*** FUTURE POSTS WILL ALSO APPEAR AT 'NOW AND NEXT' : https://rolfnorfolk.substack.com
Thursday, May 01, 2008
The "little hand-mill"
Lowest: 1.1% annualised, for the quarter ending 31 December 1966.
Highest: 44.9% annualised, for the quarter ending 30 June 1972.
Median: 11.9%
Mean: 13.45%
Is it my imagination, or does the graph spike regularly before stockmarket crashes and recessions?
Original BoE data here.
In the late 60s, my school magazine carried a major bank's advert, for 16-year-old school leavers to join them. I aimed at a degree instead. Perhaps I'd have chosen differently if the ad had read "39 thieves looking to recruit trainee".
Do recessions lead to inflation?
However, this picture suggests to me that recessions follow periods of higher inflation, and maybe where that inflation continues during the recession, it could be put down to a sort of residual momentum. Why should prices fall at precisely the moment the NBER says a recession has started? Even a cut flower will maintain its bloom for a while.
On the other hand, it seems clear from the above graph that prices do generally seem to fall after a recession. Perhaps this is because of the recently reinforced lesson about thrift, so people become less keen to spend too much on stuff they don't need.
But it's also possible that the recession has cleansed certain inefficiencies in the use of capital - businesses that should have folded faster - and as that capital gets better employed elsewhere, it does its work of improving productivity.
Which it needs to, when people have become more cost-conscious. I recall reading about an American who found a way to sell dresses for a dollar in the Great Depression - he used a machine to stamp out the outline of 100 at a time, so only the machine sewing was needed, not the measuring and cutting. So it was still possible to buy a dress for your sweetheart when money was tight.
But the little hand-mill of monetary inflation continues to grind...
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Tibet and China: clash of cultures
[...]
The Chinese protesters thought that, being Chinese, I should be on their side. The participants on the Tibet side were mostly Americans, who really don’t have a good understanding of how complex the situation is. Truthfully, both sides were being quite closed-minded and refusing to consider the other’s perspective. I thought I could help try to turn a shouting match into an exchange of ideas. So I stood in the middle and urged both sides to come together in peace and mutual respect. I believe that they have a lot in common and many more similarities than differences.
But the Chinese protesters — who were much more numerous, maybe 100 or more — got increasingly emotional and vocal and wouldn’t let the other side speak. They pushed the small Tibetan group of just a dozen or so up against the Duke Chapel doors, yelling “Liars, liars, liars!” This upset me. It was so aggressive, and all Chinese know the moral injunction: Junzi dongkou, bu dongshou (The wise person uses his tongue, not his fists).
Read the rest of Grace Wang's Washington Post article here.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
GloomBoomZoom vs. GloomBoomDoom
Here it looks as though Dr Marc Faber is expecting inflation:
Dr Marc Faber has argued that even in the United States, where property prices are in decline, in an environment of high inflation he would rather own a US$1 million home than hold the same amount of cash or bonds, because the house would better preserve value.
... but here, its extreme opposite:
The view Marc is putting forward is the opposite one - that deflation will be the clear winner, dragging the whole world economy into a slump, with lower prices for commodities as well as stocks and property...
...In a real downturn, the United States (and other developed nations) would stop importing so much oil...and so much merchandise from China, which would have the consequence of reducing energy consumption by China too. Result: lower energy prices and a worldwide recession...maybe even the worst worldwide depression in history.
I think the giveaway in the first, is in the qualifying phrase "in an environment of high inflation". All I've read so far about Marc Faber indicates that his real position is represented by the second.
In my (amateur?) view, we're heading for a bust, and unless it can be avoided (which would be wonderful news), then the sooner, the better. Ideally, it would have happened in 2000 - in fact, it did, but we then got the reckless monetary reflation of 2003-2007.
Why soon? Because the longer it goes on, the more the transfer of productive capacity to the Far East, so that when recovery comes, we in the West won't be equipped to restart.
Sunday, April 27, 2008
Saturday, April 26, 2008
Cure, effect, cause
The authors say that the effect would be better if this reflation came in the form of additional direct government spending, though they acknowledge that it still wouldn't immediately halt the economic decline:
It is somewhat discouraging to see that even a relatively large stimulus plan will fail to prevent a substantial loss of output. But over the medium term, as the devaluation of the dollar and reduced spending begin to exert a moderating effect on the current account deficit, foreign trade will boost output and employment, providing the impetus for renewed growth.
Karl Denninger begs to differ (though in his case, he's still talking about transfers of money, rather than direct government expenditure):
But now we have reached the point where we need $5 in debt to create $1 worth of GDP. As debt levels rise this ratio goes parabolic and ultimately becomes impossible to sustain. That we have reached a 5:1 ratio means that the game is basically up, and the rapidly rising rate of defaults across all areas of consumer debt mean that this "engine" to fuel "growth" simply can't find any more fuel, despite the desires of the bankers and merchants to "make it so."
The Levy paper has echoes of FDR's 30s rescue, but Denninger is more concerned to compare the present mortgage bubble with the one that led to the Crash of '29:
...we've done this before... We saw, in fact, nearly the exact same pattern of practice, fraud and theft that were featured in the housing bubble during the years just before The Depression, and those "standards" in fact were a primary causative factor OF The Depression!
So maybe both parties are correct.
It's also possible that the Uk has got it wrong even worse than Uncle Sam. $600 bn is about £300 bn sterling, but adjusted for relative population size that's only equivalent to £60 bn pumped into the UK economy. We're already talking about a possible £100 bn-worth of mortgage garbage being swapped by HMG for government bonds - and our current fussing over Gordon Brown's crumbling reputation suggests that Prudence wouldn't dare try to reflate with even more direct government spending.
Besides, we are starting with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio than the USA, a State that consumes a bigger proportion of the economy, and a populace that suffers a significantly lower level of personal income on a Purchasing Power Parity basis.
Maybe that's why the pound is matching the dollar in its downward trajectory, and may even overtake it.
I've been wondering recently whether the ordinary investor of the future will be more interested to play in the foreign exchange markets, rather than stocks whose value is lied about, manipulated by rumour and sovereign wealth funds, and nibbled half to death by fees, commissions, taxes and inflation.
UPDATE - Karl Denninger is emphatic that it can't work:
Sack, no.
You can't spend $600 billion in deficits without it coming back SOMEWHERE.
Government spending is not a net positive. You can't only get to a net positive via growth in GDP.
Debt-initiated spending only returns $1 for every $5 taken on in debt.
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Mortgage bond re-rating: reversing the rescue?
Tuesday, April 22, 2008
Second blow
Then a thought: when the recession really bites, the price war will be unrestrained. I don't know what is still manufactured in Britain, but in the second phase, when the poor become acutely cost-conscious, I can't see domestic manufacturers staying in business.
Of course, with social benefits still generous, we're not there yet (they're still buying their kids Xboxes and Lacoste trainers, while SoSecurity lay on taxis to take the tearaways to school-for-the-expelled); but wait for the tax and benefit reviews when public finances finally unravel.
And if I ever do get another new car (the Fiat Brava is kept going on a radiator refill every Saturday), maybe it's the Tata Nano for me.
I'm looking at checkmate and trying not to believe it. But that's my problem; the difference between Western waster education and Chinese school is too clear. And we'll be a sort of nationwide museum of once-were-workers. But I don't want to live in the past.
Quality down, as well as prices up
Monday, April 21, 2008
£50 billion liquidity injection - what does it mean?
In 1936, the Aga Khan was presented with his weight in gold, then 220 lb, or c. 100 kg. Gold currently sells for £14,891.58 per kilo, making the Aga Khan's weight in gold worth £1.49 million in today's prices. However, 100 kg of £50 notes is worth £3.85 million. The £50 notes would weigh as much as 13,027 Aga Khans, but would be worth 33,576"gold-priced Aga Khans".
Or, in pre-crash property terms: it is reported that Sheikh Hamad paid £100 million last year for a penthouse overlooking Hyde Park. Mervyn King has just pledged 500 "Hamads" (or over 700 "Updown Courts", if you prefer).
Or, in height terms:
1 ream of paper (500 sheets) is 5.4 cm thick. So 1 billion £50 notes would make a pile 108 kilometres, or 67.1 miles, high.
Were the Aga Khan of that time to have been the height of the average British man of today (5 ft 9 in, or 1.753 metres), £50 billion would equate to a stack of "gold-priced Aga Khans" (without shoes) almost 59 kilometres high. *
The lowest layer of the Earth's atmosphere, the troposphere, varies from 8km at the poles to 16km over the equator; the ionosphere starts at an altitude of about 80 km, and the US Air Force considers "space" to begin at 81 km.
Perhaps it would be simpler to use a new unit: the "government fudge", one box of which costs £50 billion.
By the way: hands up all those who believe the Prescott bulimia story, of which up to now there was not one breath? Now, hands up all those who have an explanation as to why this story should appear this weekend?
* I think this shows that the Aga Khan was worth twice his height in £50 notes.
Sunday, April 20, 2008
Saturday, April 19, 2008
On freedom
Like a musical string, its harmony relies on bounds. It is the tension between tyranny and anarchy, a common land affording refuge from public and private oppression. It is not lawless. Liberty is to defy another's rule; freedom, to obey one's own; free doom, the "freo la3e" of La3amon's Brut. No law, no freedom.
And now, confusedly and perhaps too late, we must begin to defend our freedom. Here in the once United Kingdom, our self-rule is fragmenting and being sold piecemeal to an unlicked bear-whelp of an aggregated foreign power; in the United States, many of the people and a handful of their representatives are calling for a rally around the principles of the Constitution, while the government becomes forgetful of its foundation. In both, there is economic mismanagement and perilous concentration of wealth. The Big Brother of a political power cutting itself free from popular franchise has his arm round the shoulder of Big CEO, whose business no longer depends on the community from which it sprang. The land will be cleared or peopled at its masters' pleasure; they will move us between their pastures for their profit. The movement will show us that the earth is not ours. We shall be rootless. We shall be dispossessed, wanderers, desperate hired men, like the landless Gregora of Scotland.
This is where we were some two centuries ago. It must all be fought for again, but perhaps, like the valiant tailor, we shall again find a way to overcome the rich and powerful who ravage our lands. Long before the battle, the American Revolution began to assemble its forces among a rabble of pamphleteers, philosophers, dissident clergy, smallholders, inventors, dreamers and adventurers. Every voice, however small, adds to the chorus.
My brother became an American citizen yesterday. Part of the ceremony was a homily, in which the presiding official said (was it a quotation from Jefferson?) that liberty was not passed down to one's children by nature, but by one's actions.
Although my brother has his own views on religion, and although I feel that America has, and has always had, much to learn in its foreign relations, it is without irony that I wish a blessing on America and the American people, and my newly American family.
UPDATE
Not Jefferson:
"Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn't pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same, or one day we will spend our sunset years telling our children and our children's children what it was once like in the United States where men were free."
Ronald Reagan 40th president of US (1911 - 2004)
Friday, April 18, 2008
Denninger calls for a borrower's strike
Hi ho-ho, hi ho-ho
For the playful, you can join the game here.
Thursday, April 17, 2008
China sponsors African dams, for minerals
Tibetology
But is it possible that some of our own museums have an agenda or two?
Big Brother has a thin skin
htp: Schadenfreude
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Weaknesses in US depositor protection
htp: Michael Panzner's "Financial Armageddon" blog.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
And after Tibet?
Friday, April 11, 2008
Defying gravity
So it's not just my perception. Read Karl "hold cash" Denninger's latest.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
The boom that wasn't
There is only one way that home prices where they are, even today, are sustainable - that would be for wages to rise by 30% across the board. That, of course, isn't going to happen, and if it did it wouldn't do you a bit of good because prices would simply rise to the same degree, leaving us exactly where we are now!..
There never was a "boom" in earnings power for middle America. The median family income - including all quintiles - was actually down $500 or so over the last eight years. If you exclude the top quintile it was down materially - 5% or so. And that's in nominal, not constant, dollars...
We're now going to adjust spending and investment levels to incomes because there is no way for us to adjust incomes to spending levels! The big productivity gains that came from computerization are finished, and we've already offshored nearly all of our manufacturing, so there's no more "cheap labor improvement" available either...
If we can keep the government from screwing things up with more vote-buying attempts we'll get through the other end of this, although people's standards of living will change. You won't be able to afford to milk your house for the second Lexus and six plasma TVs, but is this really such a disaster? I think not.
Read the whole thing in all its beauty here.
Next task, when I have the time, is to see what happened to the middle quintiles in the UK.
Monday, April 07, 2008
It really, really is a swindle
Where are the police?
UPDATE
I've been directed (see comments) to this video, "Money as debt", by Canadian Paul Grignon:
Here are the artist's own comments; here's the dedicated website; here's his professional artist's website; and here's a link to the Idaho Observer, with a little extra detail on the making of the film - cut off the last part of the address to see more of the Observer's output.
Whether it's right or wrong, simplistic or not, I'm heartened to see practical idealism like this.
FURTHER UPDATE
Karl Denninger explains why the money-lenders won't permit inflation to run away and destroy the basis of their wealth. And why this means the economy will hit the buffers.
If history repeats itself
What I didn't think to do then, is to illustrate the shape of the Dow if it continues to be as volatile as in the last 40 years. So here goes - same average growth, same inflation rate etc:
It's the volatility that does you in. As Keynes said, "In the long run..."
Matter of fact, if history repeats itself, there's a point around 2021 where in real terms, we're behind where we were in 1967. This time, I will buy beads and wear flares. I'd still be younger than Robert Graves was last time round.
Chirpy
Here he says that America's freedom and creativity will overcome present problems, as they have in the past; here he says the housing market can't be too bad if workers are unwilling to sell their houses in a falling market; and here he claims to love America's trade deficit.
Is he right? Or just seeing affairs from the point of view of a man who's had a good dinner and is assured that, in his case, good dinners will never stop coming? I've often thought that war movies should end prematurely and at different points for a random selection among, say, 20% of the audience, to remove the Olympian perspective.
But it is nice to read someone who thinks it's not all gloom and doom.
Sunday, April 06, 2008
Banks, usury and slavery
Since 1963, the M4 money supply has grown by an average of slightly under 13.5% per year. So that would be about 11% p.a. relative to GDP.
This means that bank lending, as a proportion of GDP, doubles every 7 years.
How long can this continue? How long before we are completely robbed and enslaved? Or am I asking a fool's question?
Saturday, April 05, 2008
Awaiting the caning
The reckoning - the painful correction - approaches.
Doug Noland (April 4) agrees:
It is my view that our economy will require a massive reallocation of resources. We will have to create much less non-productive (especially mortgage and asset-based) Credit and huge additional quantities of tradable goods. In the “services” sector, there will no choice but to “liquidate” labor and redirect its efforts. Throughout finance, there will be no alternative than to “liquidate” bad debt, labor and insolvent institutions – again in the name of a necessary redirecting of resources. After an unnecessarily protracted boom, there will be scores of enterprises that will prove uneconomic in the new financial and economic backdrop. “Liquidation” will be unavoidable.
Will our wise leaders in the UK learn from this?
P.S. How come (Denninger, here) the Dow p/e appears out of whack by 53:13, but the S&P 500 only 20:14? The latter implies only a possible 30% drop, which is a bit less apocalyptic than the 75+% of the Dow!
Generally the Dow and the S&P have followed similar trajectories over various periods, with a little widening in the last 12 months:
Friday, April 04, 2008
Thursday, April 03, 2008
Fishy business in the gold market
Does asset inflation help support stock prices?
You are right, but I believe that this time around it will be equities, rather than commodities or real estate that will provide the hedge against coming inflation. Tobin's Q will prevail due to the juxtaposition of equity prices vs. the other two asset classes (which already had their surges) and the market's increasing valuation sophistication compared to the last time we saw hyperinflation in developed economies (i.e. the 1970s). So I've been buying stocks as an inflation hedge, despite the statistical evidence that this is foolish...
Wikipedia offers an explanation of Tobin's Q here. Essentially, Q is a measure of the relationship between the value of all a company's shares, and the value of the company's assets. If Q is greater than 1, there is some reason (real or imaginary) why the company has extra value to offer; if less than 1, a share investor could buy a company's underlying assets at a discount.
In 2006, Michael Alexander wrote a series of articles for Safe Haven, about stock cycles. Below, from the second in the series, is his graph for Q in several bear markets, including the one which he suggests began in 2000:
According to this, Q was already below 1 in 2006, and since the market is now back to about where it was a couple of years ago, that would suggest that shares are now fairly valued in relation to company assets.
But if history repeats itself, the current bear market has a long way to go, since the other three lasted 15 - 20 years. And in each of the previous cycles, Q slumped below 0.4.
Another complicating factor, thanks to the lending boom, is the real estate bubble. Steve Moyer is firmly of the opinion that real estate is very heavily overvalued, even now. So a collapse in that market would push Tobin's Q back up for many companies, a technical indication that share prices would have to drop steeply to get back to fair value (let alone overshoot to below Q=0.5).
In this context, it's worth noting that one of Mike Alexander's books, published in 2000, is titled "Stock Cycles: Why stocks won't beat money markets over the next twenty years".
Wednesday, April 02, 2008
Is inflation negatively correlated with real stock values?
Obviously, this isn't exactly news - a quick Google leads me to this book by Alicia Haydock Munnell, where she says "The long-run negative correlation between stock prices and the rate of inflation has been confirmed in several statistical studies." Yet another academic study says "The bivariate results for the real stock returns-inflation pair weakly support a negative correlation in the 1970s and 1980s."
But what if we compare real stock prices with changes in the inflation rate? So I've done something childishly simple - perhaps childishly wrong, I await your correction:
First ("L2/J2"), I divided the FTSE index by the RPI index (end December figures in both cases); since the FTSE has grown in real terms by only about 1.6% p.a. since 1970, I think this should reduce some of the statistical noise - in effect, we have the inflation-adjusted value of the FTSE for each year end.
Then I looked at how much the RPI index had changed, year on year, expressed as a percentage.
Then I used Excel to calculate the correlation between the two sets of data. The figure (as you see at the bottom of the sheet) is (0.711). I may be mistaken but I think this shows that there is a strong negative correlation between changes in the inflation rate, and changes in the inflation-adjusted capital value of the FTSE.
(By contrast, the correlation between the annual percentage increase in RPI, and the annual percentage increase/decrease in the FTSE, is only 0.275576.)
Tuesday, April 01, 2008
Panic overstated?
40 years on from the Summer of Love. Here's a chart I made to show the capital value of the Dow at the end of each calendar year.
I used Yahoo! for Dow valuations (ex dividends); rebased them so that Dec 1967 = 100; and adjusted for cumulative inflation as per Inflation Data's calculator.
Theoretically, someone investing a sum in the Dow at the end of 1967 would have had to wait 28 years to see it return to its original (inflation-adjusted) value.
But over the whole 40 years, the averaged return is 2.175% per annum compounded, which is very close to the 2.2% p.a. real capital growth on the S&P 500 (1871-2006) illustrated in the previous post.
These long views suggest that the Dow's recent 12-year zoom is merely a kind of rebalancing. In this context, it's interesting to see that as of September 2007, the price-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 is not far off its average over the period since 1871. The fall in stock valuations since then should have brought the p/e ratio even closer to the norm.
By way of comparison, here below is the result of a similar exercise for the FTSE, though I have been unable to go back further than 1970. Again, it's the close at end December each year up to 2007, adjusted in this case for RPI. FTSE stats from Wren Research, RPI from here and (for the latest 2 years) here.
The overall shape looks fairly similar to that of the Dow over the same period. Average capital gain over 37 years is c. 1.6% p.a. compounded.
Dow & S&P500 adjusted for inflation - importance of dividends
Source: Inflation Data
Monday, March 31, 2008
Saturday, March 29, 2008
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Recent newspage updates
Dumping of US treasuries imminent, starting with Korea, says Burnick
Don Boudreaux interviewed (by a colleague) on his liberal econ book "Globalization"
"Not until total debt comes down to a realistic number can a real recovery take place. If debt is to be destroyed to that magnitude the deflation will be monstrous."
Mish: "Germany fears global meltdown"
Hutchinson: new financial system by 2013
Derivatives: Banking capital "insufficient to handle even one per cent of potential losses."
"Matt" on US M3, the money supply, inflation
California realtors report house prices collapsing (htp: Drudge Report, LA Times)
Skills shortgage hampering US job repatriation, says AT&T chief (htp: Drudge Report)
KPMG criticised for allegedly poor auditing of failed US mortgage firm (htp: Drudge Report)
2008 US durable goods report: semiconductors down sharply since New Year (htp: Karl Denninger)
Monty Guild: stock rally if mortgage bond market stabilises; invest in non-leveraged areas
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
USA - Economy (latest in RED)
"Matt" on US M3, the money supply, inflation
California realtors report house prices collapsing (htp: Drudge Report, LA Times)
Skills shortgage hampering US job repatriation, says AT&T chief (htp: Drudge Report)
2008 US durable goods report: semiconductors down sharply since New Year (htp: Karl Denninger)
Brad Setser presentation (Sept 2006): "Chinese Financing of the United States"
"Naked Capitalism"blog: "China now buys a lot of US debt through London..."
In 2007, UK increased holding of US public debt by 224% to $300 bn, Japan reduced by $50 bn
Major sectors of US economy already in foreign hands
Sub-prime and Credit Crunch (latest in RED)
"Not until total debt comes down to a realistic number can a real recovery take place. If debt is to be destroyed to that magnitude the deflation will be monstrous."
Mish: "Germany fears global meltdown"
Hutchinson: new financial system by 2013
Derivatives: Banking capital "insufficient to handle even one per cent of potential losses."
California realtors report house prices collapsing (htp: Drudge Report, LA Times)
KPMG criticised for allegedly poor auditing of failed US mortgage firm (htp: Drudge Report)
More on the "sucker clause"
Denninger: JPM may have been forced to bid more for Bear Stearns by trick clause
Subprime explained using stickman cartoons (htp: Neatorama)
"Wat Tyler": UK GDP to fall 1.3%
Wagner: Goldman thinks recession means 30% house price drop, 39% mortgages in negative equity
Amerman: 2007 subprime a prelude to much bigger potential crisis
Denninger: house prices to fall 15% - 50%
China's need to expand territory (latest in RED)
Chinese incursions into Arunachal Pradesh (2007 story)
"China Watch" from Jane's Intelligence Review
Official Chinese government website (incl. environment & international issues)
China angling for territory swap with India
Russia's north-eastern border with China: future tensions?
"Maps published in China show Burma as part of Chinese territory"
Unsustainable exploitation of Tibet's natural resources by China
Lovelock: "China uninhabitable by 2040"
Dr William Gray disagrees, predicts cooling within next 10 years (audio)
Chinese agricultural production "could drop 10% by 2050" because of climate change
Climate change in Tibet threatening East Asia's water supply
Investment (latest in RED)
Monty Guild: stock rally if mortgage bond market stabilises; invest in non-leveraged areas
Faber: historically, volatility bad for investors - stay out, take your girl on holiday
Falling US dollar threatens yen "carry trade", could trigger investment crisis
Gold a haven in crisis, NOT a long-term inflation-adjusted investment
Henry To: Cash-to-equity ratio at 20-year high, US stock market "oversold"
Denninger: Deleveraging of hedge funds may hit equities, commodities
Saturday, March 22, 2008
Inflation - UK (latest in RED)
Prof. Costas Milas: M4 money supply growth up to 10% p.a. not significantly inflationary
M4 expansion offset by declining velocity of money (see 2005 slide below) (plus UK M4 in £billions, below, right)
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BoE Bulletin (Q3 2007): "Interpreting Movements in Broad Money"
Monday, March 17, 2008
Intermission
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Wise after the event
I'm don't know what the economics editor of one of the UK's most successful papers earns, but I'd be happy for him to earn double if he could tell us all this "it was so obvious" stuff BEFORE the crisis.
Not that it couldn't have been foreseen. In the late 90s, I was so concerned at US debts and the massive zoom in tech stocks driving the FTSE and Dow into the stratosphere, and so apprehensive of what I thought would be the inevitable aftermath, that I warned clients not to get into the frenzy, reminded them they had an option to switch into cash, moved my wife's pension savings into cash, and (despite the awfulness of modern British schools) resumed teaching as well as holding onto the financial advice business.
Am I wise? No, I listened to what many others were saying, and wasn't blinded by greed. But I wouldn't have learned it from the papers.
And the smugness! "Above all, the current crisis will force us to relearn one of the oldest lessons of all, one from neither the Seventies nor the Thirties but the wisdom of the centuries: that what you owe, you must one day repay." The credit bubble was created by banks, permitted by regulators and governments, and exploited by financial engineers and intermediaries - yet it is the private debtor and the taxpayer that will pay. Don't hold your breath waiting to see unemployed bankers selling the Big Issue.
Back to 2003
I am updating expectations for this Bear Market; I no longer believe 1070 on the SPX will hold, and have now moved to the camp that sees the potential for the S&P to retrace all of the 2003-2007 Bull Market's gains, taking us back to around 800 on the SPX.
In the UK, the FTSE closed at 3,287.00 on 12 March 2003.
Forgive us our debts, Part 2
Caronte, you say:
Suppose it is believed with absolute certainty that every 50 years, say every year divisible by 50, all debts are forgiven. There would follow a bunching of loan demand as the forgiveness date nears, while willing lenders would simultaneously vanish. The market would no longer match credit demand and supply, total welfare would suffer. Debt forgiveness would only avoid this problem if it was done by stealth, unpredictably, once and for all and never again. Like forgiveness of tax evasion or illegal buildings. Difficult to persuade debtors, (or builders, or taxpayers), that forgiveness would not occur again. Lots of people would be encouraged to borrow beyond what they can afford (or evade tax) – the moral hazard implication. Unsustainable indebtedness would multiply rather than disappear. Moreover, a defaulting borrower does not need forgiveness if she genuinely cannot pay: can’t pay, won’t pay, period. If the defaulting borrower has some residual wealth, though less than the outstanding loan, who is to deprive the creditor of that? What legal or moral right would support state action without creditor compensation?
I say:
Caronte, welcome, and many thanks for the length and thoughtfulness of your response. I don't pretend to have your economic expertise, but I still think there's a debate to be had. I'll try to tackle some of your points, not necessarily in strict order.
I suppose that in ancient Israel, the economy was not so monetised as today, so the advent of the year of Jubilee may not have been so disruptive as it would today. I don't really advocate a periodic debt cancellation - though I'm beginning to wonder about the necessity of charging interest. (Isn't it the case that some Swiss banks do in fact charge you for looking after your money securely, instead of making investments with it or lending it out to others?)
Competition between lenders may help keep down interest rates, but it's the ballooning of asset prices - and the consequent increase in the size of mortgage required - that causes the damage. So many are now locked into monster mortgages that a significant rise in interest rates - which otherwise might be appropriate for tackling inflation - is politically very unfeasible.
I argue that the price of houses is pretty much beyond the buyer's control, except that there's a point where a purchase is either not affordable (we seem to have reached that stage) or, as with subprime, fudged at the outset with disastrous consequences later. So I suggest the expansion of credit (for which, as you say, regulators also share responsibility), and the terms set by fee-hungry lenders and intermediaries, are more to blame than the family that wants a roof over its head it can call its own. Finance for cars and consumer goods is something else; a house is a necessity, and surely, owning one is not an unreasonable aspiration.
Banks should be, but are not being made to face the consequences - look how governments are propping-up Northern Rock and Bear Stearns.
Debt reduction does not seem unreasonable to me. If a life insurance company fails, the book of life business can be passed on to another provider, who is only required to underwrite 90% of the outstanding life cover. So why not for lenders who (through greed and stupidity) have gotten their sums wrong? A 10% reduction in the capital only represents a couple of years' interest. Better a borrower who repays a reasonable proportion of the loan, plus interest, than simply mail back the keys and leave the bank with illiquid stock it doesn't know how to manage.
Here in the UK, you can enter an agreement with creditors and as long as you keep up the scheduled payments, interest charging stops altogether. Maybe that would be another way forward - the monthly repayment would be lower and the borrower would see his equity in the house increase over time.
We've been watching enslavement by money-owners who have been licensed to print almost unlimited amounts of their own money, but the poor man only feels it going past and can save none, so remains in debt-bondage. Better any reasonable rearrangement, than "I owe my soul to the company store".
Saturday, March 15, 2008
Market timing
The forecast price-earnings ratios of the S&P 500 for 2008 range from 18.69 to 22.20. This does not bode well for long-term retirement investments made now. If the p/e ratio from the current c. 20 to 16, this would imply a share price decline of 20%, and even then you'd outlive your income in 30% of cases. A p/e of 12 requires shares to drop now by 40%, and that still means a one-in-five chance of running out of cash.
It looks as though, rather than fear a major crash, we should hope for one - as long as we're in cash or something else that's relatively safe and liquid.
Forgive us our debts
"Hatfield Girl" gives a very vivid picture of our slow slide into dingy, shabby poverty, and it has to be every sane person's earnest wish that we (or our fellow citizens) don't return to the conditions so many suffered before the Second World War. Yet what is causing all this but the heavy chains of debt?
A disclaimer: I often feel that I not only know nothing, but never shall know anything, despite much effort. Then I see how the world is going, and wonder who knows better.
Having said that, I'm trying to work out why, as Karl Denninger says, we don't make the banks eat some of the debt they laid on us. In the comments to the Hatfield Girl piece linked above, "Caronte" refers to "moral hazard", a point I entirely accept. But I say that debt cancellation (or rather, reduction) would be a suitable punishment for the principal offender.
In our society, the relationship between mortgage lender and borrower is unequal. You have to live somewhere, and if you don't buy, you have to rent - and rents will tend to reflect the purchase price of houses.
So what determines the price of houses? Supply and demand. And a major element of demand is how much money is available. By adjusting the ratio of deposits to loans as it suits them, lenders can multiply the money supply, as everyone knows (I say everyone, but actually I don't think the public is fully aware of the simplicity and enormity of this scam). Since 2000 or so, the money in the economy doubled, and so, un-oddly I think, did the price of houses.
The lender can decide how much to lend into the market generally, and consequently influence it; the buyer cannot decide, on an individual basis, to halve the value of the type of house he wants in the area where he needs to live.
So by what right should lenders inflate asset prices, fix on them loans of money they created virtually ex nihilo, then deflate asset prices by reducing lending in difficult times, and expect the borrower to bear the full weight of the consequences?
The borrower may have colluded with the lender to take on an unsustainable debt (or one that exposed the borrower to excessive deflation risk), but for reasons already given I suggest it was a shotgun marriage (or a mass marriage, like those Moonie wedding rallies) with the lender handling the Purdey. For subprime borrowers, I think it's fair to argue that the class of people involved means that the lenders had far better knowledge of the implications, and so are far more culpable.
Rather than prop up the worst of the lenders, let them go down. Why should the taxpayer assume the burden? Pay off the depositors, but shrink the lending book - which is mostly funny money, less substantial in its origins than candy floss - a drop of ink on 80-gram paper.
To quote the inscription on the statue of Justice above the Central Criminal Court, "Defend the children of the poor and punish the wrongdoer." The trespasses of the mighty are less to be forgiven.
The silent watchdog
The long-serving Comptroller Generals, both in the USA and here the UK, have recently retired. The difference between them is that the American, David Walker, has spent two years on an increasingly well-publicised Cassandra mission to warn the public of future dire financial dislocation, because of unfunded liabilities such as medical care and pensions. I may be doing a disservice to Sir John Bourn, but I can't remember any media fuss about him going on such a tour here.
Looking at the website for the National Audit Office, I see that in the FAQs, the spelling of "comptroller" comes second, after a dry summary of the NAO's role. However, the "find" option on my Windows toolbar can find no occurrence of the following words in that web page:
disaster
bankruptcy
poverty
IMF
inflation
Some barking from its kennel would now be most welcome.
Thursday, March 13, 2008
In the know
Housing stall, after all?
If the financial victim next door has to sell his house at a 50% discount, that's all the more reason for you not to sell yours. If no-one sells voluntarily, how do you determine a real, as opposed to forced-sale value? So one effect of the housing drop could be a general slump in sales - with maybe a rise in home swaps for those who need to go to a different geographical area, perhaps for job reasons.
But what about people caught in negative equity? Here in the UK, ditching the house for less than the outstanding loan could leave you being chased for the balance, for years, unless you opt for bankruptcy. However, in the USA, many mortgages are on the roof but not on the borrower, leaving the lender short if the homeowner mails the keys back. Denninger has said more than once that borrowers need to consider this option solely on its financial/legal merits, as he thinks many lenders lost the moral argument when they knowingly advanced far too much to people who they knew couldn't maintain the loans. Now this could really upset the applecart.
Michael Panzner features a piece by FT columnist Martin Wolf. Wolf wonders what may happen if a high proportion of negative-equity homeowners default. The economic impact may be closer to Nouriel Roubini's $3 trillion, than to Goldman Sachs' more sanguine $1 trillion (the latter itself is a massive increase on the sort of figures bandied about before Christmas). Wolf sees two options:
There are two ways of adjusting the prices of housing to incomes: allow nominal prices to fall or raise nominal incomes. The former means mass bankruptcy and a huge fiscal bail out; the latter imposes the inflation tax.
But either option is so unattractive that (despite Denninger's image of paddling furiously as we head for the waterfall) there is a very strong incentive for fudge and delay. We've seen central banks pump many billions into the system in the last few days; and the ratings agencies seem to be trying their best to help maintain the status quo by not downgrading lenders as quickly and severely as some think they deserve. But again, housing is intrinsically illiquid, and houses aren't turned over rapidly like shares, which is why we have "mark to model" instead of "mark to market". What's the rush to crystallise a terrible loss now? Better a Micawberish hope that "something will turn up" than a grim Protestant insistence on an immediate collapse which would benefit very few people.
The real threat is this "jingle mail", and the potential consequences seem so dire that something creative may be done. Bankruptcy rules might be modified to protect lenders; maybe portions of recent loans may be written-off. How about part-ownership, part-rent, as with UK housing associations - having escaped the trailer park, many first-time homeowners may want to keep their foot on that first rung of the ladder. Not everyone will want to pour engine oil into the carpet and trash the light fittings.
So I think we will have fudge, delay and attempts at more creative solutions, and a long stall in the housing market. Unless there's another hammer blow that the system simply can't take, such as an explosion in the financial derivatives market, as arch-doomster Marc Faber expects and (in his inherited Swiss Protestant way) hopes. In that case, every sign we've seen so far is that our governments will run the money-presses white-hot rather than face major deflation. We all have an incentive to paddle away from the brink.
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Put your hand in a parting wave
Unbelievable, unimaginable
Michael Panzner reproduces an article by Paul Farrell in MarketWatch about the absolutely enormous international derivative market, currently estimated at $516 trillion. Those numbers are beyond imagining, but if 2% goes bad, that's equivalent to 20% of the world's annual GDP up the chimney.