Such a man was Edward Heath. He thought he knew what was
best for this ancient Kingdom. He was wrong, of course. Traitors are never
right. Heath as an Englishman and as Privy Councillor had an absolute duty of
loyalty to this Kingdom.
So what did he do?
Edward Heath was tasked by McMillan to carry out
negotiations for the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community,
for entirely the wrong reason De Gaulle said "non".
When he became Prime Minister Heath was determined to take
us into the EEC at any cost. Sir Con O'Neil, our chief negotiator, was told not
to negotiate but to accept whatever the French offered. Sir Con O'Neil coined
the phrase "Swallow it whole, swallow it now".
The laws which prevented our membership of the EEC had
already been removed: the Act of Provisors was repealed in the Criminal Law
Revision Act 1948, and the Act of Praemunire was repealed in the Criminal Law
Act 1967. The way was now clear for Heath to commit high treason.
But how did he go about it? The first thing he did was to
contact a man named Norman Redaway who worked at the Foreign Office in a
department called the Information Research Department, which during the Second
World War was known as the Office of Strategic Services. Redaway was a spook. Heath
asked him if he could change the mind of the British people and Redaway said he
could do that. He needed help and he got it from a man named Anthony Royle.
Did Heath know what he was doing? The answer is yes, he
sought advice from Lord Kilmuir the Lord Chancellor. His advice is in this
letter*:
 |
| http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/rp2010/RP10-079.pdf |
They set up a conspiracy designed to subvert the English
Constitution, which is the major crime of sedition, and at this level of sedition
an act of high treason. And to hand this Kingdom lock, stock and barrel to a
foreign power the EEC was the major crime of high treason.
But how to do it? First, organized breakfast meetings at the
Connaught Hotel in London; these meetings were attended by Government
Ministers, MPs, the British Council for the European Movement and top people
from ITV, the BBC and the national newspapers. At these meetings the media
people were persuaded to remove all their front line anti-EEC reporters and to
replace them with pro-EEC reporters.
They set up a department in a back room of Chatham House
where five people wrote thousands of letters all purporting to come from people
like you and me, every letter saying what a great idea this EEC was; but the
IRD did not have a facility to distribute them, so they were distributed to the
central offices of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties and the British
Council for the European Movement. They got them signed and sent to the letters
pages of the news outlets. By this method they completely skewed the public’s
perception of what was best for the Kingdom and themselves and their families.
Heath also asked the Foreign office what effect joining the
EEC would have on Britain. They told him it would mean surrendering powers to
govern to a foreign power, and taking on foreign laws.
So both Lord Kilmuir and the foreign office knew it would
mean surrendering powers to govern to a foreign power, Lord Kilmuir saying this
had never been done. Of course it had not, because to do that is treason. The
Foreign Office went so far as to say, "It is important for our politicians
to get positions of authority in the European Parliament, ready for the day it
takes over.”
The rest, as they say, is history, Heath is dead; others are
not. Our job now must be to reverse this ongoing treason by putting on trial
the surviving members of Heath’s machine. In order to do that, check our
website: www.acasefortreason.org.uk.
________________________* Slightly edited copy of the text - from here - is as follows (apologies for the odd line breaks, caused by pasting from pdf):
RESEARCH PAPER 10/79
Appendix 2 Letter to Edward Heath from Lord Kilmuir, December 1960
I have no doubt that if we do sign the Treaty, we shall suffer some loss of sovereignty [...]
Adherence to the Treaty of Rome would, in my opinion, affect our sovereignty in three
ways:-Parliament would be required to surrender some of its functions to the organs of the
Community; The Crown would be called on to transfer part of its treaty-making power to
those organs; Our courts of law would sacrifice some degree of independence by becoming
subordinate in certain respects to the European Court of Justice.
(a) The position of Parliament
It is clear from the memorandum prepared by your Legal Advisers that the Council of
Ministers could eventually (after the system of qualified majority voting had come into force)
make regulations which would be binding on use even against our wishes, and which would
in fact become for us part of the law of the land. There are two ways in which this
requirement of the Treaty could in practice be implemented:-Parliament could legislate ad hoc on each occasion that the Council made regulations requiring action by us. The difficulty would be that, since Parliament can bind neither itself nor its successors, we could only comply with our obligations under the Treaty if Parliament abandoned its right of passing independent judgment on the legislative proposals put before it. A parallel is the constitutional convention whereby Parliament passes British North America Bills without question at the request of the Parliament of Canada; in this respect
Parliament here has in substance, if not in form, abdicated its sovereign position, and it would
have, pro tanto, to do the same for the Community.
It would in theory be possible for Parliament to enact at the outset legislation which would
give automatic force of law to any existing or future regulations made by the appropriate
organs of the Community. For Parliament to do this would go far beyond the most extensive
delegation of powers, even in wartime, that we have experienced and I do not think there is
any likelihood of this being acceptable to the House of Commons.
Whichever course were adopted, Parliament would retain in theory the liberty to repeal the
relevant Act or Acts, but I would agree with you that we must act on the assumption that
entry into the Community would be irrevocable; we should have therefore to accept a
position where Parliament had no more power to repeal its own enactments than it has in
practice to abrogate the Statute of Westminster. In short, Parliament would have to transfer to
the Council, or other appropriate organ of the Community, its substantive powers of
legislating over the whole of a very important field.
(b) Treaty-making Powers
The proposition that every treaty entered into by the United Kingdom does to some extent
fetter our freedom of action is plainly true. Some treaties, such as GATT and O.E.E.C.,
restrict severely our liberty to make agreements with third parties and I should not regard it as
detrimental to our sovereignty that, by signing the Treaty of Rome, we undertook not to make
tariff or trade agreements without the Council’s approval. But to transfer to the Council or the
Commission the power to make such treaties on our behalf, and even against our will, is an
entirely different proposition. There seems to me to be a clear distinction between the
exercise of sovereignty involved in the conscious acceptance by use of obligations under our
treaty-making powers and the total or partial surrender of sovereignty involved in our cession
of these powers to some other body. To confer a sovereign state’s treaty-making powers on
an international organisation is the first step on the road which leads by way of confederation
to the fully federal state. I do not suggest that what is involved would necessarily carry us
very far in this direction, but it would be a most significant step and one for which there is no
precedent in our case. Moreover, a further surrender of Parliamentary supremacy would
necessarily be involved: as you know, although the treaty-making power is vested in the
Crown, Parliamentary sanction is required for any treaty which involves a change in the law
or the imposition of taxation (to take only two examples), and we cannot ratify such a treaty unless Parliament consents. But if binding treaties are to be entered into on our behalf, Parliament must surrender this function and either resign itself to becoming a rubber stamp or give the Community, in effect, the power to amend our domestic laws.
(c) Independence of the Courts
There is no precedent for our final appellate tribunal being required to refer questions of law
(even in a limited field) to another court and – as I assume to be the implication of ‘refer’ to
accept that court’s decision. You will remember that when a similar proposal was considered
in connection with the Council of Europe we felt strong objection to it. I have no doubt that
the whole of the legal profession in this country would share my dislike for such a proposal
which must inevitably detract from the independence and authority of our courts.
Of these three objections, the first two are by far the more important. I must emphasise that in
my view the surrenders of sovereignty involved are serious ones and I think that, as a matter
of practical politics, it will not be easy to persuade Parliament or the public to accept them. I
am sure that it would be a great mistake to under-estimate the force of the objections to them.
But those objections ought to be brought out into the open now because, if we attempt to
gloss over them at this stage, those who are opposed to the whole idea of our joining the
Community will certainly seize on them with more damaging effect later on. Having said
this, I would emphasise once again that, although these constitutional consideration must be
given their full weight when we come to balance the arguments on either side, I do not for
one moment wish to convey the impression that they must necessarily tip the scale. In the
long run we shall have to decide whether economic factors require us to make some sacrifice
of sovereignty: my concern is to ensure that we should see exactly what it is that we are being
called on to sacrifice, and how serious our loss would be.
http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/rp2010/RP10-079.pdf
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Figure 1: Distributions and ranges for climate sensitivity from different lines of evidence. The circle indicates the most likely value. The thick coloured bars indicate likely value (more than 66% probability). The thin coloured bars indicate most likely values (more than 90% probability). Dashed lines indicate no robust constraint on an upper bound. The IPCC likely range (2 to 4.5°C) and most likely value (3°C) are indicated by the vertical grey bar and black line, respectively.