It's an ill wind...

A funny piece by Tim Hanson in The Motley Fool for June 26. He makes the point that travelling to a place may not change the facts, but can change your perspective, and he is bullish on some sectors of China stocks.

As you might expect, given that the outgoing tide of wealth from the West is rising in the East and floating Chinese boats. They will bob up and down, and some may tip over, but that seems to be the trend.

Richard Duncan's worry is that the ever-inflating dollar is causing the markets to operate inefficiently, so that China's rise may be preceded by a crisis that creates a long and deep global slump. I really must post a summary of his book soon.

Michael Panzner: risky lending and expert complacency

Michael Panzner usefully quotes and comments on an article in the Wall Street Journal (the WSJ online edition charges a fee). The piece is by Steven Rattner, a private equity investment manager, and its theme is risky lending. Here are a couple of snippets:

In 2006, a record 20.9% of new high-yield lending was to particularly credit-challenged borrowers, those with at least one rating starting with a "C." So far this year, that figure is at 33%... money is available today in quantities, at prices and on terms never before seen in the 100-plus years since U.S. financial markets reached full flower...

...The surge in junk loans has also been fueled by a worldwide glut of liquidity that has descended more forcefully on lending than on equity investing. Curiously, investors seem quite content these days to receive de minimis compensation for financing edgy companies, while simultaneously fearing equity markets. The price-to-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 index is currently hovering right around its 20-year average of 16.4, leagues below the 29.3 times it reached at the height of the last great equity bubble in 2000.

Some portion of this phenomenon seems to reflect tastes in Asia and elsewhere, where much of the excess liquidity resides: Foreign investors own only about 13% of U.S. equities but 43% of Treasury debt.

I think this tends to support what I suggested yesterday. The tide of money has not risen evenly on all shores - in real terms, equities have failed to keep up. Some bearishness is now already built into the price of shares.

But not, perhaps, sufficient bearishness, so the market is not an accurate measure of the health of the economy. Much investment wealth is in the hands of the over-50s, the golden generation who had good pensions and in many cases got early retirement. They also rode the inflation train on their houses and have paid off their mortgages. At least in my country, many of that generation don't bother to keep a close eye on their investments, because they don't depend on them much. For them, ignorance is bliss.

For institutional investors, ignorance is well-paid. That's putting it a little harshly, but Panzner's piece, and his most recent post, comment on the complacency of analysts and investment managers, suggesting that it may be self-serving (when do they tell you to cash-in?). Besides, many are relatively young, so their optimism is supported by a lack of direct experience of truly dark days, and by the general health and strength of youth. When the market drops, they will look for what they think are support levels and buy-in for the long term. Bad markets often see a transfer of investments from private to institutional investors, I believe; it's a kind of vampirism. The average private investor sells too late, and buys too late.

But institutional support may explain why a major equity descent takes years: it's the jerky learning curve of the naturally upbeat investment manager.

And in any case, the equity market is more often the vic than the perp, to put it in police jargon. The Wall Street Crash was, I understand, the consequence of a banking crisis, itself created by years of monetary inflation, according to Richard Duncan.

So now it's the banks and the money supply we have to watch. And that's why we need to listen to the analysts of the money system, before the investment analysts.

The banks cause market bubbles, too

I plan to review Richard Duncan's book "The Dollar Crisis" soon - it's not just time constraints that are the problem, but trying to condense his arguments.

Essentially, Duncan sees the unlimited creation of credit as the mischief-maker in economics. Since the dollar is not restricted by valuation against gold, the government can print as much money as it wants.

But even when there was a gold standard, credit could still be multiplied, because banks lend out many times more cash than they've been given to look after. Banks only retain whatever fraction they (and the regulators) feel is essential to deal with likely withdrawals by depositors.

Then when bad times come, they multiply the problems by cutting back on credit - remember the old saying, "Banks lend you an umbrella when the sun shines and want it back when it starts raining"? I recall hearing (in the recession of the early 90s) of a businessman with a big turnover and a £3.25 million overdraft facility, who received a payment from a customer for £3 million. Acting on head office orders, the bank manager promptly reduced the overdraft to £250,000 and hurriedly left for the day, while the now-ruined businessman grabbed a shotgun and went looking for him at his office.

Have a look at this article by Wladimir Kraus in the archive of the Luwig von Mises Institute, criticising "fractional reserve banking".

Globalisation and economic depression - some strategies

China has its problems. Monsters and Critics, quoting UPI, says that 3.5 million jobs could go if the yuan appreciates much more against the dollar. But if it doesn't, the trade imbalance continues and the economy and stockmarket carry on overheating. So China too is between a rock and a hard place.

In the long run and given free global trade, surely low-wage economies will take work from the higher-wage ones, until we reach equilibrium. It's the rate of change that makes it messy. For people like the Chinese, they have to work out how to take over our manufacturing capacity without bankrupting their biggest customers; for the West, how to lose all this work and wealth and remain democracies.

Richard Duncan thinks it can't be done without some original form of intervention - he suggests a steadily rising minimum wage, to give the worker in the developing economies enough money to take over the job of buying things, a job that we in the West thought was ours for life.

But the implication for us seems clear - we must become poorer. The winners among us will be those who are able to extract capital out of their possessions and preserve it. Marc Faber says that there are bubbles everywhere - property, shares, commodities - but I guess that in a deflationary world there must be something that will increase in value relative to most other things.

Cash seems obvious - the deflation of the Thirties was such that in the UK we had the Geddes Axe, actually cutting the wages of public servants to maintain a steady relationship between money and things (UPDATE: I got Geddes wrong - see HERE - sorry). So public servants who had accumulated savings would have done well - if they had saved. For many others, it was unemployment and poverty. To get an idea of the process and consequences, read "Twopence to cross the Mersey" by Helen Forrester, a real-life story about the economic descent of her middle-class family, which had (typically) lived on credit before the Crash.

Some fear that our governments will shudder at the thought of repeating that period and will try to buy their way out of the jam by printing money, in which case we could go from deflation to hyperinflation, and this is where the gold-bugs raise their voices.

On this analysis, I should think the strategy is clear. First, get out of/avoid debt. Then, live simply, and if possible convert unnecessary assets to cash - which you may partly invest in whatever you think will hold its value. And look for the steadiest job you can find?

Interview: "The Dollar Crisis" by Richard Duncan

While I am finishing Richard Duncan's book, please see here for an interview in which the author explains his analysis and proposed solutions. This man is no Chicken Little - he's worked for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The problems he describes are very real and very important.

As I understand it, America is like a gourmet and the Far East is his favourite cafe. With the party of friends he brings, he is by far its most important customer - but he pays for the meals in IOUs. He's been such good business that the cafe has borrowed from the bank to build an extension and hire extra staff.

But some start to worry that America won't be able to settle the now-enormous bill. What to do? If he pays up, he runs out of money and stops visiting the restaurant. America will go on a diet of bread and water and the cafe will go bust. On the other hand, if the restaurant accepts that his IOUs are worthless, it's bust anyway.

One solution is to look for new customers before the crisis hits, so the cafe can keep going. And another is to outlaw IOUs - if you haven't got the cash, you don't get the meal.

So Mr Duncan proposes:

(a) a global minimum wage, so poorer people around the world can have the money to buy the goods and services the Far East is geared up to provide.

(b) a global bank, to oversee financial balances between countries and prevent these credit problems recurring.

Meanwhile, America must face a much lower standard of living for a long time, until he's out of the hole he dug for himself. And maybe he'll be allowed a discount on his debt (i.e. inflation). The cafe is going to suffer a loss; the question is whether the business can find a way to survive it.