Sir;
Sir Peregrine Worsthorne (Letters, 16 January) may have been right to support Mrs Thatcher for confronting the unions, but I believe he is wholly mistaken when he says she tackled inflation. Thanks to the opening up of global markets, consumer prices have been lowered by cheap foreign labour, indirectly by the importation of goods, and directly by the deliberately uncontrolled immigration of low-paid workers. However, behind the scenes there has been massive long-term monetary inflation, the woeful consequences of which we are now merely beginning to suffer. Economics may seem rather dry, but its implications are correspondingly fiery and so I hope your magazine will allow room for explanation.
Comparing GDP with (M4) bank lending figures from the Bank of England’s website, which gives data from 1963 on, we see that annual increases in lending almost always outstrip increases in GDP, but sometimes far more so than others. The worst was in 1972, when M4 increased by 35% (GDP grew by only 12%); the fear of monetary inflation and its potential effect on exchange rates may have been a major factor in OPEC’s decision to hike oil prices in 1973, which triggered years of high price inflation in the UK and the humiliating IMF rescue in 1976. Lending increases dropped below GDP between 1974 and 1977, then resumed ascendancy, though not in time to rescue James Callaghan’s premiership.
But inflation did wonders for Mrs Thatcher. The average annual excess of M4 growth over GDP in 1964-79 was 2%; from 1979-1990, the “Thatcher years”, it averaged 8% (and about 4% p.a. thereafter). The results have included overspending on luxuries; the loss of jobs and industrial skills; the export of machinery and tools; and a huge exaggeration of property and stock valuations. Worse, we now have a large class of economic dependants, both home-grown and recently imported, whose support costs cannot be externalised as easily as our manufacturing capacity.
Sir Peregrine may not divine in Mr Cameron the architect of our rescue, but I fear the situation may now have developed well beyond any man’s power to amend without reform on a scale that may not be entirely possible in a democratic society.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Debt, the financial sector and economic growth
Someone who occasionally reads and comments on my older blog has a formulation of real growth: increase in GDP less increase in debt. I've finally taken the bait and invested time to look at this, for the UK, and it's intriguing.
First, I've taken figures for M4 bank lending, from the Bank of England's website. This gives the quarterly increase as a percentage, re-expressed as an annual equivalent figure. I've used Excel to average the four quarters for each calendar year. Since the information is only available from partway through 1963, I use the estimated annual percentage increase from 1964 onwards.
For GDP, I use the Measuring Worth site and the "UK nominal GDP" figures (i.e. x million pounds, not adjusted for inflation), and again give the percentage increase year-on-year (the last available year here is 2008).
Here's the resulting graph for increases in M4 and GDP (click on graph to enlarge):
What is obvious is that apart from a short time in the early 1990s, lending has risen far more than GDP for the last 30 years. That extra money went somewhere, and it seems that all it did was inflate asset prices, in the stockmarket and in housing, at the same time that global trade has kept down wages and consumer prices.
Between 1964 and 1981, GDP increased by an average 12.69% and M4 by 15.16% - a difference of 2.48% per year. But from 1982 to 2008, GDP increased annually on average by 6.63% and M4 by 12.32% - a difference of 5.69% p.a. Compounded up over the past quarter century, that extra difference may explain how financiers have become so large and powerful. In the USA, according to Robert Creamer , the financial sector accounted for 8% of national GDP over the last 10 years, but made 41% of the profits.
I can't say when it will end, but equally I can't see this going on forever. This is why I am inclined to listen to the Jeremiahs who warn us of further economic setbacks, despite strong recent rises in the stockmarkets.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
First, I've taken figures for M4 bank lending, from the Bank of England's website. This gives the quarterly increase as a percentage, re-expressed as an annual equivalent figure. I've used Excel to average the four quarters for each calendar year. Since the information is only available from partway through 1963, I use the estimated annual percentage increase from 1964 onwards.
For GDP, I use the Measuring Worth site and the "UK nominal GDP" figures (i.e. x million pounds, not adjusted for inflation), and again give the percentage increase year-on-year (the last available year here is 2008).
Here's the resulting graph for increases in M4 and GDP (click on graph to enlarge):
What is obvious is that apart from a short time in the early 1990s, lending has risen far more than GDP for the last 30 years. That extra money went somewhere, and it seems that all it did was inflate asset prices, in the stockmarket and in housing, at the same time that global trade has kept down wages and consumer prices.
Between 1964 and 1981, GDP increased by an average 12.69% and M4 by 15.16% - a difference of 2.48% per year. But from 1982 to 2008, GDP increased annually on average by 6.63% and M4 by 12.32% - a difference of 5.69% p.a. Compounded up over the past quarter century, that extra difference may explain how financiers have become so large and powerful. In the USA, according to Robert Creamer , the financial sector accounted for 8% of national GDP over the last 10 years, but made 41% of the profits.
I can't say when it will end, but equally I can't see this going on forever. This is why I am inclined to listen to the Jeremiahs who warn us of further economic setbacks, despite strong recent rises in the stockmarkets.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Interactive long-term house price graphs
Via Australian economist Steve Keen, here is a tool from The Economist magazine to help you see how house prices have changed over time. This may help you guess whether current prices are too high, too low or Goldilocks!
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Preparing for the worst is not for loners
Charles Hugh Smith offers some sensible general principles for making it through what he sees as likely very difficult, disrupted times ahead. Key recommendations include broadening your skills, and developing social networks. I think he's right - Robinson Crusoe is not the model for how to survive in our populous countries.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
More warning signs
Update: see "Jesse" on speculation about recent curious purchases of US Treasury bonds.
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"Mish" looks at two countries experiencing trouble - Argentina and Venezuela - and point out that European banks are exposed to risk in that area.
"George Washington" thinks the recent rise in the stockmarket has been because of activity by "hedgies, pension funds, banks and other institutional investors", including possibly even clandestine intervention by the government itself (I've seen this allegation before). However, in the US 80% of stocks are owned by individuals, not these corporate entities, so the suspicion is that the rally has been engineered to encourage the private investor to return to the market.
It doesn't seem to be working - much of the money withdrawn from stocks has gone into bonds (I think the unfortunate private investor may lose again if - as I fear - interest rates rise and bond values plummet).
I also suspect that if the individual re-entered the market because of what appears to be leveraged (boosted with borrowed money) speculation by the institutions, the latter would then cash-in and leave the individual holding the baby. This pattern is known as a "sucker rally".
But if the private investor is not "suckered" back into the market, then institutions will race to get out again (suckering each other, faute de mieux) and we could see a sharp fall in stocks. This, I assume would confirm the private investor's worst suspicions and lead him/her to pull even more out of the market.
Some, including myself, have suggested that the real bottom (at some point, goodness knows when) in the stockmarket may be somewhere around 4,000 on the Dow and 2,000 on the FTSE (adjusted for inflation, if that takes off). It may never happen, but Google "Dow 4000" and see some quite respectable commentators bandying around that idea.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
__________________________________________
"Mish" looks at two countries experiencing trouble - Argentina and Venezuela - and point out that European banks are exposed to risk in that area.
"George Washington" thinks the recent rise in the stockmarket has been because of activity by "hedgies, pension funds, banks and other institutional investors", including possibly even clandestine intervention by the government itself (I've seen this allegation before). However, in the US 80% of stocks are owned by individuals, not these corporate entities, so the suspicion is that the rally has been engineered to encourage the private investor to return to the market.
It doesn't seem to be working - much of the money withdrawn from stocks has gone into bonds (I think the unfortunate private investor may lose again if - as I fear - interest rates rise and bond values plummet).
I also suspect that if the individual re-entered the market because of what appears to be leveraged (boosted with borrowed money) speculation by the institutions, the latter would then cash-in and leave the individual holding the baby. This pattern is known as a "sucker rally".
But if the private investor is not "suckered" back into the market, then institutions will race to get out again (suckering each other, faute de mieux) and we could see a sharp fall in stocks. This, I assume would confirm the private investor's worst suspicions and lead him/her to pull even more out of the market.
Some, including myself, have suggested that the real bottom (at some point, goodness knows when) in the stockmarket may be somewhere around 4,000 on the Dow and 2,000 on the FTSE (adjusted for inflation, if that takes off). It may never happen, but Google "Dow 4000" and see some quite respectable commentators bandying around that idea.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Measure your pessimism
Hat-tip to Credit Writedowns. I'm relieved to see that I'm still at the Teddy/Cub stage!
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Human Nature?
Today, I started my 27th year of teaching at a State-supported US university. Compared with 1984, we have the same number of students, fewer full-time teaching faculty, and twice as many administrators. In the past 8 years alone, the non-academic budget has grown from 44% to 60% of the budget.
This week, we start discussions on increasing teaching loads (which will, of course, require more administrators to 'organize' things).
I see this trend in business, government, medicine and the military. Is it just the human condition that the non-productive take over everything?
I recall that, when the Mongols took over a city, they killed the bureaucrats, and took the scholars home with them. The Allies did much the same in Germany in 1945.
Perhaps they had the right idea?
This week, we start discussions on increasing teaching loads (which will, of course, require more administrators to 'organize' things).
I see this trend in business, government, medicine and the military. Is it just the human condition that the non-productive take over everything?
I recall that, when the Mongols took over a city, they killed the bureaucrats, and took the scholars home with them. The Allies did much the same in Germany in 1945.
Perhaps they had the right idea?
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