An old (Jan 2006) interview on Financial Sense with George Gu gives some more hopeful signs: progress towards the rule of law (as we in the West slide into bureaucratic authoritarianism); opening up the economy to outsiders; a reducing role for the military.
Like James Kynge, Gu makes the point that the big profits are made by the multinationals - the cheap labour input from China is only a small factor. (Surely this shows that there is a very strong incentive for China to develop its own marketing and management class.)
Gu explains that although India's labour costs are even lower than China's, India hasn't yet developed its supply chain and infrastructure to the same degree:
... China, over the last 26 years has gotten all of them in one place. For example, in consumer electronics you can set up your shop in Guangdong, then you get more than 10,000 component makers.
So, the gauntlet is thrown at India's feet.
Showing posts with label James Kynge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James Kynge. Show all posts
Monday, October 29, 2007
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
James Kynge on China in 2014
If you've read James Kynge's very worrying book "China shakes the world" (2006), you may be interested in an article he published before then, in November 2004. It's in "The Alchemist", which is the quarterly journal of the London Bullion Market Association. Some salient points (though I can't say whether Kynge would say exactly the same things now):
1. The housing market has soared in China, creating massive wealth.
2. "The economy does not look terribly overheated or overbuilt."
3. "Consumer spending - especially on services - is quite a bit higher than official statistics show." (Perhaps this will answer Richard Duncan's recommendation to stimulate demand in developing economies.)
4. Property prices are so high (in 2004) that the rate of appreciation must slow down, which in turn will reduce the demand for steel, aluminium and cement; "a GDP slowdown is in prospect."
5. In 2003, China was responsible for nearly all the increased demand for copper, nickel and steel, but its appetite will endure: "When, and if, China overtakes the US as the world's largest economy, its people on a per capita basis will only be one sixth as wealthy as Americans. They will still be hungry, still cost competitive."
6. The middle class will grow more quickly than GDP; high-tech industrial wage rates will increase; low-tech factories are being forced inland, away from the trading seaboard.
7. China will move from manufacturing (at that time 60% of GDP, versus 30% in the US) towards services and a knowledge economy.
8. China will not collapse, but environmental problems will slow its industrial growth. Land is already intensively used, the north is short of water; air pollution is increasing the burden of health care to the point where the cost may exceed the value of extra factory output.
9. Demographics will also slow China - the over-60s are expected to rise from 11% of the population in 2004 to 28% by 2040. "China may grow old before it grows rich."
10. "China already has too much stuff" - the oversupply of manufactured goods has wiped out profit margins and the banking system is full of debt.
Going back to point 5 for a moment, Kynge doesn't see an end to the trading imbalance. China may decelerate, but it's still going to suck wealth out of the West for a long time.
1. The housing market has soared in China, creating massive wealth.
2. "The economy does not look terribly overheated or overbuilt."
3. "Consumer spending - especially on services - is quite a bit higher than official statistics show." (Perhaps this will answer Richard Duncan's recommendation to stimulate demand in developing economies.)
4. Property prices are so high (in 2004) that the rate of appreciation must slow down, which in turn will reduce the demand for steel, aluminium and cement; "a GDP slowdown is in prospect."
5. In 2003, China was responsible for nearly all the increased demand for copper, nickel and steel, but its appetite will endure: "When, and if, China overtakes the US as the world's largest economy, its people on a per capita basis will only be one sixth as wealthy as Americans. They will still be hungry, still cost competitive."
6. The middle class will grow more quickly than GDP; high-tech industrial wage rates will increase; low-tech factories are being forced inland, away from the trading seaboard.
7. China will move from manufacturing (at that time 60% of GDP, versus 30% in the US) towards services and a knowledge economy.
8. China will not collapse, but environmental problems will slow its industrial growth. Land is already intensively used, the north is short of water; air pollution is increasing the burden of health care to the point where the cost may exceed the value of extra factory output.
9. Demographics will also slow China - the over-60s are expected to rise from 11% of the population in 2004 to 28% by 2040. "China may grow old before it grows rich."
10. "China already has too much stuff" - the oversupply of manufactured goods has wiped out profit margins and the banking system is full of debt.
Going back to point 5 for a moment, Kynge doesn't see an end to the trading imbalance. China may decelerate, but it's still going to suck wealth out of the West for a long time.
Marc Faber: consumer spending to decrease
Seeking Alpha's Sunday review of fund manager stock suggestions reveals that Marc Faber expects consumer discretionary spending to decrease:
"He calls for a 10% correction by year-end, with emerging markets down 20%."
That may reduce the monthly trade deficit for a while, but won't turn it into a surplus. China's ultra-low wage costs, combined with what seems to be very loose enforcement of intellectual property rights, are still set to hollow out Western industrial production of all kinds, as James Kynge's book makes abundantly and frighteningly clear.
It's all very well finding ways for individual investors to benefit, but if you haven't got spare money to invest, you can't back the winner in this unequal contest. Without some degree of prosperity, what real peace will our countries have? I'd like to see a credible national economic plan from our politicians.
"He calls for a 10% correction by year-end, with emerging markets down 20%."
That may reduce the monthly trade deficit for a while, but won't turn it into a surplus. China's ultra-low wage costs, combined with what seems to be very loose enforcement of intellectual property rights, are still set to hollow out Western industrial production of all kinds, as James Kynge's book makes abundantly and frighteningly clear.
It's all very well finding ways for individual investors to benefit, but if you haven't got spare money to invest, you can't back the winner in this unequal contest. Without some degree of prosperity, what real peace will our countries have? I'd like to see a credible national economic plan from our politicians.
Saturday, June 16, 2007
European sclerosis and a Chinese freebooter
I have just begun reading James Kynge's book, "China shakes the world". He takes as his starting-point the move of the enormous ThyssenKrupp steelworks from the German Ruhr to China in 2002. Lessons are leaping off the page immediately:
1. German steelworkers expected a 30-odd hour working week; the Chinese demolition team worked 12-hour shifts, seven days a week and unmade the factory in a third of the estimated time. The Chinese didn't use safety harnesses and looked like acrobats.
2. The political project of a united Germany had incurred costs that led to higher taxes, which slowed the economy at an already critical time, the late 90s.
3. The Germans were willing to sell the steel plant for its scrap value, because the market for that commodity was in a slump in 2000. But the Chinese man (Shen Wenrong) who bought it could see several things: the slump would eventually come to an end; the plant produced high-quality steel that emerging Chinese car factories would need; buying a second-hand factory meant he could get into production faster and more cheaply.
The writer points out that if the Germans had waited until 2004, the market in steel would have recovered so far that the plant would have been profitable again, in Dortmund, where iron had been made for nearly 200 years.
Doubtless Kynge intends us to see this as a symbolic example: a Europe more concerned with unification and workers' rights, than with global competitiveness; regulation and taxation hobbling the economy; stupid, short-sighted management. (This, by the way, is the Europe that my country seems determined to marry, sans pre-nuptial contract.)
Shen not only foresaw the resurgence of steel, but expects it to collapse again. In 2004 he said:
When the next crash in world steel prices comes, and it will certainly come in the next few years, a lot of our competitors who have bought expensive new equipment from abroad will go bust or be so weighed down by debt that they will not be able to move. At that time you will see that this purchase was good.
Industry and thrift, as per Benjamin Franklin (or indeed any late eighteenth-century enterpreneur). And long-sighted strategy, without the benefit of an MBA. Shen has a tiny desk, takes information by word of mouth and on A4 paper (not plasma screens), and makes fast, one-man decisions all day.
Yet what he does, is no more than what our people once did here.
1. German steelworkers expected a 30-odd hour working week; the Chinese demolition team worked 12-hour shifts, seven days a week and unmade the factory in a third of the estimated time. The Chinese didn't use safety harnesses and looked like acrobats.
2. The political project of a united Germany had incurred costs that led to higher taxes, which slowed the economy at an already critical time, the late 90s.
3. The Germans were willing to sell the steel plant for its scrap value, because the market for that commodity was in a slump in 2000. But the Chinese man (Shen Wenrong) who bought it could see several things: the slump would eventually come to an end; the plant produced high-quality steel that emerging Chinese car factories would need; buying a second-hand factory meant he could get into production faster and more cheaply.
The writer points out that if the Germans had waited until 2004, the market in steel would have recovered so far that the plant would have been profitable again, in Dortmund, where iron had been made for nearly 200 years.
Doubtless Kynge intends us to see this as a symbolic example: a Europe more concerned with unification and workers' rights, than with global competitiveness; regulation and taxation hobbling the economy; stupid, short-sighted management. (This, by the way, is the Europe that my country seems determined to marry, sans pre-nuptial contract.)
Shen not only foresaw the resurgence of steel, but expects it to collapse again. In 2004 he said:
When the next crash in world steel prices comes, and it will certainly come in the next few years, a lot of our competitors who have bought expensive new equipment from abroad will go bust or be so weighed down by debt that they will not be able to move. At that time you will see that this purchase was good.
Industry and thrift, as per Benjamin Franklin (or indeed any late eighteenth-century enterpreneur). And long-sighted strategy, without the benefit of an MBA. Shen has a tiny desk, takes information by word of mouth and on A4 paper (not plasma screens), and makes fast, one-man decisions all day.
Yet what he does, is no more than what our people once did here.
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