The, er, credit, er, crunch

UK M4 official data here

No wonder most of us have difficulty understanding the financial equivalent of the matter-antimatter drive powering the USS Enterprise. You'd think lending would have decreased, wouldn't you? Smoke and mirrors...

Bank crashes and the Basel Accords

I need information and understanding - please help me, somebody.

I've pointed out more than once that M4 bank lending in the UK accelerated from 2003 on, and I suspected it was something to do with reducing bank capital adequacy requirements, so the government (via its regulators) would have been implicated. In other words, I've been looking for the villain of the piece, and the smoking gun.

But do you think I can find them?

What I have found so far is references to the Basel Accords, Basel I and Basel II. Basel I became law in the G10 countries including the UK in 1992, and Basel II was published in 2004. The general drift, I understand, is to encourage a uniformity of approach to systemic financial risk, and to introduce a system of risk-weighting bank capital according to what the banks are lending against or investing in. What a success that has proved! Perhaps we should refer to the scheme as "Basel Fawlty".

But can somebody help unpack and simplify what actually happened? Is it, for example, possible that this system was perceived by the banks as a more pliable alternative to fixed minimum reserve ratios, and so they reduced the cash in their vaults to the very least that they could tweak the definitions? For example, we have read many times how mortgage-backed securities are at the heart of the subprime problem, because the packages could be represented as having much less risk than they actually contained.

So is the present crisis an unintended consequence of more elastic international regulation, dating back as far as the early 1990s?

Another letter to the Spectator

Let's see if they bin this one: (n.b. I've made a few alterations in the hour since posting)

Sir;

Your leader (“Long live capitalism”, 20 September) calls for a “kick up the backside” to the banking industry. That kick should be aimed elsewhere.

Light regulation and free markets, which the Spectator advocates, depend on the self-regulating properties of a sound money system. But like many others, the British government has long used the fiat nature of its currency-cum-credit to solve temporary problems and create permanent ones. The long-term real growth of GDP is said to average 2.5% annually, yet since 1963 the Bank of England’s own statistics show that the M4 money supply has grown by about 13.5% p.a. Over the same period, RPI has averaged about 6.5% p.a. At this rate, the banks will ultimately own everything.

For the first 5 years of the New Labour administration, M4 growth was, not exactly prudently, but less recklessly, restricted to around 8.25% p.a. However, by 2003 the FTSE had halved from its 2000 peak, and there was gloomy talk of recession; and over the next five years M4 suddenly averaged nearly 14%. Then house prices doubled; hinc illae lachrymae.

How did this happen? The system of fractional reserve lending means that banks can loan out a multiple of what they retain in their vaults. State regulators set the rules for the required marginal reserves, and when reserve requirements are halved, lending can double, and usually will; like Labradors, bankers will have whatever is put on their plate.

Knowing this tendency, the British and American governments have not merely permitted this crisis to happen, but positively created it by a deliberate relaxation of monetary controls. Worse still, they have now decided that instead of destroying excess credit by asset deflation, bankruptcies and share collapses, the monetary inflation is to be consolidated by absorption of bad debt into the public finances.

I don’t see how this can end well. Some commentators are already saying that, if passed unaltered, the proposed American financial legislation could, once properly understood, trigger a major crash in US financial shares, possibly before this letter is published.

I think the Spectator and its economically savvy readers should put on fresh pairs of winkle-pickers, and gather in Whitehall and Washington for some kicking practice.

Yours faithfully

M4 up

FXstreet.com reports (htp: Alice) on significant increase in UK M4 money supply and lending (someone please help me with the distinction). Conclusion: inflation.

To put it in context, click here for BoE long run stats on M4.

The "little hand-mill"

Official figures going back to 1963 show that bank lending has NEVER stopped increasing.

Lowest: 1.1% annualised, for the quarter ending 31 December 1966.
Highest: 44.9% annualised, for the quarter ending 30 June 1972.

Median: 11.9%
Mean: 13.45%

Is it my imagination, or does the graph spike regularly before stockmarket crashes and recessions?

Original BoE data here.

In the late 60s, my school magazine carried a major bank's advert, for 16-year-old school leavers to join them. I aimed at a degree instead. Perhaps I'd have chosen differently if the ad had read "39 thieves looking to recruit trainee".

Prudence

(the percentages are annualised equivalents) Source: Bank of England

Banks, usury and slavery

In the UK, GDP is said to trend long-term to an increase of around 2.5% per year, hence also the Monetary Policy Committee's figure for inflation target-setting.

Since 1963, the M4 money supply has grown by an average of slightly under 13.5% per year. So that would be about 11% p.a. relative to GDP.

This means that bank lending, as a proportion of GDP, doubles every 7 years.

How long can this continue? How long before we are completely robbed and enslaved? Or am I asking a fool's question?

The enemy, part 2

UK M4 stats (click to enlarge)

Money supply, shares and property

Here's a 22 May article by Cliff d'Arcy in The Motley Fool, comparing house prices and the FTSE 100. From mid-1984 to December last year, the FTSE has outperformed by 7.4% compound per year versus 7.2% for houses. But as he points out, houses are "geared" by mortgages, whereas most of us don't borrow to buy shares.

From September 1984 to the end of 2006, the money supply as measured by M4 showed an annualised average increase of 11.64%. Looking at the growth of M4 as against that of two classes of asset, I wonder where the difference went? Do interest charges roughly account for this?