Wednesday, January 09, 2013
What Lessons From Germany and Denmark? [2]
If the Danish electricity sector is an unrepresentative model for most other nations to follow, by dint of its hard-to-replicate access to ultra-flexible hydro electricity from Norway, the Danes do at least seem to have a feasible (if expensive) structure in place. The same cannot be said of Germany, that other favourite exemplar of red/green advocates of renewable energy, which upon examination is a very odd model for them to be eulogising.
To summarise: Germany barely got through 2012 without serious blackouts; voltage has become highly unreliable in many parts of their complex grid system; heavily subsidised renewables have trashed the German wholesale power market; neighbouring markets are also suffering as a result of unpredictable surges of German wind-power exports; Germany is building a large number of big new coal- and lignite-fired power stations to cope; in the interim, they have become dependent on large-scale imports from some very dirty old lignite plants in Eastern Europe; and to crown it all, their CO2 emissions are increasing!
How has this come to pass?
On major issues like energy, German policy is generally framed by big, set-piece legislation that lays down what is in effect a national plan. The last coherent German energy plan dates back to the 1980s, and more recent policies have been layered on top in an ad hoc fashion. That's how it's often done in the UK and other countries, but for methodical Germany it is anomalous: and intelligent Germans view the resultant mess as inevitable.
The most recent nonsense was the sequence of on-off-on-off nuclear decisions, culminating in a post-Fukushima bombshell: the summary closure of a large part of the nuclear fleet. This was always going to leave a big gap to fill in a hurry - hence the immediate increase in imports, which naturally come from neighbours with surplus capacity: France (nuclear, of course), Poland and the Czech Republic (coal, some of it dreadfully polluting lignite). The ironies are obvious, and one hopes the anti-nuke greens are proud of themselves.
But the subtler and even less tractable issue is the unforeseen impact of large amounts of 'must take' wind- and solar-power, financed by whopping subsidies. (The electricity doesn't even need to be generated - the producer merely needs to install the plant. There are many windfarms in northern Germany that are completed but not connected to the grid - the system cannot accommodate them, and they lie idle - getting paid anyway.)
Key to the situation is that the marginal cost of wind- and solar-power is close to zero. Unsurprisingly, at times of the day when large quantities of zero-cost power are being fed into the grid (foisted on utilities who must take it, irrespective of its market value), the impact on the wholesale market price is to reduce it substantially - not just to zero, it sometimes actually goes negative, so that people are being paid to take power off the system
The timing of wind generation is notoriously unpredictable, but solar is straightforward: it peaks around noon. In Germany (though not in all countries) this at least coincides with peak demand. The impact on wholesale prices is clear.
One cannot fail to notice (a) demand rising to maximum at midday ('Volume' on the chart) which would 'normally' coincide with the highest hourly prices: but (b) a midday collapse in hourly price, which at 1pm is lower than at midnight ! The market price for 'peak' electricity as defined in the German/Austrian market (9 am to 8 pm) is now barely greater than for baseload (24-hour), meaning inter alia that no-one will see any incentive to build or run a plant designed to offer flexibility. In particular, it fundamentally undermines the economics of flexible gas-fired plant, which - since no subsidies are on offer to fossil fuels - needs a 'normal', undistorted day-time price to pay its way. And yet that is the very plant needed to balance the vagaries of wind generation !
Why this was not foreseen is a matter for conjecture. (Personally, I reckon - and have offered evidence elsewhere - that many Germans who should know better genuinely do not understand how markets work.) But of this we may be sure: its impact is highly destabilising.
READ ON:
PART THREE
PART FOUR (CONCLUSION)
PREVIOUS: PART ONE
Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy. The blog author may have, or intend to change, a personal position in any stock or other kind of investment mentioned.
To summarise: Germany barely got through 2012 without serious blackouts; voltage has become highly unreliable in many parts of their complex grid system; heavily subsidised renewables have trashed the German wholesale power market; neighbouring markets are also suffering as a result of unpredictable surges of German wind-power exports; Germany is building a large number of big new coal- and lignite-fired power stations to cope; in the interim, they have become dependent on large-scale imports from some very dirty old lignite plants in Eastern Europe; and to crown it all, their CO2 emissions are increasing!
How has this come to pass?
On major issues like energy, German policy is generally framed by big, set-piece legislation that lays down what is in effect a national plan. The last coherent German energy plan dates back to the 1980s, and more recent policies have been layered on top in an ad hoc fashion. That's how it's often done in the UK and other countries, but for methodical Germany it is anomalous: and intelligent Germans view the resultant mess as inevitable.
The most recent nonsense was the sequence of on-off-on-off nuclear decisions, culminating in a post-Fukushima bombshell: the summary closure of a large part of the nuclear fleet. This was always going to leave a big gap to fill in a hurry - hence the immediate increase in imports, which naturally come from neighbours with surplus capacity: France (nuclear, of course), Poland and the Czech Republic (coal, some of it dreadfully polluting lignite). The ironies are obvious, and one hopes the anti-nuke greens are proud of themselves.
But the subtler and even less tractable issue is the unforeseen impact of large amounts of 'must take' wind- and solar-power, financed by whopping subsidies. (The electricity doesn't even need to be generated - the producer merely needs to install the plant. There are many windfarms in northern Germany that are completed but not connected to the grid - the system cannot accommodate them, and they lie idle - getting paid anyway.)
Key to the situation is that the marginal cost of wind- and solar-power is close to zero. Unsurprisingly, at times of the day when large quantities of zero-cost power are being fed into the grid (foisted on utilities who must take it, irrespective of its market value), the impact on the wholesale market price is to reduce it substantially - not just to zero, it sometimes actually goes negative, so that people are being paid to take power off the system
The timing of wind generation is notoriously unpredictable, but solar is straightforward: it peaks around noon. In Germany (though not in all countries) this at least coincides with peak demand. The impact on wholesale prices is clear.
 |
| Source: EPEX |
Why this was not foreseen is a matter for conjecture. (Personally, I reckon - and have offered evidence elsewhere - that many Germans who should know better genuinely do not understand how markets work.) But of this we may be sure: its impact is highly destabilising.
READ ON:
PART THREE
PART FOUR (CONCLUSION)
PREVIOUS: PART ONE
Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy. The blog author may have, or intend to change, a personal position in any stock or other kind of investment mentioned.
Sunday, January 06, 2013
What Lessons from Germany and Denmark? [1]
Energy, like defence, is a topic where huge numbers of people seem to have strong views based on very little knowledge. If evidence is required, go to the Guardian’s Comment is Free website where almost any piece on an energy topic receives hundreds of comments exhibiting ignorance aplenty.
A favourite theme from the green/red camp is ‘what about Germany?’ or its close variant ‘if Denmark can do it, we can, too’. The ‘it’ in question is of course very large-scale renewable generation in both countries, which is taken to be triumphantly proving its worth there in quantities that put the UK to shame.
At the headline level, the statistics are striking. In the 1st half of 2012, renewables generated around 25% of Germany’s electricity, of which 9% was wind and 5% solar. (The balance is mostly biofuels, which greens are a bit more ambivalent about, but let that pass.) Denmark has reached 24% of electricity consumption being generated from renewables: and as a percentage of Denmark’s own generation, the figures are even more remarkable: over 40% is renewable, of which 28% is wind.
The difference between Denmark’s ‘24% of consumption’ and ‘40% of own generation’ immediately tips us off to an important additional factor – imports, or, more generally, cross-border electricity trade. Trade between interconnected countries is generally in either direction at different times, as advocates of free trade would hope and expect: wholesale electricity prices in one country will rarely be identical to those in a neighbour’s market, given different supply/demand dynamics, generation fleets, weather etc. Cross-border trade is the highly appropriate result.
In Denmark’s case the detailed pattern is complex: they do indeed export electricity some of the time but, as the figures suggest, they are generally substantial net importers. Wind turbines, of course, produce ‘intermittently’ (and relatively unpredictably): and anyone wishing to hold up Denmark’s renewables as an example for other nations should be aware that their significant amount of wind generation is only feasible because of the ease with which they are able to import the ultra-flexible hydro-power available from Norway. Attempting to balance the grid using their remaining indigenous sources - the largest of which is, yes, coal - would not be remotely economic, and in fact would probably not be feasible at any price (we will comment later on cost aspects.)
Wind plus hydro can be a feasible combination with which to satisfy electricity demand. Denmark, where this is achievable, doesn’t offer a model for countries where there is little or no hydro on tap (or, of course, some equally flexible alternative - of which there are very few indeed).
Germany’s import / export pattern is exceptionally complex, and changing all the time as the unexpected post-Fukushima decision, to shut down a significant portion of its nuclear capacity, is accommodated. But it is not hydro imports that make Germany an unconvincing model for other nations. Rather, it is the distinct possibility that Germany’s power system is not feasible at all.
Read on:
PART TWO
PART THREE
PART FOUR (CONCLUSION)
Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy. The blog author may have, or intend to change, a personal position in any stock or other kind of investment mentioned.
A favourite theme from the green/red camp is ‘what about Germany?’ or its close variant ‘if Denmark can do it, we can, too’. The ‘it’ in question is of course very large-scale renewable generation in both countries, which is taken to be triumphantly proving its worth there in quantities that put the UK to shame.
At the headline level, the statistics are striking. In the 1st half of 2012, renewables generated around 25% of Germany’s electricity, of which 9% was wind and 5% solar. (The balance is mostly biofuels, which greens are a bit more ambivalent about, but let that pass.) Denmark has reached 24% of electricity consumption being generated from renewables: and as a percentage of Denmark’s own generation, the figures are even more remarkable: over 40% is renewable, of which 28% is wind.
The difference between Denmark’s ‘24% of consumption’ and ‘40% of own generation’ immediately tips us off to an important additional factor – imports, or, more generally, cross-border electricity trade. Trade between interconnected countries is generally in either direction at different times, as advocates of free trade would hope and expect: wholesale electricity prices in one country will rarely be identical to those in a neighbour’s market, given different supply/demand dynamics, generation fleets, weather etc. Cross-border trade is the highly appropriate result.
In Denmark’s case the detailed pattern is complex: they do indeed export electricity some of the time but, as the figures suggest, they are generally substantial net importers. Wind turbines, of course, produce ‘intermittently’ (and relatively unpredictably): and anyone wishing to hold up Denmark’s renewables as an example for other nations should be aware that their significant amount of wind generation is only feasible because of the ease with which they are able to import the ultra-flexible hydro-power available from Norway. Attempting to balance the grid using their remaining indigenous sources - the largest of which is, yes, coal - would not be remotely economic, and in fact would probably not be feasible at any price (we will comment later on cost aspects.)
Wind plus hydro can be a feasible combination with which to satisfy electricity demand. Denmark, where this is achievable, doesn’t offer a model for countries where there is little or no hydro on tap (or, of course, some equally flexible alternative - of which there are very few indeed).
Germany’s import / export pattern is exceptionally complex, and changing all the time as the unexpected post-Fukushima decision, to shut down a significant portion of its nuclear capacity, is accommodated. But it is not hydro imports that make Germany an unconvincing model for other nations. Rather, it is the distinct possibility that Germany’s power system is not feasible at all.
Read on:
PART TWO
PART THREE
PART FOUR (CONCLUSION)
Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy. The blog author may have, or intend to change, a personal position in any stock or other kind of investment mentioned.
Max Keiser and George Galloway: a deafening silence in the media
On 20th November, Max Keiser addressed a large audience in the Grand Committee Room in the Houses of Parliament, as the guest of George Galloway MP.
Galloway pointed out that this was the second largest public room in Parliament (the first had already been booked) and all MPs had been invited in writing, twice - yet none of them had turned up.
In some ways this is understandable: Galloway is "colourful" and, to me, something of an enigma, and his fellow Parliamentarians must have considered the risk of tainting by association.
Or worse, reputational entrapment: for although Keiser had strong criticisms to make of Gordon Brown's gold sale (1999 - 2002), which he said is the moment when Britain's independence was surrendered, he also laid the blame for the present crisis on the monetary expansion that began under Reagan and Thatcher. Additionally, he had harsh words to say about George Osborne and David Cameron, whom he sees as fighting for corrupt City interests. In the circumstances, MPs on both sides must have seen little political advantage in attending.
Yet there wasn't that much else on in Parliament on the evening of 20th November. The House of Commons Order of Business after 7 p.m. was a handful of decisions to be made without debate, plus the presentation of a petition and the Adjournment Debate. Granted, many MPs would be heading home for the weekend - but another hour or so, of worthwhile economic instruction, might have done them some good.
And it's surprising that, try as I may, I can find no mainstream media report of Keiser's speech. Remember that he is possibly the most-watched TV journalist in the world, talking on a subject of the utmost importance in the very heart of London. This, perhaps deliberate neglect plays into the growing public cynicism about our political elite and the Fourth Estate.
Regular Keiser-watchers will have heard much of his material before, many times, though it may be news to some that the reason he's shifted his base of operations to London is that he wants a ringside seat to cover what he sees as the coming, full-blown disaster of historic proportions, and expects our poor country to be the epicentre.
He also says that Germany will use its gold hoard and massive Eurobond issuance to establish its advantage over the City; Frankfurt will become the centre of banking and trading in Europe, he feels. Britain, having allowed its financial sector to swell to over 10% of national GDP, has set itself up for a terrible fall.
According to Keiser, only raising interest rates sharply - as Paul Volcker did in the USA (20% by 1981) - can cleanse the speculation and malpractice from the system; and he doesn't see us doing that.
Also interesting in this film, is the naivety of questions, underlining Keiser's (and George Osborne's) observations about the financial illiteracy of the British public.
Like Nigel Farage (another ex-financial trader), Keiser is loud, brash and fast-talking (he starts more sentences than he finishes); and both are also, in my assessment, completely sincere in their concern and indignation.
The film lasts slightly more than an hour, but you can simply listen to it while doing something else, as I did. I think you'll find it worth your while.
Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy. The blog author may have, or intend to change, a personal position in any stock or other kind of investment mentioned.
Galloway pointed out that this was the second largest public room in Parliament (the first had already been booked) and all MPs had been invited in writing, twice - yet none of them had turned up.
In some ways this is understandable: Galloway is "colourful" and, to me, something of an enigma, and his fellow Parliamentarians must have considered the risk of tainting by association.
Or worse, reputational entrapment: for although Keiser had strong criticisms to make of Gordon Brown's gold sale (1999 - 2002), which he said is the moment when Britain's independence was surrendered, he also laid the blame for the present crisis on the monetary expansion that began under Reagan and Thatcher. Additionally, he had harsh words to say about George Osborne and David Cameron, whom he sees as fighting for corrupt City interests. In the circumstances, MPs on both sides must have seen little political advantage in attending.
Yet there wasn't that much else on in Parliament on the evening of 20th November. The House of Commons Order of Business after 7 p.m. was a handful of decisions to be made without debate, plus the presentation of a petition and the Adjournment Debate. Granted, many MPs would be heading home for the weekend - but another hour or so, of worthwhile economic instruction, might have done them some good.
And it's surprising that, try as I may, I can find no mainstream media report of Keiser's speech. Remember that he is possibly the most-watched TV journalist in the world, talking on a subject of the utmost importance in the very heart of London. This, perhaps deliberate neglect plays into the growing public cynicism about our political elite and the Fourth Estate.
Regular Keiser-watchers will have heard much of his material before, many times, though it may be news to some that the reason he's shifted his base of operations to London is that he wants a ringside seat to cover what he sees as the coming, full-blown disaster of historic proportions, and expects our poor country to be the epicentre.
He also says that Germany will use its gold hoard and massive Eurobond issuance to establish its advantage over the City; Frankfurt will become the centre of banking and trading in Europe, he feels. Britain, having allowed its financial sector to swell to over 10% of national GDP, has set itself up for a terrible fall.
According to Keiser, only raising interest rates sharply - as Paul Volcker did in the USA (20% by 1981) - can cleanse the speculation and malpractice from the system; and he doesn't see us doing that.
Also interesting in this film, is the naivety of questions, underlining Keiser's (and George Osborne's) observations about the financial illiteracy of the British public.
Like Nigel Farage (another ex-financial trader), Keiser is loud, brash and fast-talking (he starts more sentences than he finishes); and both are also, in my assessment, completely sincere in their concern and indignation.
The film lasts slightly more than an hour, but you can simply listen to it while doing something else, as I did. I think you'll find it worth your while.
Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy. The blog author may have, or intend to change, a personal position in any stock or other kind of investment mentioned.
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