Martin Hutchinson (07 January) makes my case, with particular reference to Tata and Jaguar-cum-Land Rover :
... it seems likely that the most skilled Westerners will continue to give their countries a comparative advantage against emerging markets. However, there is no guarantee that these research-intensive sectors are likely to support the entire Western population, far from it. They are highly cyclical, benefiting hugely from an active stock market and venture capital market. Further there is no evidence that innovation itself, as distinct from the fruits of recent past innovations, is significantly expanding as a percentage of output -- indeed, research expenditure has if anything declined.
... Since the majority of location-dependent jobs in Western countries are low-skill it therefore follows that if governments wish to protect local living standards, they need to discourage low-skill immigration. Except in Japan, they have not been doing so; both in the EU and the United States low-skill immigration, frequently illegal immigration, has got completely out of control and is immiserating the working classes.
... the economic histories of a high proportion of the Western population under 30, except the very highly skilled, will involve repeated bouts of unemployment, with job changes involving not a move to higher living standards but an angry acceptance of lower ones. By 2030, it is possible that the median real income in the United States and Western Europe may be no more than 50-60% of its level today.
This will expose the democratic divide between those who vote and influence the system in their favour, and the rest. The class division could sharpen as "I'm all right Jack" is replaced by "One can't complain, Piers".
Sackerson awards a Prose Prize for Hutchinson's use of the term "immiserating".
P.S.
... and presumably this will have an obvious effect on residential property prices. Who's for selling up and buying a caravan?
Showing posts with label globalisation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label globalisation. Show all posts
Monday, January 07, 2008
Friday, October 26, 2007
Sovereign wealth funds and national prosperity
I have had a comment (on an earlier piece about sovereign wealth funds) from a Shromon Das, who gives his view on SWFs here and a follow-up today here.
Without pretending to technical expertise in this area, I can envisage implications for a growing ownership of equities by governments. One effect may be to reduce volatility in large-capitalisation stocks, since national treasuries can take a longer view than the individual investor.
But there must also be concern about the possible use of ownership for political purposes. For example, I wonder at the UK's having allowed foreign enterprises to take over some of our energy and water supply companies.
I began this blog for investors, but increasingly I think the real story is not about how some may make (or protect) their fortunes, but about the implications for ordinary citizens.
Today I drove past the site of the former Rover car plant in Longbridge, Birmingham. The firm was on its way out years ago and a venture capital company called Alchemy offered to take it over, cut its size and specialise in a line of sports cars. The rest of the land could be redeveloped - housing and retail. The surplus workers would have their pension rights and redundancy payouts honoured, and some could still look around for employment in other plants.
But there was an election coming (2000), so the government chose to encourage a management buyout instead. Thousands of jobs were saved, supposedly. Besides, it was said (I seem to recall) that the site was too polluted for residential development, anyhow.
Well, Rover did go bust anyway (after a £6.5 million "bridging loan" to prevent its collapse immediately before the 2005 General Election). The workers didn't get the redundancy payments they'd have had from Alchemy in 2000, and their pensions were hit too. Anyone still interested in car work elsewhere would then be five years older, in an industry that some believe discriminated on the basis of age prior to new legislation in 2006.
A Chinese firm, SAIC, has picked over the carcase, with special attention to any designs and other paperwork that might help with setting up an alternative in the Far East. And now the site is being cleared - for residential and retail development.
There is a big, shiny new building on the Bristol Road in Longbridge - a JobCentre Plus.
Where, in all this, were the working people's long-term interests really considered, even by their political representatives?
Without pretending to technical expertise in this area, I can envisage implications for a growing ownership of equities by governments. One effect may be to reduce volatility in large-capitalisation stocks, since national treasuries can take a longer view than the individual investor.
But there must also be concern about the possible use of ownership for political purposes. For example, I wonder at the UK's having allowed foreign enterprises to take over some of our energy and water supply companies.
I began this blog for investors, but increasingly I think the real story is not about how some may make (or protect) their fortunes, but about the implications for ordinary citizens.
Today I drove past the site of the former Rover car plant in Longbridge, Birmingham. The firm was on its way out years ago and a venture capital company called Alchemy offered to take it over, cut its size and specialise in a line of sports cars. The rest of the land could be redeveloped - housing and retail. The surplus workers would have their pension rights and redundancy payouts honoured, and some could still look around for employment in other plants.
But there was an election coming (2000), so the government chose to encourage a management buyout instead. Thousands of jobs were saved, supposedly. Besides, it was said (I seem to recall) that the site was too polluted for residential development, anyhow.
Well, Rover did go bust anyway (after a £6.5 million "bridging loan" to prevent its collapse immediately before the 2005 General Election). The workers didn't get the redundancy payments they'd have had from Alchemy in 2000, and their pensions were hit too. Anyone still interested in car work elsewhere would then be five years older, in an industry that some believe discriminated on the basis of age prior to new legislation in 2006.
A Chinese firm, SAIC, has picked over the carcase, with special attention to any designs and other paperwork that might help with setting up an alternative in the Far East. And now the site is being cleared - for residential and retail development.
There is a big, shiny new building on the Bristol Road in Longbridge - a JobCentre Plus.Where, in all this, were the working people's long-term interests really considered, even by their political representatives?
Thursday, August 09, 2007
Globalisation - a race we can't win
To put it another way, how much more does a Chinese have to earn, to live well and still undercut America?
In the sheet below, I compare six countries in terms of nominal per capita GDP (in US dollars equivalent). These have to be reinterpreted in terms of purchasing power parity, i.e. if local prices are lower, you can enjoy the same things for less money. (Nominal and PPP terms are taken from slightly different IMF surveys, but you get the idea.)
The last couple of columns answer the question, "How much income would each national need, to match America's standard of living?"
In the sheet below, I compare six countries in terms of nominal per capita GDP (in US dollars equivalent). These have to be reinterpreted in terms of purchasing power parity, i.e. if local prices are lower, you can enjoy the same things for less money. (Nominal and PPP terms are taken from slightly different IMF surveys, but you get the idea.)
The last couple of columns answer the question, "How much income would each national need, to match America's standard of living?"
Doubtless there's problems with the methodology - PPP may well change as each country's nominal GDP increases. And it seems clear that the whole world can't live exactly like Americans do today. (It's also interesting to note that pricey, high-tax countries like the UK and Japan can't catch up with the USA without exceeding the latter's per capita GDP.)
But on these figures, China could match American living standards, on a quarter the income. So the low-pay trading advantage it enjoys is huge now, and is likely to remain so.
And look at India and Vietnam - they'd only need about one-fifth American per capita income to have the same in PPP terms. In fact, they could out-compete China in labour costs, which is one reason for China to move away from labour-intensive work like trainer-stitching, and towards heavy industry.
So Vietnam undercuts China undercuts America...
And given India's enormous population, its higher proportion of cultivatable land (compared with China), its well-established political and legal institutions, and its many millions of English-language speakers, it may be that India is the economy to watch this century.
Saturday, July 28, 2007
New Growth Theory and Friedman's "Flat Earth"
Here's an interview with Thomas Friedman in Yale Global Online (18 April 2005). Some quotes, with the issues I see in them italicised:
Lean thinking:
Wal-Mart doesn't make anything. But what they do is draw products from all over the world and get them into stores at incredibly low prices. How do they do that? Through a global supply chain that has been designed down to the last atom of efficiency. So as you take an item off the shelf in New Haven, Connecticut, another of that item will immediately be made of that item in Xianjin, China. So there's perfect knowledge and transparency throughout that supply chain.
International trade vs local social costs:
The consumer in me loves Wal-Mart... And not just me... Some lower-income people are stretching their dollars further because of Wal-Mart...The shareholder in me... loves Wal-Mart... The citizen in me... hates Wal-Mart, because they only cover some 40 percent of their employees with health care... [For the rest,] we tax-payers pay their health care. And the neighbor in me... is very disturbed about Wal-Mart. Disturbed about stories about how they've discriminated against women, disturbed about stories that they've locked employees into their stores overnight, disturbed about how they pay some of their employees. So... I've got multiple identity disorder, because the shareholder and the consumer in me feels one thing, and the citizen and the neighbor in me feel something quite different.
New Growth Theory issues:
What is the mix of assets you need to thrive in a flat world? Money, jobs, and opportunity in the flat world will go to the countries with the best infrastructure, the best education system that produces the most educated work force, the most investor-friendly laws, and the best environment. You put those four things together: quality of environment that attracts knowledgeable people, investment laws that encourage entrepreneurship, education, and infrastructure. So that's really where, in a flat world, the money is going to go.
And I don't really believe much in foreign aid because I think, at the end of the day, that's not how countries grow and get rich. But to the extent that you are going to give foreign aid, it should be to inspire, encourage, and help develop one of those four pillars for whatever developing country you're dealing with. But I do believe in trade, not aid. I think that axiom still applies, even more so in a flat world.
Security:
The flat world is a friend of Infosys and of Al-Qaeda. It's a friend of IBM and of Islamic jihad. Because these networks go both ways. And one thing we know about the bad guys: They're early adopters...
Trade, nationalism and peace:
...what I call the "Dell Theory" – you know, Dell Computers. The Dell Theory says that no two countries that are part of the same global supply chain will ever fight a war as long as they're each still part of that supply chain... here's what I predict: If you do go to war and you're part of one these supply-chains, whatever price you think you're going to pay, you're going to pay ten times more. Once you lose your spot in the supply chain because you've gone to war, the supply chain doesn't come back real soon. They're not going to. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. That's why you really risk a lot. And that's why these supply chains now really mean a lot. They're the new restraints.
Anti-globalization:
The anti-globalization movement ... is basically dead today – because China and India have embraced this process and this project... The anti-globalization movement... [are] all still talking about the IMF and the World Bank and conditionality – as if globalization is all about what the IMF and World Bank impose and force on the developing world. Well when the world is flat, there's a lot more globalization that's about pull. This is people in the developing world – in China, Russia, India, Brazil – wanting to pull down these opportunities.
Intellectual property rights:
Look at what happened in [India] with intellectual property law... there's no question that we did want India to have intellectual property protection to protect our products... But what it turned out was that a lot of Indians wanted it as well because they become innovators themselves. They are now plug-and-playing in this world and they want the intellectual property protections for their innovations.
Failure of Western technical education:
There is a crisis. We're not producing in this country, in America, enough young people going into science and technology and engineering – the fields that are going to be essential for entrepreneurship and innovation in the 21st Century. So we're at a crisis – it's a quiet crisis, as Shirley Ann Jackson from the Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute says. If we don't do something about it, then in 10 to 15 years from now this quiet crisis will be a very big crisis. And that's why my friend Paul Romer at Stanford says – and I totally agree with him – is a crisis is a terrible thing to waste. And right now we're wasting this crisis.
Lean thinking:
Wal-Mart doesn't make anything. But what they do is draw products from all over the world and get them into stores at incredibly low prices. How do they do that? Through a global supply chain that has been designed down to the last atom of efficiency. So as you take an item off the shelf in New Haven, Connecticut, another of that item will immediately be made of that item in Xianjin, China. So there's perfect knowledge and transparency throughout that supply chain.
International trade vs local social costs:
The consumer in me loves Wal-Mart... And not just me... Some lower-income people are stretching their dollars further because of Wal-Mart...The shareholder in me... loves Wal-Mart... The citizen in me... hates Wal-Mart, because they only cover some 40 percent of their employees with health care... [For the rest,] we tax-payers pay their health care. And the neighbor in me... is very disturbed about Wal-Mart. Disturbed about stories about how they've discriminated against women, disturbed about stories that they've locked employees into their stores overnight, disturbed about how they pay some of their employees. So... I've got multiple identity disorder, because the shareholder and the consumer in me feels one thing, and the citizen and the neighbor in me feel something quite different.
New Growth Theory issues:
What is the mix of assets you need to thrive in a flat world? Money, jobs, and opportunity in the flat world will go to the countries with the best infrastructure, the best education system that produces the most educated work force, the most investor-friendly laws, and the best environment. You put those four things together: quality of environment that attracts knowledgeable people, investment laws that encourage entrepreneurship, education, and infrastructure. So that's really where, in a flat world, the money is going to go.
And I don't really believe much in foreign aid because I think, at the end of the day, that's not how countries grow and get rich. But to the extent that you are going to give foreign aid, it should be to inspire, encourage, and help develop one of those four pillars for whatever developing country you're dealing with. But I do believe in trade, not aid. I think that axiom still applies, even more so in a flat world.
Security:
The flat world is a friend of Infosys and of Al-Qaeda. It's a friend of IBM and of Islamic jihad. Because these networks go both ways. And one thing we know about the bad guys: They're early adopters...
Trade, nationalism and peace:
...what I call the "Dell Theory" – you know, Dell Computers. The Dell Theory says that no two countries that are part of the same global supply chain will ever fight a war as long as they're each still part of that supply chain... here's what I predict: If you do go to war and you're part of one these supply-chains, whatever price you think you're going to pay, you're going to pay ten times more. Once you lose your spot in the supply chain because you've gone to war, the supply chain doesn't come back real soon. They're not going to. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. That's why you really risk a lot. And that's why these supply chains now really mean a lot. They're the new restraints.
Anti-globalization:
The anti-globalization movement ... is basically dead today – because China and India have embraced this process and this project... The anti-globalization movement... [are] all still talking about the IMF and the World Bank and conditionality – as if globalization is all about what the IMF and World Bank impose and force on the developing world. Well when the world is flat, there's a lot more globalization that's about pull. This is people in the developing world – in China, Russia, India, Brazil – wanting to pull down these opportunities.
Intellectual property rights:
Look at what happened in [India] with intellectual property law... there's no question that we did want India to have intellectual property protection to protect our products... But what it turned out was that a lot of Indians wanted it as well because they become innovators themselves. They are now plug-and-playing in this world and they want the intellectual property protections for their innovations.
Failure of Western technical education:
There is a crisis. We're not producing in this country, in America, enough young people going into science and technology and engineering – the fields that are going to be essential for entrepreneurship and innovation in the 21st Century. So we're at a crisis – it's a quiet crisis, as Shirley Ann Jackson from the Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute says. If we don't do something about it, then in 10 to 15 years from now this quiet crisis will be a very big crisis. And that's why my friend Paul Romer at Stanford says – and I totally agree with him – is a crisis is a terrible thing to waste. And right now we're wasting this crisis.
Wednesday, July 11, 2007
Peak oil, commodity prices, globalisation, back to the land
An interesting article from Tom Stevenson in Britain's Daily Telegraph, on oil. He reaches two conclusions:
1. it's good news for the commodity investor
2. when supply hits its limit, demand will have to change, and so will our lives
The second is far more interesting. I think we will eventually start listening to the dreamers who are even now formulating new currency systems for localised commerce. And we'll need to unwind our dependence on the car. Think of the implications.
1. it's good news for the commodity investor
2. when supply hits its limit, demand will have to change, and so will our lives
The second is far more interesting. I think we will eventually start listening to the dreamers who are even now formulating new currency systems for localised commerce. And we'll need to unwind our dependence on the car. Think of the implications.
Sunday, July 08, 2007
Living off our inheritance: global wealth distribution, GDP and debt
The World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) launched a report last December, about household net worth around the world. Here's a nugget or two from their press release:
“The study finds wealth to be more unequally distributed than income across countries. High income countries tend to have a bigger share of world wealth than of world GDP.” (p. 3)
This suggests to me that the wealthy countries are to some extent living on their capital.
‘China … fails to feature strongly among the super-rich because average wealth is modest and wealth is evenly spread by international standards. However, China is already likely to have more wealthy residents than our data reveal for the year 2000, and membership of the super-rich seems set to rise fast in the next decade.’ (p.4)
Surprisingly, household debt is relatively unimportant in poor countries. As the authors of the study point out: ‘While many poor people in poor countries are in debt, their debts are relatively small in total. This is mainly due to the absence of financial institutions that allow households to incur large mortgage and consumer debts, as is increasingly the situation in rich countries….many people in high-income countries have negative net worth and—somewhat paradoxically—are among the poorest people in the world in terms of household wealth.’ (p. 5 - italics are mine.)
Figure 7, “Asset Composition in Selected Countries”, shows the proportion of real property, financial assets and debt in 7 countries, including the US, Canada and Japan. Looking at the ratio of debt to financial assets, China is clearly the least debt-burdened.
When a spendthrift heir meets a poor but hard-working and hard-saving entrepreneur, the result seems predictable. Look at page 16 of Warren Buffett's 28 Feb 2007 letter to shareholders, which I quoted at greater length on July 5:
"The world is ... willing to accept our bonds, real estate, stocks and businesses. And we have a vast store of these to hand over.... [but] foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad. In effect, we’ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card."
“The study finds wealth to be more unequally distributed than income across countries. High income countries tend to have a bigger share of world wealth than of world GDP.” (p. 3)
This suggests to me that the wealthy countries are to some extent living on their capital.
‘China … fails to feature strongly among the super-rich because average wealth is modest and wealth is evenly spread by international standards. However, China is already likely to have more wealthy residents than our data reveal for the year 2000, and membership of the super-rich seems set to rise fast in the next decade.’ (p.4)
Surprisingly, household debt is relatively unimportant in poor countries. As the authors of the study point out: ‘While many poor people in poor countries are in debt, their debts are relatively small in total. This is mainly due to the absence of financial institutions that allow households to incur large mortgage and consumer debts, as is increasingly the situation in rich countries….many people in high-income countries have negative net worth and—somewhat paradoxically—are among the poorest people in the world in terms of household wealth.’ (p. 5 - italics are mine.)
Figure 7, “Asset Composition in Selected Countries”, shows the proportion of real property, financial assets and debt in 7 countries, including the US, Canada and Japan. Looking at the ratio of debt to financial assets, China is clearly the least debt-burdened.
When a spendthrift heir meets a poor but hard-working and hard-saving entrepreneur, the result seems predictable. Look at page 16 of Warren Buffett's 28 Feb 2007 letter to shareholders, which I quoted at greater length on July 5:
"The world is ... willing to accept our bonds, real estate, stocks and businesses. And we have a vast store of these to hand over.... [but] foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad. In effect, we’ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card."
Saturday, July 07, 2007
The world is flat - or is it? Is Leamer right about Friedman?
Thomas Friedman's book, "The World Is Flat" is a best-seller - Wikipedia summary here. Friedman's related website is here - I think the photograph of the author is interesting, for those who like to read faces.
Last year, Edward Leamer reviewed Friedman somewhat snippily here. Gosh, I wish people could be more succinct. As Byron wrote of Coleridge, "I wish he would explain his explanation". Still, I guess Leamer has to fly the flag for critical scholarship.
The issue is important: does globalization threaten America's standard of living? Free traders say no. But have a look at Figure 6 on page 33 of Leamer, showing global income distribution in 1980, when US per capita GDP was 4 times the world average. That's quite some inequality, and if they were two very different levels of water in the same canal, opening the lock between them would see wealth gush from A to B.
So as barriers to trade are coming down, why hasn't this happened? Leamer says (p.34), "Much of the difference in GDP per capita among countries comes from the greater amounts of physical and human capital in the West, which advantages aren’t going to go away any time soon."
I'm not so sanguine. As regards human capital, I think the East is very keen indeed to increase its investment in education and training, and isn't hampered by notions of equality of outcome for its students. As to industrial capital, we are watching a vast sucking-in of resources, right down to our iron manhole covers, by China and other emerging economies; but also (particularly in China) we see a rapid and determined acquisition of slowly-accrued Western intellectual capital.
I think the catch-up process would be even faster in China if their industries observed patent and copyright more scrupulously, so they weren't almost wiping out each other's profit margins in their domestic market; and financial capital will accumulate far more rapidly when Chinese manufacturers get to keep more of the foreign buyer's price, instead of losing most of the profit to shippers, distributors, marketers and advertisers. If I were Chinese, I'd be looking at those areas for the training of my bright young people; and I bet they are.
Figure 7 on page 35 compares global income distribution in 1980 and 2000. The rich have done fine, the middle earners have made almost no progress, the poor are gradually rising. But when you think about it, maybe the middle is progressing: Western industrial workers are losing their jobs and looking for work in less well-paid service industries, while new industrial jobs are being created abroad. James Kynge ("China Shakes The World") says he sees heavy industry taking over on the Chinese coast, and labour-intensive light industry being forced inland. The move from low-skilled to higher-skilled labour in China is certainly a progression, matched by downward movement in the West. I wonder what the higher end of the graph will look like in another 20 years, when the Chinese have their own armies of industrial tycoons, company VPs, economics professors, investment analysts and marketing experts? I bet they're quite content to watch their coolie-work go to even poorer countries, as long as it doesn't happen too soon in the game.
Leamer admits (p.46): "The real bottom line: we do not know the breadth and intensity of global contestability of US jobs, and until we do, we will not have a real handle on the impact of global competition on the US workforce."
Why is he relaxed? See page 48:
"Finally, I want to comment on what I think is the big issue. It isn’t globalization or a flat world; it’s technology and the post- industrial labor markets.
The US is in the midst of a radical transformation from industrial to post-industrial society. Some of this transition is associated with the movement of mundane manufacturing jobs to low-wage foreign locations, but much of it comes from the dramatic changes in technology in the intellectual services sectors. The policy response to the globalization force is pretty straightforward: we need to make the educational and infrastructure investments that are needed to keep the high-paying non-contestable creative jobs here at home and let the rest of the world knock themselves silly competing for the footloose mundane contestable jobs."
Well, I don't think the rest of the world is quite as silly as that. I don't think Western education systems are geared to excellence, as once they were; so for that reason, as well as IPR enforcement issues, I don't think we can bank on using our intellectual property to sustain our global income differential. I don't think multinational businesses have, or feel they can afford, nationalistic sentiment. And whenever I read statements that start "we need to do x", I get the feeling that x isn't going to happen. Individuals will still make their stellar way, but I can't envision the West as a whole reclining in comfort in a "post-industrial" society.
But maybe I'm wrong.
Last year, Edward Leamer reviewed Friedman somewhat snippily here. Gosh, I wish people could be more succinct. As Byron wrote of Coleridge, "I wish he would explain his explanation". Still, I guess Leamer has to fly the flag for critical scholarship.
The issue is important: does globalization threaten America's standard of living? Free traders say no. But have a look at Figure 6 on page 33 of Leamer, showing global income distribution in 1980, when US per capita GDP was 4 times the world average. That's quite some inequality, and if they were two very different levels of water in the same canal, opening the lock between them would see wealth gush from A to B.
So as barriers to trade are coming down, why hasn't this happened? Leamer says (p.34), "Much of the difference in GDP per capita among countries comes from the greater amounts of physical and human capital in the West, which advantages aren’t going to go away any time soon."
I'm not so sanguine. As regards human capital, I think the East is very keen indeed to increase its investment in education and training, and isn't hampered by notions of equality of outcome for its students. As to industrial capital, we are watching a vast sucking-in of resources, right down to our iron manhole covers, by China and other emerging economies; but also (particularly in China) we see a rapid and determined acquisition of slowly-accrued Western intellectual capital.
I think the catch-up process would be even faster in China if their industries observed patent and copyright more scrupulously, so they weren't almost wiping out each other's profit margins in their domestic market; and financial capital will accumulate far more rapidly when Chinese manufacturers get to keep more of the foreign buyer's price, instead of losing most of the profit to shippers, distributors, marketers and advertisers. If I were Chinese, I'd be looking at those areas for the training of my bright young people; and I bet they are.
Figure 7 on page 35 compares global income distribution in 1980 and 2000. The rich have done fine, the middle earners have made almost no progress, the poor are gradually rising. But when you think about it, maybe the middle is progressing: Western industrial workers are losing their jobs and looking for work in less well-paid service industries, while new industrial jobs are being created abroad. James Kynge ("China Shakes The World") says he sees heavy industry taking over on the Chinese coast, and labour-intensive light industry being forced inland. The move from low-skilled to higher-skilled labour in China is certainly a progression, matched by downward movement in the West. I wonder what the higher end of the graph will look like in another 20 years, when the Chinese have their own armies of industrial tycoons, company VPs, economics professors, investment analysts and marketing experts? I bet they're quite content to watch their coolie-work go to even poorer countries, as long as it doesn't happen too soon in the game.
Leamer admits (p.46): "The real bottom line: we do not know the breadth and intensity of global contestability of US jobs, and until we do, we will not have a real handle on the impact of global competition on the US workforce."
Why is he relaxed? See page 48:
"Finally, I want to comment on what I think is the big issue. It isn’t globalization or a flat world; it’s technology and the post- industrial labor markets.
The US is in the midst of a radical transformation from industrial to post-industrial society. Some of this transition is associated with the movement of mundane manufacturing jobs to low-wage foreign locations, but much of it comes from the dramatic changes in technology in the intellectual services sectors. The policy response to the globalization force is pretty straightforward: we need to make the educational and infrastructure investments that are needed to keep the high-paying non-contestable creative jobs here at home and let the rest of the world knock themselves silly competing for the footloose mundane contestable jobs."
Well, I don't think the rest of the world is quite as silly as that. I don't think Western education systems are geared to excellence, as once they were; so for that reason, as well as IPR enforcement issues, I don't think we can bank on using our intellectual property to sustain our global income differential. I don't think multinational businesses have, or feel they can afford, nationalistic sentiment. And whenever I read statements that start "we need to do x", I get the feeling that x isn't going to happen. Individuals will still make their stellar way, but I can't envision the West as a whole reclining in comfort in a "post-industrial" society.
But maybe I'm wrong.
Thursday, June 28, 2007
More on railroads, Buffett, Soros
Further to the last post, the Santa Fe railway is now owned by Burlington Northern (BNI), in which Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway has recently increased its stake to over 10%; and this 2002 article in the Observer reveals that George Soros worked as a railway porter. I expect Soros has his hard-headed reasons for his own investment, but it's hard to rid yourself of the love of choo-choos.
Soros' views as summarised in the Observer article resonate today:
His basic arguments remain the same - that centralised institutions need strengthening as a political counterweight to economic globalisation; financial markets are inherently unstable; and there is an inbuilt inequity, or centre-periphery, problem.
...he is examining the minutiae of the workings of the World Trade Organisation, and statistics on capital flows to developing countries.
...there is no level playing field in the world economy. The rules of the game favour the rich, or 'centre', countries. 'Within the well-developed global markets, the centre has a considerable advantage over the periphery because the centre is in charge. And contrary to the false ideology of market fundamentalism, financial markets do not tend towards equilibrium, they need to be managed. So whoever is in charge has a distinct advantage,' he says.
He says conditions set by the IMF during financial crises tend to reinforce boom-and-bust cycles. 'They push countries into recessions by forcing them to raise interest rates and cut budgets - exactly the opposite of what the US is doing in similar circumstances,' he writes in the new book. [i.e. "On Globalization"]
He is also critical of the US obsession with 'moral hazard' - that intervening in financial crises rewards incompetent investors. Bailing-in private investors has replaced bailing-out crisis-ridden countries, he argues. Such policies are building a 'new Maginot line', fighting yesterday's war against credit crises rather than focusing on the real problem of the calamitous collapse in investment flows to developing countries.
Soros' views as summarised in the Observer article resonate today:
His basic arguments remain the same - that centralised institutions need strengthening as a political counterweight to economic globalisation; financial markets are inherently unstable; and there is an inbuilt inequity, or centre-periphery, problem.
...he is examining the minutiae of the workings of the World Trade Organisation, and statistics on capital flows to developing countries.
...there is no level playing field in the world economy. The rules of the game favour the rich, or 'centre', countries. 'Within the well-developed global markets, the centre has a considerable advantage over the periphery because the centre is in charge. And contrary to the false ideology of market fundamentalism, financial markets do not tend towards equilibrium, they need to be managed. So whoever is in charge has a distinct advantage,' he says.
He says conditions set by the IMF during financial crises tend to reinforce boom-and-bust cycles. 'They push countries into recessions by forcing them to raise interest rates and cut budgets - exactly the opposite of what the US is doing in similar circumstances,' he writes in the new book. [i.e. "On Globalization"]
He is also critical of the US obsession with 'moral hazard' - that intervening in financial crises rewards incompetent investors. Bailing-in private investors has replaced bailing-out crisis-ridden countries, he argues. Such policies are building a 'new Maginot line', fighting yesterday's war against credit crises rather than focusing on the real problem of the calamitous collapse in investment flows to developing countries.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Globalisation - is it having an impact on our wealth?
Please see this article on wages and fringe benefits in the US, in which the free-marketers try to show that free trade has not made American wage-earners worse off. I put in a few comments to suggest that healthcare is not a benefit in the same way as cash. I also try to disturb the free-traders' complacency about globalisation.
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