"Gold ads bug us from the TV and radio. To the new gold experts this means gold sentiment is now too bullish. We’re due for a crash.
Have they noticed that the gold ads are about selling not buying gold?"
In a long but well-worth-reading article, Eric Janszen of iTulip maintains that despite eight years of rising prices, gold is not undervalued, because the economic system is unstable. He points out that, for the first time in many years, central banks have started to buy gold.
Unlike many commentators, he doesn't support the notion that the dollar will collapse, because other major economies (e.g. China and Japan) have become dependent on the USA to buy their exports. Global inter-linking means that the coming bust will not take the same form as previous ones.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Sunday, December 13, 2009
Inflation and then a bust, by 2012, says Andy Xie
Andy Xie, a respected former Morgan Stanley economic analyst says that low interest rates (cheap money) will lead to increasing asset prices until the game simply cannot continue, whereupon there will be a massive, world-wide breakdown, which he expects in 2012.
But Xie's ex-employer thinks the credit crisis may hit Britain as early as next year (hat-tip to "Jesse").
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
But Xie's ex-employer thinks the credit crisis may hit Britain as early as next year (hat-tip to "Jesse").
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Could Britain go bust?
Britain's debtor weaknesses
Update: PIMCO has announced that it will be a net seller of UK bonds this year. The European portfolio manager is Andrew Balls, brother of UK government minister Ed Balls, so one wonders what the siblings may have to tell each other.
This week's Spectator includes an article by Irwin Stelzer, a noted economic commentator, entitled "Who would lend to a bankrupt Britain?"
Stelzer's comments follow recent developments in the market for "credit default swaps" (CDS) - insurance contracts that pay out if a business or government defaults on its debt. The premium (price) of the insurance reflects the degree of concern, and in the case of the UK, that concern has deepened.
CMA DataVision supplies information on the CDS market. Its third-quarter report on sovereign (national) debt assesses each country for the chances of a default within the next five years (CPD, or "Cumulative Probability of Default"), the cost of default insurance and what that means about creditworthiness. In this report (see page 14), the UK is rated as having a 4% CPD, with an implied credit rating at "aa+".
The top "aaa" credit rating is enjoyed by the USA, Australia and a small handful of European countries including ourselves, but things have moved on and it looks as though we are heading for a downgrading. The CMA report linked above covered the market for CDS contracts between July and September. On 7 December, the average CDS risk premium for the UK reportedly increased to 0.74% p.a. (85% higher than in the third quarter), which compares very unfavourably with the USA's premium at 0.32% p.a. This insurance repricing suggests that the UK's risk of default within 5 years may have risen to around 5.5%.
Are we going broke? Not yet, but our economy is not as strong as it used to be, and this is reflected in the price of gilts (government bonds, or Treasury securities). Gilts offer a fixed income for a fixed period, but can be bought and sold many times before their maturity date. Factors influencing their price include interest rates available elsewhere and the chance of default.
If gilts become cheaper, their fixed income is higher in comparison. The relationship of income to the traded price is called the "yield" - effectively, an interest rate. Immediately after British Chancellor Alistair Darling delivered his Pre-Budget Report to Parliament on 9 December, 10-year gilt prices fell and their yield rose from 3.81% to 3.85%.
The bond markets are, so to speak, the judges on Strictly Come Borrowing, and they are not impressed by the proposals they have seen. This, not bankruptcy, is the implication of CDS premiums, gilt yields and national credit ratings: we can expect to pay more for access to extra funds.
Since we are already so indebted, personally and nationally, an increase in interest rates will add to our burdens, at the same time that (in a recession) profits and tax revenues are decreasing; so Britain could have to borrow even more just to keep going. Spiralling debt and the growing reluctance of lenders could eventually force us to call in the International Monetary Fund as a lender of last resort, which we last did in 1976. That was bitter medicine, but still better than what would happen if we defaulted altogether and credit markets shunned us completely (or imposed loan-shark rates and terms).
However, we are very far from the worst case globally. The same third-quarter report by CMA DataVision named three countries that had a five-year default risk of over 50%: the Ukraine, Venezuela and Argentina. The annual CDS risk premiums for the first two were 12% and 11.25% respectively; both have since increased to over 13% per annum. Closer to home, Ireland's risk premium is 1.55%, Greece's 2%, , Lithuania's 3.2% and Iceland's 4.4%.
Although the USA is still regarded as a safe borrower, individual States are not: California's annual CDS premium is about 2.5%, reflecting an estimated 20% risk of default within 5 years.
British banks themselves now have a significant CDS premium, ranging from about 0.9% p.a. for Barclays to 1.4% p.a. for the Royal Bank of Scotland - the latter implies about a 10% risk of defaulting within 5 years.
So, no panic yet, but grounds for considerable concern.
Derivatives: a bigger worry?
A second worry is the state of credit default swaps themselves, and other "derivatives". The total amounts insured in this hard-to-understand market are vast, much bigger than any country's GDP. The USA's GDP is something like $14 trillion, but the CDS market is worth about $36 trillion - down from $62 trillion in 2008.
The derivatives market as a whole is much larger - an estimated $1,400 trillion in April 2009, many times the entire world's annual GDP. It's a mammoth global insurance/betting game, and if a major player comes unstuck it could destabilise finance, just as the collapse of Lehman Brothers and others threatened to do not long ago.
We think of insurance as reducing risk, but actually it's about transferring risk. Promises can turn out to be very expensive: the world's oldest mutual insurer, Equitable Life, suffered a major crisis because of a guarantee it made regarding minimum annuity rates for some of its pension investors; Barings, the oldest merchant bank in London, was destroyed by derivatives traded by its employee Nick Leeson.
The derivatives market is huge, interconnected and inadequately regulated. It is the fourth threat identified by Michael Panzner in his prescient book, "Financial Armageddon," which I reviewed in May 2007. Let us hope that this one can be neutralized in time.
______________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Update: PIMCO has announced that it will be a net seller of UK bonds this year. The European portfolio manager is Andrew Balls, brother of UK government minister Ed Balls, so one wonders what the siblings may have to tell each other.
This week's Spectator includes an article by Irwin Stelzer, a noted economic commentator, entitled "Who would lend to a bankrupt Britain?"
Stelzer's comments follow recent developments in the market for "credit default swaps" (CDS) - insurance contracts that pay out if a business or government defaults on its debt. The premium (price) of the insurance reflects the degree of concern, and in the case of the UK, that concern has deepened.
CMA DataVision supplies information on the CDS market. Its third-quarter report on sovereign (national) debt assesses each country for the chances of a default within the next five years (CPD, or "Cumulative Probability of Default"), the cost of default insurance and what that means about creditworthiness. In this report (see page 14), the UK is rated as having a 4% CPD, with an implied credit rating at "aa+".
The top "aaa" credit rating is enjoyed by the USA, Australia and a small handful of European countries including ourselves, but things have moved on and it looks as though we are heading for a downgrading. The CMA report linked above covered the market for CDS contracts between July and September. On 7 December, the average CDS risk premium for the UK reportedly increased to 0.74% p.a. (85% higher than in the third quarter), which compares very unfavourably with the USA's premium at 0.32% p.a. This insurance repricing suggests that the UK's risk of default within 5 years may have risen to around 5.5%.
Are we going broke? Not yet, but our economy is not as strong as it used to be, and this is reflected in the price of gilts (government bonds, or Treasury securities). Gilts offer a fixed income for a fixed period, but can be bought and sold many times before their maturity date. Factors influencing their price include interest rates available elsewhere and the chance of default.
If gilts become cheaper, their fixed income is higher in comparison. The relationship of income to the traded price is called the "yield" - effectively, an interest rate. Immediately after British Chancellor Alistair Darling delivered his Pre-Budget Report to Parliament on 9 December, 10-year gilt prices fell and their yield rose from 3.81% to 3.85%.
The bond markets are, so to speak, the judges on Strictly Come Borrowing, and they are not impressed by the proposals they have seen. This, not bankruptcy, is the implication of CDS premiums, gilt yields and national credit ratings: we can expect to pay more for access to extra funds.
Since we are already so indebted, personally and nationally, an increase in interest rates will add to our burdens, at the same time that (in a recession) profits and tax revenues are decreasing; so Britain could have to borrow even more just to keep going. Spiralling debt and the growing reluctance of lenders could eventually force us to call in the International Monetary Fund as a lender of last resort, which we last did in 1976. That was bitter medicine, but still better than what would happen if we defaulted altogether and credit markets shunned us completely (or imposed loan-shark rates and terms).
However, we are very far from the worst case globally. The same third-quarter report by CMA DataVision named three countries that had a five-year default risk of over 50%: the Ukraine, Venezuela and Argentina. The annual CDS risk premiums for the first two were 12% and 11.25% respectively; both have since increased to over 13% per annum. Closer to home, Ireland's risk premium is 1.55%, Greece's 2%, , Lithuania's 3.2% and Iceland's 4.4%.
Although the USA is still regarded as a safe borrower, individual States are not: California's annual CDS premium is about 2.5%, reflecting an estimated 20% risk of default within 5 years.
British banks themselves now have a significant CDS premium, ranging from about 0.9% p.a. for Barclays to 1.4% p.a. for the Royal Bank of Scotland - the latter implies about a 10% risk of defaulting within 5 years.
So, no panic yet, but grounds for considerable concern.
Derivatives: a bigger worry?
A second worry is the state of credit default swaps themselves, and other "derivatives". The total amounts insured in this hard-to-understand market are vast, much bigger than any country's GDP. The USA's GDP is something like $14 trillion, but the CDS market is worth about $36 trillion - down from $62 trillion in 2008.
The derivatives market as a whole is much larger - an estimated $1,400 trillion in April 2009, many times the entire world's annual GDP. It's a mammoth global insurance/betting game, and if a major player comes unstuck it could destabilise finance, just as the collapse of Lehman Brothers and others threatened to do not long ago.
We think of insurance as reducing risk, but actually it's about transferring risk. Promises can turn out to be very expensive: the world's oldest mutual insurer, Equitable Life, suffered a major crisis because of a guarantee it made regarding minimum annuity rates for some of its pension investors; Barings, the oldest merchant bank in London, was destroyed by derivatives traded by its employee Nick Leeson.
The derivatives market is huge, interconnected and inadequately regulated. It is the fourth threat identified by Michael Panzner in his prescient book, "Financial Armageddon," which I reviewed in May 2007. Let us hope that this one can be neutralized in time.
______________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Friday, December 11, 2009
The end of the dollar? But where else can we go?
The market is inherently unpredictable: if you think an accident is bound to happen, that still doesn't tell you when it will happen. However, this article by Paco Ahlgren takes the long view and maintains that the dollar must one day become worthless.
In the short term, who knows? In times of panic, many investors could run back to holding the dollar and temporarily boost its value.
Other countries are also weakening their currencies. Even the Euro suffers from flaws in the economies of some of its member countries, so although it may seem strong now against the pound and dollar, it too may be overvalued.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
In the short term, who knows? In times of panic, many investors could run back to holding the dollar and temporarily boost its value.
Other countries are also weakening their currencies. Even the Euro suffers from flaws in the economies of some of its member countries, so although it may seem strong now against the pound and dollar, it too may be overvalued.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Education or Indoctrination?
Sackerson directed me to the following article: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/12/school-is-propaganda.html
In response, I argue that we have public schools because (based on the data):
a) they are cheaper than private schools;
b) they out-perform private schools, on average;
c) it is better to educate than imprison;
d) education is the only modern means for social mobility.
In response, I argue that we have public schools because (based on the data):
a) they are cheaper than private schools;
b) they out-perform private schools, on average;
c) it is better to educate than imprison;
d) education is the only modern means for social mobility.
Wednesday, December 09, 2009
Bringing down the Temple of Dagon
I listend to Radio 4's Any Questions? last Saturday and a question about bankers' bonuses reared its lovely head. And then the pundits fell down, one after another.
I can't answer the conundrum about the sound of one hand clapping, but I sure heard the sound of punches being pulled. Perhaps some of the speakers have banker friends; perhaps some are hoping not to alienate the Masters of the Universe in the weary stagger up to a General Election. But here's what I'd like to have said, and it proceeds from a simple question:
Did the bankers know the likely consequences of their actions?
If they didn't, they are incompetent and instead of dithering about the threat of the RBS' board to resign, the government should sack them and all like them. Doctors who are that bad at their jobs would be sued and/or worse.
If they did, they should be jailed. In my view, Max Keiser is not exaggerating when he calls them terrorists. They have wrought destruction on our economies and though the human cost may be hard to assess accurately, it is and will continue to be terrible.
So, why isn't it happening? A number of reasons occur to me:
1. It is convenient for politicians to have a few people earn (sorry, be given, legally steal) vast sums of money. The lucky recipients of this largesse can be taxed at 40% (or even 50% as under today's draft Budget proposals) and still have more than they can possibly eat, drink, wear or stick up their noses. "Tax doesn't have to be taxing", as that wretched radio advert chirrups.
2. Clapped-out politicians may one day be looking for a well-overpaid sinecure, like T--- B----. Best not to be too hard on your potential future employer.
3. Embarrassingly, the roots of the credit crunch are not (not merely) in socialist profligacy, but date back to the early 1980s. It was a so-called Conservative government, supposedly a convert to monetarism, that opened the floodgates of credit and tsunamied the economic "boom". Not a genuine boom, and now a very real bust. Criticising the present hapless bunch too sharply would beg a loud, sustained argument of "tu quoque" ("thou also didst so").
4. Just as an addict is partly responsible for the sins of the dealer, the consumer is implicated in the phoney house price rises and the spending spree. But I say that the Devil has the lowest place in Hell, because his knowledge was greater.
5. Nevertheless, if push came to shove, the bankers could point out that effectively, they were acting as the agents of a government determined to win re-election.
Very well, then. Let us have our punishment - we shall, anyway, and the next generation after us. But they must have theirs - the bankers, the politicians and the Fourth Estate that got too close and too cosy for too long.
Go for it.
I can't answer the conundrum about the sound of one hand clapping, but I sure heard the sound of punches being pulled. Perhaps some of the speakers have banker friends; perhaps some are hoping not to alienate the Masters of the Universe in the weary stagger up to a General Election. But here's what I'd like to have said, and it proceeds from a simple question:
Did the bankers know the likely consequences of their actions?
If they didn't, they are incompetent and instead of dithering about the threat of the RBS' board to resign, the government should sack them and all like them. Doctors who are that bad at their jobs would be sued and/or worse.
If they did, they should be jailed. In my view, Max Keiser is not exaggerating when he calls them terrorists. They have wrought destruction on our economies and though the human cost may be hard to assess accurately, it is and will continue to be terrible.
So, why isn't it happening? A number of reasons occur to me:
1. It is convenient for politicians to have a few people earn (sorry, be given, legally steal) vast sums of money. The lucky recipients of this largesse can be taxed at 40% (or even 50% as under today's draft Budget proposals) and still have more than they can possibly eat, drink, wear or stick up their noses. "Tax doesn't have to be taxing", as that wretched radio advert chirrups.
2. Clapped-out politicians may one day be looking for a well-overpaid sinecure, like T--- B----. Best not to be too hard on your potential future employer.
3. Embarrassingly, the roots of the credit crunch are not (not merely) in socialist profligacy, but date back to the early 1980s. It was a so-called Conservative government, supposedly a convert to monetarism, that opened the floodgates of credit and tsunamied the economic "boom". Not a genuine boom, and now a very real bust. Criticising the present hapless bunch too sharply would beg a loud, sustained argument of "tu quoque" ("thou also didst so").
4. Just as an addict is partly responsible for the sins of the dealer, the consumer is implicated in the phoney house price rises and the spending spree. But I say that the Devil has the lowest place in Hell, because his knowledge was greater.
5. Nevertheless, if push came to shove, the bankers could point out that effectively, they were acting as the agents of a government determined to win re-election.
Very well, then. Let us have our punishment - we shall, anyway, and the next generation after us. But they must have theirs - the bankers, the politicians and the Fourth Estate that got too close and too cosy for too long.
Go for it.
Debt: UK economy worse off than USA's
This article from Credit Writedowns looks at the development of debt over a long time, in both the US and UK economies.
Two things stand out (see charts 1a and 1b):
1. US debt (as a proportion of national income) is a worse problem now than in the Great Depression of the 1930s.
2. The UK's debt burden is signficantly worse than America's.
Consumer indebtedness exploded in the early 1980s - see the the first chart on this site. Up to then, it had pretty much kept pace with the growth of the economy generally. This is a major part of how our economic problems have developed - a deliberate loosening of credit to restimulate the stagnant economy of c. 1982. The banks grew fat on the loan-financed consumer boom, and on the inflation of property prices.
Now, our governments are looking for a way out. Mass unemployment and bankruptcies will turn the voters against them, so they have tried to keep the banking system going with loans that future generations must pay off. Insiders will tell you that they don't really know what they are doing, but they are in a panic to do something.
Technically, we are experiencing deflation - the total amount of money plus credit in the economy is shrinking, as lenders and spenders have become more cautious. But just as with Dubai recently, foreign investors are losing confidence in our ability to repay debt, and the dollar and pound have become worth less on the currency exchanges.
In the UK, as in the US, we spend a lot on things that come from outside our economy, and some of them are hard to cut out - energy, for example. So while house and car prices may be coming down, other costs are still rising, in pound terms. And as economic problems continue, it is possible that the pound may have further to fall.
So a combination of a slowed-down economy with price inflation - "stagflation" - is a potential threat to the UK.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
Two things stand out (see charts 1a and 1b):
1. US debt (as a proportion of national income) is a worse problem now than in the Great Depression of the 1930s.
2. The UK's debt burden is signficantly worse than America's.
Consumer indebtedness exploded in the early 1980s - see the the first chart on this site. Up to then, it had pretty much kept pace with the growth of the economy generally. This is a major part of how our economic problems have developed - a deliberate loosening of credit to restimulate the stagnant economy of c. 1982. The banks grew fat on the loan-financed consumer boom, and on the inflation of property prices.
Now, our governments are looking for a way out. Mass unemployment and bankruptcies will turn the voters against them, so they have tried to keep the banking system going with loans that future generations must pay off. Insiders will tell you that they don't really know what they are doing, but they are in a panic to do something.
Technically, we are experiencing deflation - the total amount of money plus credit in the economy is shrinking, as lenders and spenders have become more cautious. But just as with Dubai recently, foreign investors are losing confidence in our ability to repay debt, and the dollar and pound have become worth less on the currency exchanges.
In the UK, as in the US, we spend a lot on things that come from outside our economy, and some of them are hard to cut out - energy, for example. So while house and car prices may be coming down, other costs are still rising, in pound terms. And as economic problems continue, it is possible that the pound may have further to fall.
So a combination of a slowed-down economy with price inflation - "stagflation" - is a potential threat to the UK.
DISCLAIMER: Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog.
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