat is this "jingle mail", and the potential consequences seem so dire that something creative may be done. Bankruptcy rules might be modified to protect lenders; maybe portions of recent loans may be written-off. How about part-ownership, part-rent, as with UK housing associations - having escaped the trailer park, many first-time homeowners may want to keep their foot on that first rung of the ladder. Not everyone will want to pour engine oil into the carpet and trash the light fittings.

So I think we will have fudge, delay and attempts at more creative solutions, and a long stall in the housing market. Unless there's another hammer blow that the system simply can't take, such as an explosion in the financial derivatives market, as arch-doomster Marc Faber expects and (in his inherited Swiss Protestant way) hopes. In that case, every sign we've seen so far is that our governments will run the money-presses white-hot rather than face major deflation. We all have an incentive to paddle away from the brink.

Property slump or stall?

Karl Denninger says house prices over the last 100 years have averaged three times income. What's the implication for us?

This BBC survey says the average semi (a standard unit of housing, one would think) is "worth" slightly over £200,000; official statistics put household income at £33,492. So houses cost around six times earnings.

That suggests a 50% drop is due. But as Keynes observed with wages, house prices tend to be "sticky downward": no-one is in a hurry to realize a big loss on their home equity. Death, divorce and redundancy may force some sales; others may choose to wait, or go for house swaps.

Or wages could double. Up till recently, it was a standard assumption that "inflation" would run at 2.5% p.a. and wage increases 2% above that. Using the "Rule of 72", it would take 16 years of 4.5% wage increases to double nominal incomes.

Whether wages will always rise in real terms, is another matter. One of the effects of globalization is to hold down wages in the developed countries; and food and energy costs look as though they will continue to rise as the rest of the world gets richer and more populous.

What's your house worth?

Home prices WILL contract so that the median house is 2.5-3x the median income

says Karl Denninger. Now do your sums.

Some interesting comments and suggestions (including my usual twopenn'orth) on this post at the Capitalists@work blog - people seriously discussing inflation hedging and survivalism, here in the UK. We're getting beyond ivory-tower discussion.

Going down

Another grizzly, this time Captain Hook:

You should know that when banks begin to fail in the States, and they will, things could spiral out of control to the extent controls will to need be placed on both digital and physical movement. Transfers between banks will cease up completely, debts will be called in (so pay them off now), systems from food distribution to medical care will break down, and Martial Law will be the result as the population retaliates. Life will change as you know it.

[...] Japan has never really escaped the credit crunch that gripped their economy back in the 90's after bubblizing the real estate market. That's the tell-tale-sign a bubble economy is on its last legs you know - when master planners need resort to bubblizing the real estate market. Generally it's all down hill after that on a secular (long-term) basis because this is a reflection of not just a turn in the larger credit cycle; but more, and the driver of credit growth in the end, this is the signal demographic constraints have turned negative. [...] It's a simple numbers game, where an aging population is less prone to take on debt.

He considers the possibility of a Japanese-style asset deflation, which gels with my earlier thoughts regarding a generation-long UK property slump.

Twang

Jim in San Marcos borrows and discusses a chart showing homeowners' equity. As residential property prices drop, more borrowers move into negative equity. He says bank-owned properties (REOs) are already pricing-in a fall of 30%+.

"Examine the disappearing equity. It came from no where and is going back to no where."

That's what happens when credit becomes a form of currency, as the bullion moralists keep reminding us.

Why are banks allowed to create so much "fiduciary money"? Who does own the Fed?